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This thesis investigates the ways in which hereditary degeneration was discussed by 
Scottish psychiatrists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with 
particular reference to the anti-alcohol debate. I examine the theoretical writings of 
both clinical and forensic psychiatry to show how the theory of degeneration 
functioned as part of a new understanding of legal medicine and that psychiatric 
knowledge was always implicitly related to a broader conception of criminal capacity 
and the role of the modern state. While the argument is situated in the wider literature 
covering psychiatry and degeneration in Europe and America during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, I trace a rather singular story rooted in the 
institutional peculiarities of Scotland, showing how psychiatrists attempted to use the 
problem of alcoholic degeneration to mould their science into a branch of public 
health, propelling them into their preferred role as guardians of the race.  
 
This public health campaign facilitated the creation of new categories of 
psychiatric knowledge consisting of mental abnormalities that did not amount to 
absolute insanity, but that none the less had a bearing on how people thought about 
the mind, conduct, and criminal capacity. All the leading figures of Scottish 
psychiatry had a significant interest in alcohol as a cause of degeneration, and in their 
descriptions of the condition, the legal applications of the doctrine were never from 
view. One reason for this was undoubtedly the autonomous nature of the Scottish 
legal system which, when combined with the relatively small professional population 
of Scotland, greatly increased the rate of intellectual exchange between psychiatrists 
and lawyers while intensifying the political implications of associating with certain 
doctrines. Thus, a large part of my thesis will also be devoted to the legal 
interpretation of psychiatric claims, and in later part of the thesis I examine in depth 
the extent to which psychiatric knowledge claims were able to modify the laws of 
Scotland. Three substantive themes protrude from the documents consulted: Heredity, 
degeneration and alcohol, and medico-legal interaction. In analysing these themes, I 
engage with specific aspects of the social and institutional life of Scottish psychiatrists 
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In 1866 the members of the British Asylum Officers’ Association made a statement of 
scientific intent by changing the title of their professional organisation to the Medico-
Psychological Association [MPA]. At the inaugural meeting of this new organisation 
the president-elect, Scottish asylum-doctor W. A. F. Browne noted to those assembled 
that the change of title reflected both a broadening of the association’s intellectual 
interests and recognition of the increasingly public role psychiatrists would play in 
“anticipating, preventing and modifying mental maladies.” This new public health 
campaign would be conducted under the aegis of “the laws of hérédité, moral and 
intellectual degeneration, and of intermarriage” which were said to “constitute a 
science in themselves; and, perhaps, contain the basis of the future development and 
utility of prophylactic medicine.”1 Browne’s address succinctly captured the sequence 
of sub-discourses which combined to form the theory of degeneration in the second 
half of the nineteenth century, offering a series of guarantees to the public that the 
promotion of psychiatry was intrinsic to the national interest:  
 
1. Prophylaxis and public hygiene – the political guarantee that psychiatrists 
would operate as an essential element in the constitution of nineteenth-century 
states. 
2.  The laws of heredity – the a priori guarantee of the discipline’s truth as a 
medical speciality from which its statements would flow as credible ones. 
                                                 
1 W. A. F. Browne, ‘Address: on medico-psychology’, Journal of Mental Science, xii, 1866, pp.309-
327. The term ‘psychiatry’ [Ger. Psychiatrie] was imported into the English language as early as 1846, 
with reference to ‘psychiatrists’ from the 1890s. Even so, neither term was in popular English usage 
before the 1930s; indeed, it was not until 1971 that the British Medico-Psychological Association 
became known as the College of Psychiatrists. During the nineteenth century, specialists in mental 
disease were more typically known as ‘alienists’ or ‘medical officers of asylums’. While there is an 
acknowledged anachronism in continuing to refer to nineteenth-century mental scientists as 
‘psychiatrists’, I will generally employ this practice throughout. There are two good justifications for 
this: First, both terms are in common use amongst historians of psychiatry and serve as convenient and 
recognisable labels; second, and more significantly, the various groups of actors I cover in this thesis 
did not pursue a rigorous and precisely defined programme of research, hence, in labelling their 
discourse as ‘psychiatric’, I am able to capture the fluidity of professional boundaries that was so 
characteristic of their approach. That is to say, the term ‘psychiatrist’ functions as an ‘analyst’s 
category’ rather than an ‘actor’s category’. When it is necessary to draw more precise distinctions, I 
will specify the institutional roles played by various actors. On the history of the term psychiatry in the 
English language, see J L Crammer, ‘Training and Education in British Psychiatry, 1770 – 1970’, in G. 
E. Berrios and H. Freeman, 150 Years of Psychiatry: The Aftermath, Volume II, London: Athlone 
Press, 1996, p.209 
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3. Moral and intellectual degeneration – the guarantee offered to society that 
psychiatric research would address its concerns over the fate of the race. 
4. Concerns over intermarriage – though closely related to concerns over the 
laws of heredity, this guarantee was in fact offered as a sign of psychiatry’s 
alignment with democratic and progressive movements. 
 
Indeed, from the mid-nineteenth century onward the notoriously aristocratic practices 
of intermarriage and consanguinity were subjected to a growing scrutiny in both 
medical and popular literature. Already by 1860 The Lancet was using the language of 
degeneration to re-situate debates over consanguinity, introducing controversy with a 
piece considering whether the aristocratic practice of consanguineous marriage was to 
blame for the rise in mental alienation and physical deformity.2 Similarly, when The 
Spectator came to review Galton’s Hereditary Genius (1865), it offered ample 
demonstration of just how seriously questions of heritage and transmission were taken 
as indicators of political affiliation, considering Galton’s claims concerning heredity 
in reference to aristocratic, theological, and democratic notions of ancestral descent 
before turning to examine theories of universal equality.3  These controversies were 
not short lived, and James Arthur Thomson, Regius Professor of Natural History at 
the University of Aberdeen and populariser of the term ‘heredity’ in the English 
language, was still working with this issue in his 1908 treatise on the subject when he 
stated that: “The idea that the marriage of near kin is a cause of degeneracy seems to 
be relatively modern, and is probably based in a large measure on the observed 
degeneracy in closely intermarried noble families.”4 
 
                                                 
2 ‘The Degeneration of Race’, The Lancet, Dec. 22, 1860: 619-20: Degeneration was described as a 
condition well known to affect the progeny of consanguineous marriages; however the rise in 
deformity and mental illness contemporary with the article’s publication gave the author reason to 
believe there must have been other causes of these degenerations which not specifically tied to the 
breeding patterns of the bourgeoisie. 
3 W Adam, ‘Consanguinity in Marriage’, Fortnightly Review, 2, 1865, 710 – 31 (Part I); 3, 1865, 74 – 
89 ; ‘Review of Hereditary Genius’, The Spectator, Nov. 27, 1869 
4 J A Thomson, Heredity, London: John Murray, 1908 (p.387). However, Thomson suggested that 
experimental evidence of interbreeding in plants and animals did not demonstrate that heredity 
proximity was, in itself, responsible for the transmission of particular heredity taints since “the same 
consequences would probably result if matings took place among unrelated organisms with the same 
kind of taint.” (p.391) c.f. Mercier’s “Law of Sanguinity”, relating to the degree of similarity and 
dissimilarity between parents (consanguinity and exsanguinity), with consanguineous couples 
producing “either no children or degenerate children.” See Maurice Craig, Psychological Medicine: A 
Manual on Mental Diseases for Practitioners and Students, London: J & A Churchill, 1912 (2nd ed.) 
p.27 
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  Degeneration was, according to this account, the bio-social consequence of the 
artificial constraints placed on the free circulation, an increasingly prominent and 
recurring theme in the late-nineteenth century as growing economic concerns over the 
restricted circulation of goods fused seamlessly with growing medical concerns 
surrounding the restricted circulation of blood.5 One commentator, drawing upon 
Lankesterian images of parasitism, alleged in 1887 that while the ‘Aryan and Proto-
Aryan’ races had ruled throughout the history of civilisation, there was a general 
tendency observable in the historical record for these groups to become “an 
aristocracy, and, therefore, degenerate into a still more sensual, still more self-
indulgent, still lazier condition.” In the rigorous and temperate climate of Britain, he 
continued, “we have two well-marked classes living side by side. We have an 
aristocracy and a democracy”; the former with failing health and low fertility – both 
notorious stigmata of degeneration – causing it such difficulties in self-perpetuation 
that “the British House of Lords, in spite of the artificial efforts to drag in collateral 
branches to the family titles, cannot maintain its numbers without continual 
reinforcement from picked specimens of the most energetic of the democracy.”6  
 
While the tensions of political legitimacy and franchise that played out in the 
national press were formed from the specificity of the British social climate, the 
notion of hereditary degeneracy that entered British psychiatry was unquestionably 
French in its origins, being attributed by both historians and contemporary 
commentators to the Superintendent at Saint-Yon Asylum, Bénédict Augustin Morel 
(1809 – 1873). Indeed it is said that toward the end of the nineteenth century the 
documentation used to record a patient’s symptoms at French psychiatric institutions 
would begin by simply stating ‘Diagnosis: Mental Degeneration and –’.7 The 
remarkable appeal of degeneration, so ubiquitous that it came pre-printed on 
admission forms, seemed for a time invisible in its omnipresence, though already by 
1909 the French psychiatrist and historian René Semelaigne was recalling in the 
British Journal of Mental Science that “Some years ago, degeneration and chronic 
delirium were all the fashion” in France, a situation that was rendered all the more 
                                                 
5 See Foucault, History of Sexuality, Volume I: The Will to Knowledge, Penguin, 1998 (orig. 1976), 
p.24 
6 Williams, M, ‘Science Notes’, Gentleman's Magazine, 263, Dec. 1887, p.616 
7 Schachter et al. Behavioural Aspects of Epilepsy: Principles & Practice, Demos Medical Publishing, 
2002, p.502 
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puzzling by the fact that the term was “not sufficiently precise, and might be applied 
to various forms of insanity.”8  
 
Yet it was precisely this lack of precision in terminology that allowed the 
concept of degeneration to rise to such prominence in both medical and popular 
discourse during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, a time when scientific 
publications, popular broadsheets, and urbane periodicals carried a wealth of 
discussion surrounding the issue. In this way degeneration crossed quickly from an 
explanatory tool in the medico-psychiatric exploration of morbid heredity to a popular 
panic over the fate of the Teutonic race and the closure of an era in European 
civilisation – as the English translator of Zola’s Dr Pascal asked fearfully in his 
preface: “The century is rapidly drawing towards its close, and what manifestations 
are there of the improvement of the race either psychologically or somatically? . . . 
Much of present-day vice and degradation of the human species is due to hereditary 
influence.”9 As late as 1911 The Edinburgh Review was writing of the “mournful 
dirges” of the British degenerationist, noting that to gauge just how deeply such ideas 
had rooted themselves in the national consciousness it was “only necessary to take up 
a copy of the ‘Times’, with tolerable certainty of finding in it some positive statement 
of degeneration bracketed with extensive proposals for arresting it.” The journal 
continued to note that the “craze for finding symptoms of degeneration” was so 
popular that articles discussing it seldom needed to supply any positive facts as to its 
existence, for they could be sure that the “popular fetish” of degeneracy would go 
unchallenged by their readership.10 Indeed, even amongst psychiatrists there was 
occasional awareness that while “mental degeneration [played] a very large part in 
[the] conception of mental pathology”, it was “becoming a more and more indefinite 
expression,”  whose tendency to incorporate an increasing diversity of cases would 
make it soon “impossible to find an ordinary human being who is not degenerate, let 
alone a lunatic.”11 
 
                                                 
8 René Semelaigne, ‘France’, JMS,, 55 (229), 1909, p.366 
9 Zola (Ernest Vizetelly trans.), Dr Pascale, London: 1893; for a review of Zola’s place within the 
understanding of degeneration in France, see Pick, Faces of Degeneration, pp.74-87 (on Dr Pascale see 
esp. 79-83 
10 Anon, ‘Degeneration and Pessimism’, Edinburgh Review, 1911, July, 214:437, pp.138-164 (147) 
11 Review of J. Roubinovitch, ‘Des Variétés de la Folie en France et en Allemagne’, Journal of Mental 
Science, 43 (181), 1897, 341 - 42 
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 While this great degeneracy debate attracted much attention (and many 
sympathisers) amongst Britain’s new cultural elite, British doctors were generally 
more reserved in their assessment of the phenomenon, which, as the Professor of 
Practice of Physic at the University of Glasgow complained in an open letter to The 
Scotsman, was antithetical to the methods of “the more restrained scientists of the 
north.”12 Even scientists of the north who were largely convinced of the vitality of the 
theory of degeneration, such as Thomas Clouston of the Royal Edinburgh Asylum, 
felt obliged to temper their optimism with qualifications: “No doubt most of us who 
have looked through the books of Lombroso and Havelock Ellis and others are 
inclined to admit that it is a little overdone by some of our continental brethren” he 
commented at a discussion of the Medico-Psychological Association in 1895, before 
bearing witness to his own pervasive obsession with the same theme by noting that he 
had, however, “had once occasion to carefully examine the inmates of the Edinburgh 
prison, and if there was one thing that impressed itself upon me it was that I had to do 
with a degenerate aggregation of human beings.”13  
 
This inability to settle the question of degeneration once and for all strikes at 
the heart of its role in nineteenth-century medicine, and at an Association meeting in 
Dublin just a year earlier, in discussion of Semelaigne’s paper on ‘Delusions in 
Persecutory Mania’, Clouston had “referred to the abuse of the term ‘degenerate’” as 
a delusion peculiar to the modern age. On hearing these words the President of the 
Association, Dr Conolly-Norman spoke of “a most interesting work which he had 
lately read, by Dr Max Nordau, a German writer” in which:  
 
all writers, novelists, poets, musicians, and painters were described as ‘degenerate.’ Wagner, Tolstoi, 
and our own countryman, Oscar Wilde, were included in this class, while Zola was described as 
morally and physically degenerate (laughter). The book was very amusing, and [I] admired its literary 




 We can see instantly the complexities the terms ‘degeneration’ and ‘degenerate’ 
generated; mocked as unscientific in their broad applications, they nonetheless met 
                                                 
12 William T Gaiedner, ‘The Criminal Stigmata Theory’, The Scotsman, Sept 4, 1896, p.6  
13 Clouston in D. Nicolson, ‘Presidential Address’, JMS, 1895, 41(175), 567-591 (589) 
14 The Dublin Evening Herald, Jun 14, 1894: Report from the MPA meeting in Dublin in LHB 7/12:5 
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with a mixture of admiration and suspicion. Indeed Continental theories of 
degeneration were experienced first-hand at the 1896 International Congress of 
Criminal Anthropology in Geneva, where the illustrious British psychiatric and 
biological scientists Thomas Clouston, William Bevan-Lewis, David Nicolson, Henry 
Maudsley, Havelock Ellis, and Francis Galton gathered to hear the organisers declare: 
“Both lunatics and criminals belong to the large, pitiable family of the abnormal, the 
sick, the degenerate, the anti-social beings”, before attending papers on “Sexual 
Inversion”, “The Results of Ancestral Alcoholism”, “Unrecognised Insanity and the 
Need for More Frequent Medical Intervention”, and Cesare  Lombroso’s discussion of 
“The Treatment of Criminals.”15 
 
 Continental fashions aside, the central tenet of the degenerationist’s faith in an 
unseen ‘pathological nexus’ existing between the various species of social deviance, 
and the prominent place ascribed to alcohol in this chain, appeared to be indispensable 
to the institutional administrators of Scottish society, who viewed the nation’s 
problems with crime and insanity as largely stemming from a degenerate alcoholic 
over-indulgence. When John Francis Sutherland, Senior Deputy Commissioner in 
Lunacy for Scotland, met Lombroso to discuss the latter’s theory of criminal 
anthropology, he informed the Italian doctor that no such scientific sophistication was 
needed in Scotland, where crimes were “committed by persons more or less 
completely under the influence of alcohol, and suffering from varying degrees of 
mental and physical degeneration incidental to the alcoholic habit long indulged.”16 
The pronouncements of Scottish High Court judges throughout the century offer 
                                                 
15 ‘Congress at Geneva’, Journal of Mental Science, 42 (178): 1896, p.690; Heinrich Oppenheimer, The 
Criminal Responsibility of Lunatics: A Study in Comparative Law, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1909, 
p.309. The 1896 Geneva Congress was the first such event to attract significant British participation (a 
result of much effort by the organising committee). Following their “lamentable and discouraging 
abstention from the very successful Congress of 1889 at Paris”, the “support of English alienists [was] 
not invited” to the 1892 Congress at Brussels, (‘The Approaching Congress of Criminal 
Anthropology’, Journal of Mental Science, 38 (161): 1892, p.329.) Robert Nye has argued that it was at 
the 1889 and 1892 Congresses that significant fault lines opened up between Italian criminal 
anthropologists and French proto-criminologists (Nye, ‘Heredity or Milieu’). One would therefore 
imagine that the organising committee had good reasons to solicit participants from Britain and 
Germany at the following Congress of 1896. Indeed, a scrap-book held at the Royal Edinburgh 
Hospital’s Archive contains a card signed by Lombroso himself, inviting delegates to the 1894 
International Medical Congress in Rome (Section on Psychiatry, Neurology and Criminal 
Anthropology). [LHB7/12:5] 
16 Sutherland J F. ‘Jurisprudence of Intoxication’, EJR, 10, 1898, 309-23 (313) Sutherland’s obituary 
notes that he had devoted his career to campaigning for “more scientific and humane treatment of 
degenerates”; BMJ, Jan 13, 1912, p.107 
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ample confirmation of Sutherland’s belief that, in Scotland, alcohol consumption lay 
at the root of all evil:  
 
“Almost every crime has its origin more or less in drinking.” – Judge Gurney; “Ninety-nine cases out 
of every hundred are caused by drink.” – Judge Erskine; “Intemperance has destroyed large numbers of 
people, and will at its present rate of increase in time destroy the country itself.” – Justice Grove.17 
 
Thus, a particularly intriguing question is posed concerning the relationship between 
the empiricist’s heresy of degeneration, the diagnoses and taxonomies of psychiatrists, 
the social spectacle of drunkenness, and the underlying assumptions made by both 





This thesis investigates the ways in which hereditary degeneration was discussed by 
Scottish psychiatrists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, focusing in 
particular on the role alcoholism played in their descriptions of insanity. I examine the 
theoretical writings of both clinical and forensic psychiatry in order to address why 
alcohol played such a prominent role in psychiatric discussions, and how the debates 
over alcohol were used to broaden the scope of mental medicine, allying its claims 
with degenerationist ideas relating to State medicine and social reform. I argue that 
two principle themes recur throughout the period under investigation: Firstly, I argue 
that a new understanding of state and legal medicine way central to psychiatry during 
this period, showing how the theme of degeneration was always implicitly related to a 
broader conception of criminal capacity and the role of the modern state. Secondly, I 
argue that degeneration functioned as part of this debate by allowing the various 
‘social’ discourses that began to define themselves during this period (anthropology, 
sociology, criminology, psychiatry) to address one and the same malleable object (the 
degenerate). Hence, this thesis is situated with the existing (and voluminous) literature 
covering psychiatry and degeneration in Europe and America during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, within this broad framework I will 
                                                 
17 Anon, ‘Judicial Dicta on Drink’, EJJ, 16, 1872, p.607 
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trace a rather singular story rooted in the institutional peculiarities of Scotland, 
showing how the leading figures of Scottish psychiatry were particularly interested in 
the topic of hereditary degeneration and the role of alcohol as a cause and effect of 
insanity.  
 
I will show how psychiatrists in Scotland attempted to use the problem of 
alcoholic degeneration to mould their science into a branch of public health, 
propelling them into their preferred role as guardians of the race. This public health 
project facilitated the creation of new categories of psychiatric knowledge consisting 
of mental abnormalities that did not amount to absolute insanity, but that none the less 
had a bearing on how people thought about the mind, conduct, and criminal capacity. 
All the leading figures of Scottish psychiatry had a significant interest in alcohol as a 
cause of degeneration, and in their descriptions of the condition, the legal applications 
of the doctrine were never from view. One reason for this was undoubtedly the 
autonomous nature of the Scottish legal system which, when combined with the 
relatively small professional population of Scotland, greatly increased the rate of 
intellectual exchange between psychiatrists and lawyers while intensifying the 
political implications of associating with certain doctrines. Thus, a large part of my 
thesis will also be devoted to the legal interpretation of psychiatric claims, and in later 
part of the thesis I examine in depth the extent to which psychiatric knowledge claims 
were able to modify the laws of Scotland. Three substantive themes protrude from the 
documents consulted: Heredity, degeneration and alcohol, and medico-legal 
interaction. In analysing these themes, I engage with specific aspects of the social and 
institutional life of Scottish psychiatrists in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
century. 
 
Following a review of literature (chapter two) I begin in chapter three by 
examining the main features of degeneration within French psychiatry, and the role 
played by alcohol in the description of degeneracy, from its origins in 1857 through 
its development in the second half of the nineteenth century. Here I consider the work 
of the two canonical theorists of degeneration – Morel and Magnan – drawing in 
particular on those elements of their writings that influenced Scottish contemporaries. 
In chapter four I examine the impact of degeneration in Great Britain, discussing both 
the early reception of Morel’s treatise and how its claims influenced and intersected 
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with existing medical, psychiatric, and criminological ideas. From this wide-ranging 
survey of medical and psychiatric literature I move in chapter five to a detailed study 
of the writings of Thomas Clouston, the most prominent Scottish psychiatrist of the 
late nineteenth century, showing how the concept of degeneration structured his 
thought throughout his long and distinguished career.  In chapter six I examine the 
transcripts of Scottish High Court cases in which forms of ‘semi-madness’ were 
invoked by the defence, discussing the relationship between ‘official’ legal discourse 
on insanity and the claims made by psychiatrists. Finally, in chapter seven I chart the 
changing nature of psycho-legal knowledge in jurisprudential treatises and manuals of 
forensic psychiatry throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, showing 






The evidence upon which this argument is based is drawn from a wide variety of 
primary sources, including psychiatric, medical, and legal journals, textbooks, student 
theses, daily newspapers, periodicals, and the Justiciary Reports of the High Court of 
Scotland. In particular I am grateful to the staff and curator of the Lothian Health 
Services Archive of the Royal Edinburgh Hospital. These archives contained many 
useful documents and much fascinating insight into the workings of Scottish 
psychiatry in the nineteenth century. Housed in this archive there were two 
particularly useful resources: Firstly, the collection of publications by hospital staff, 
containing pamphlets, essays, and clinical notes relating to a wide array of topics.18  
This made available wealth of material in a conveniently accessible form, making 
researching this thesis a much less arduous task. Secondly, the Press Cuttings Books 
offered me a vast array of newspaper articles and pamphlets preserved by members of 
the Royal Edinburgh Asylum between 1862 and 1903.19 This scrapbook, instituted by 
David Skae (1814 – 1873), Medical Superintendent at the Royal Edinburgh Asylum 
from 1846 until his death, reveals a world of journalistic reporting that would 
                                                 
18 LHB7/14  
19 LHB7/12 (stored in six volumes) 
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otherwise be exceedingly difficult to locate. While some of the newspapers 
catalogued during this period such as The Times and The Scotsman have remained in 
circulation and keep their own excellent and fully searchable archives, others have 
disappeared without a trace, making the Press Cuttings Book an invaluable resource. 
Additionally, the very nature of this book reveals the issues that preoccupied 
Edinburgh’s psychiatrists (certain articles were selected for preservation, ordered, 
highlighted, annotated etc.). Skae, who had worked as a clerk in a law office before 
turning to medicine, was, like most alienists of his age, particularly interested in the 
medico-legal relations of insanity and the frequency of legal cases and lunacy 
legislation within these books is in itself revealing.20   
 
A further important insight into the psychiatric culture of Edinburgh in the 
period under review was provided by analysing MD theses submitted to the 
University’s Medical Faculty. These offer fascinating glimpses into the ways in which 
doctors in training approached psychiatric topics, and, since a high percentage of 
these theses were submitted by doctors practising in Scotland, it is particularly 
instructive to see how they situated their discussion of local cases in regard to broader 
theoretical approaches. Around 20% of the theses submitted toward the degree of 
Doctor of Medicine during this period dealt with ‘psychiatric’ themes, broadly 
defined, and, I will show, a high proportion of these theses were either explicitly 
concerned with the study of alcohol and degeneration, or made frequent reference to 
these topics as a theoretical support for their claims, a fact that further strengthens the 
argument that such issues were of extreme interest to Scotland’s psychiatric 
community in the late nineteenth century.  
 
A substantial body of evidence for my study of the relationship between 
psychiatry and the law in reference to alcohol, degeneration, and responsibility will be 
drawn from transcripts of diminished responsibility cases tried at the High Court. This 
source will allow psychiatric claims to be situated in the context of legal 
developments and compared against the types of claims which were made within 
publications aimed at the psychiatric community. There is a solid precedent for this 
type of research in the history of psychiatry, with Joel Eigen and Roger Smith in 
                                                 
20 See, for example, Skae D. The Legal Relations of Insanity, Edinburgh: Murray & Gibb, 1861.  
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particular contributing to our understanding of the role of expert medico-psychiatric 
testimony in criminal cases.21 There are two main sources for the details of these 
criminal cases in Scotland. Detailed reports of serious criminal cases were taken by 
court-room stenographers and subsequently printed in the Justiciary Reports (housed 
in the University of Edinburgh Law Library). These reports are often very detailed 
and contain extensive commentary on the cases presented by the defence and 
prosecution, as well as the legal guidelines set by the High Court Judges who presided 
over them. This official reporting may be productively supplemented by cross-
checking the case reports which appeared in The Scotsman and, to a lesser extent, The 
Times. Often newspapers give more salacious details than are found within the 
justiciary reports and, on occasion, contain some important medical evidence which 
the official report omitted for the sake of brevity (particularly as the former source 
was more concerned with the legal dimensions of the case).  
 
In addition to these High Court cases, I will draw extensively upon discussions 
of psychiatry and allied topics which were carried in Scotland’s legal press. Peter 
Bartlett has done much to advance the claim of legal studies as an important aspect of 
psychiatric history, cataloguing the documents and sources available to historians.22 
Bartlett argues that while the role of criminal law tends to be well documented in 
histories of psychiatry, particularly in studies focusing upon High Court cases, civil 
laws of confinement, capacity, testate, and marriage have been widely neglected. 
However, one may approach medico-legal interaction in a third way by utilising legal 
journals, since these offer important insights into how psychiatric ideas were 
appreciated by the larger legal profession. This type of source is particularly useful to 
historians of psychiatry, providing a far more nuanced picture of medico-legal 
interaction, yet it has hitherto been either ignored entirely or underexploited in the 
existing literature. The typically sharp divide between ‘psychiatry’ and ‘the law’ that 
scholars have emphasised is, I suggest, largely a consequence of selective reading. 
The legal profession was not universally, or even predominantly opposed to 
                                                 
21 See, for example, Joel Eigen, Unconscious Crime, Mental Absence and Criminal Responsibility in 
Victorian London, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003; Witnessing 
Insanity: Madness and Mad-doctors in the English Court, New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1995; Roger Smith, Trial by Medicine, Insanity and Responsibility in Victorian Trials, 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981 
22 Peter Bartlett, ‘Legal Madness in the Nineteenth Century’, Social History of Medicine, 14, 1, pp. 107 
– 131 
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psychiatric descriptions of conduct and capacity, and there is much evidence that 
psychiatric theories were read with great interest by the wider legal profession.  
 
As Scotland’s institutional hub, Edinburgh played host to a distinct and vibrant 
culture of legal journalism which showed much interest in the science of psychiatry. 
Part of the reason for this was undoubtedly Edinburgh’s notable tradition of education 
in forensic psychiatry, which had been taught at the University’s Law Faculty from 
1792, before finally gaining acceptance within the medical school in 1825.23 This 
gave Edinburgh’s doctors in training a unique opportunity to acquaint themselves 
with legal principles, evidential standards, and the finer points of court-room 
etiquette.  More generally, the idiosyncratic details of Edinburgh’s legal culture in 
nineteenth century illuminate why legal journalism should be such a productive 
source for a historical account of the city’s psychiatric knowledge.  
 
In a chronological study of the history of legal journals in Scotland, Reinhard 
Zimmerman has noted that it was not until the second quarter of the nineteenth 
century that such publications became tentatively available, a situation which 
contrasts with England where, in the early years of the century, there was already a 
well established periodical literature dealing with the law.24 The first two legal 
journals to appear in Scotland were the Law Chronicle of Journal of Jurisprudence 
and Legislation (1829) and the Edinburgh Law Journal (1832), though both titles 
folded around four years after their initial publication.25 The reasons for the relatively 
late appearance, and subsequent failure, of journals aimed at the Scottish legal 
profession are numerous. Firstly, the prevalence of ‘law tracts’ in Edinburgh’s 
Advocates’ Library would have provided ample background reading for the 
metropolitan jurist, while periodical titles such as the Edinburgh Review, aimed at a 
more general, though well educated, audience frequently carried notices and 
discussions of legal books. In addition, there were undoubtedly important 
demographic factors at work in restricting the market for dedicated legal titles; with a 
                                                 
23 White B. ‘Training medical policemen: forensic medicine and public health in nineteenth-century 
Scotland’, in Clark M. & Crawford C. (eds.), Legal Medicine in History, Cambridge University Press, 
1994 
24See S Vogenauer, ‘Law journals in nineteenth-century England’, Edinburgh Law Review, 2008, 12, 
pp.26-50 (p.35) 
25 Zimmerman R. ‘Law Journals in Nineteenth-Century Scotland’, Edinburgh Law Review, 2008, 12:9: 
9-25 (10) 
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population of around two and a half million people by 1841, and a correspondingly 
small body of legal professionals running to just over 1,500 in total, the “Scottish 
legal profession of the 1830s did not offer a sufficient market for a specialised legal 
journal to establish itself.”26 Indeed, when Scotland’s first national and financially 
viable legal periodical, The Edinburgh Journal of Jurisprudence appeared in 1857, a 
note to the reader explained that the title had subsumed a previously existing regional 
title into its pages as the Scottish market could not support two separate 
publications.27 The restrictions imposed on financially viable journalism by a low 
population were compounded by the fact that Edinburgh’s relatively small legal elite 
circulated in the intellectual milieu of the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-
centuries, where a culture privileging personal relationships and verbal exchange at 
dinner parties, gentlemen’s clubs, and private debating societies was preferred to the 
vulgarity of publishing opinions to be circulated indiscriminately.28 Indeed, the world 
of the High Court Judge was one of order, title, and privilege, frowning upon the 
existence of public institutions, sentiments The Scotsman highlighted when it 
described the growth of public offices and institutions in Edinburgh as a sure sign of 
the city’s decline, arguing that “Associations and Institutions are, in fact – as our 
friend Mr. Punch used to say – refuges for the weak and destitute.”29  
 
 By the middle of the nineteenth century however, the Edinburgh-based 
Journal of Jurisprudence had established itself as the national outlet for printed legal 
discussion, covering case reports, new legislature, book reviews, general articles, and 
commentaries. Given the size of Scotland’s legal community and the attendant 
economic difficulties faced by legal publications, it is safe to assume that this title was 
received by a large proportion of those working under the Scottish justiciary, and that 
legal professionals who neglected to subscribe to the nation’s only dedicated legal 
journal would have been conspicuous in their abstention. It is important to emphasise 
here just how Edinburgh-centric the Scottish legal profession was. For instance, while 
Glasgow had two professorial chairs in law, only the capital possessed what could be 
                                                 
26 Zimmerman (2008), p.16. The total number of legal professionals in Scotland during the 1850s were 
15 judges working on the Court of Sessions, around 120 Advocates, and around 1,500 “law agents or 
solicitors” 
27 ‘The Month’, Edinburgh Journal of Jurisprudence, 1857,1, p.138 
28 Zimmerman (2008), p.16 
29‘The Athenaeum on the Modern Athens’, The Scotsman, June 3, 1857  
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considered a School of Law (itself composed of four chairs).30 Additionally, 
according to Zimmerman, many professors were also “practising members of the 
Faculty of Advocates”, and their students would often attend classes at the end of a 
day working as clerks.31 Hence, the articles carried in the Journal of Jurisprudence 
were not marginal contributions to legal theory, but were part of an ongoing exchange 
born of the tensions inherent to Edinburgh’s profession. 
 
Towards the end of the century a new journal appeared, the Juridical Review 
(1889). While the editors were aiming to produce a new national journal of law, they 
nonetheless emphasised a cosmopolitan stance which transcended national borders, 
arguing at the outset of the first issue that the increasing popularity of the English 
language, coupled with the introduction of modern means of transport and 
communication, had moved America and “the principal cities of the Continent” as 
close to Edinburgh as the Scots capital had formerly been to London.32 Pursuing this 
initial aim, the journal proceeded to publish a wide variety of pieces examining both 
foreign and antiquated systems of jurisprudence, and gave a far broader scope to its 
authors. Yet, at the same time, this was to be the first “academically orientated” legal 
journal in Scotland, carrying pieces marked by a theoretical and scholarly rigour 
largely absent from the Journal of Jurisprudence. Perhaps as a result of its wider 
conception of the scope of legal discussion, the Juridical Review elicited several 
articles discussing psychiatry, alcoholism, and responsibility and offered a forum for 
those not working in the legal profession to speak directly to the Judges and 
Advocates they wished to influence. 
 
1.4 ‘Scottish’ Psychiatry 
 
As this thesis deals largely (though by no means exclusively) with Scottish materials, 
it would seem that an analysis of what constitutes ‘distinctly Scottish’ psychiatry is 
called for. Historians of psychiatry have searched for an answer to this question in 
                                                 
30 Anon, ‘Law Studies in Scotland’, Journal of Jurisprudence, 1866, 10, p.281 
31 Zimmerman (2008), p.18 
32 ‘Prefatory Note’, Juridical Review, 1889, 1:1, p.2 
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recent years, though no concrete conclusions have yet been given.33 Indeed, when 
charting the history of porous notions in medical theory, it is prima facie unclear as to 
what a distinctly Scottish approach would actually entail. How, after all, does one 
quantify ‘Scottish’ approaches to a science such as psychiatry in which peregrination 
and intellectual cosmopolitanism were distinctive features of its most prominent 
figures? This mobility raises a problem concerning the relationship between physical 
and intellectual space: Do we take a figure such as Thomas Laycock, born in England 
yet conducting his major work in Edinburgh in later life, to be representative of the 
Scottish or English approach to psychiatry? Conversely, to what extent must we 
consider the hugely important Diasporas that spread Scottish trained medical 
graduates throughout the British Empire? Does speaking of a distinctly Scottish form 
of psychiatry suggest that there was an explicit and conscious process at work on the 
part of doctors who self-identified with a particular form of national identity, or does 
it merely refer to a set of influences (institutional, educational, or ‘cultural’) through 
which a form of knowledge, generally supposed by its advocates to be neutral, was 
unwittingly inflected with a particular national taint? How do we deal with those 
Scottish doctors who self-consciously cultivated what they saw as a ‘Continental 
approach’ to medical knowledge – are they to be taken as distinctly Scottish?  
 
As Colin Kidd has argued, perhaps the problem here is with the 
meaningfulness of categories we mistakenly hold as self-evident, in particular the 
salience of the category of the nation as a determinant of identity amongst nineteenth-
century actors. On the face of it this seems to be false – the nineteenth century was of 
course the main period of state formation and the century during which many 
                                                 
33 See Scull, ‘Rethinking the History of Asylumdom’ in J Melling & B Forsythe (eds.), Insanity, 
Institutions, and Society, 1800 – 1914, London: Routledge, 1999, pp. 295-315 (306). Michael Barfoot 
has recently asked “what, if anything, was distinctive about the history of Scottish psychiatry” between 
1840 and 1860? See, Michael Barfoot, ‘David Skae: Resident Asylum Physician; Scientific General 
Practitioner of Insanity’, Medical History, 2009. 53, 469-88 (488). The most convincing answers to this 
question come from scholars who confine their analysis to discreet and easily quantifiable variables 
such as the distinctive nature of Scotland’s legal system or the ways in which the Poor laws functioned. 
See on this Harriet Sturdy and William Parry-Jones, ‘Boarding-out insane patients: the significance of 
the Scottish system 1857 – 1913’, in Peter Bartlett and David Wright (eds.), Outside the Walls of the 
Asylum: The History of Care in the Community 1750-2000. London: The Athlone Press 1999, p.86; 
Jonathan Andrews, “They’re in the Trade”, (p.41) A thoroughly detailed examination of these 
concerns (though in reference to English psychiatry)  is provided in Peter Bartlett, The Poor Law of 
Lunacy: The administration of pauper lunatics in mid-nineteenth-century England, Leicester 
University Press, 1999 
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recognisably modern approaches to identity were consolidated. However, Kidd 
argues, when considering Scottish identity, the “precipitate decline of Unionism” 
from the 1970s onwards has misled many historians into assuming that Scottish or 
‘Celtic’ identity was a given, something “most nineteenth-century Lowland Scots 
would have vociferously rejected.”34 By addressing how nineteenth-century Scotland 
was imagined by its own intelligentsia, Kidd shows that, for many educated Scots 
living in industrial cities and towns such as Glasgow and Edinburgh, establishing a 
pan-British Teutonic racial identity was a more pressing intellectual concern than 
delimiting Anglo-Scottish national boundaries.35 In particular the 1880s saw a surge 
of interest in the racial differentiation present within Great Britain, particularly 
following the publication of Beddoe’s The Races of Britain: A Contribution to the 
Anthropological History of Western Europe (1885). The division of Britain’s ‘ethnic 
populations’ into a racial hierarchy was particularly important for Scottish 
commentators who wished to associate with what they perceived as the culturally 
superior Teutonic race (indeed the pattern Beddoe popularised had already been 
applied in 1880 by Scots lunacy Commissioner and Secretary for the Society of 
Antiquities of Scotland, Arthur Mitchell, whose Past in the Present (1880) argued that 
rural areas of Scotland were populated by a technologically and biologically inferior 
race plagued by degeneration).36 When W. A. F. Browne ventured to the islands off 
the coast of Argyllshire in search of anthropological data he submitted to the MPA a 
report of specimens so enfeebled as to suggest they were suffering “the last stage of 
some frightful plague, the type of the lower animals, or that they are the last members 
of a distinct and degenerated race of mankind.” In a poetic turn he went on to describe 
the lot of “these and similar cases, met with in Scotland” who “from their pit-like 
home [look] far out among the surges of the Atlantic which they never crossed, 
gazing eternally into the embers of a fire from which they [cannot] escape, absorbed 
                                                 
34 Colin Kidd, ‘Race, Empire, and the Limits of Nineteenth-Century Scottish Nationhood’, The 
Historical Journal, 46: 4, 2003, 873-892 (874) 
35 While this association of Lowland Scotland and England with a common Teutonic racial group was 
by no means universal – some Scots associated themselves with the Scandinavian race while some 
English writers claimed Celtic racial ancestry for their nation – the general consensus amongst the 
educated classes was one of racial homogeneity. C.f. L P Curtis, Apes and Angels: The Irishman in 
Victorian Caricature, Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997. “Certainly”, writes Curtis, “there is no lack 
of evidence about the ubiquity of racial discourse in Victorian culture and society. Prominent writers 
and politicians revelled in the language of race or racism”, particularly when justifying the activities of 
the new ‘Imperial race’ (p.111) 
36 Arthur Mitchell, Past in the Present: What is Civilisation?, Edinburgh: D Douglas, 1880 
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in the contemplation of their monoideism.”37 Similarly, we have the medical student 
posted in the Highlands who regarded himself more as an anthropologist set amongst 
a peculiarly backwards foreign tribe than as a local physician, writing of his 
experience that: 
 
 The Scottish Celts, in common with all primitive peoples, regarded mental disorder as peculiarly due 
to the action and influence of supernatural, as apart from merely mundane and physical [causes] . .  . 
individuals drawn from such a sombre population when placed under equal conditions amongst the 
inhabitants of the lowlands and elsewhere do exhibit, in a proverbial degree, those traits of excitability 
and irritability which have come to be associated with the Celtic, as contrasted with the Saxon and 
Teutonic character.”38  
 
It was reported that Thomas Clouston, the most celebrated of Scottish psychiatrists, 
always prided himself on his (rather vague) Norse heritage, something that was 
apparently a greater source of pride than the knighthood conferred upon him in his 
dotage (a fact noted by his colleagues at the MPA, who presented him with a silver 
Norse galley upon his retirement).39 Clouston was particularly keen to insist upon the 
racial peculiarities of the Celt (and to distinguish the healthy Scotsman from these 
others), and at a meeting of the MPA in Liverpool he was said to have “created much 
amusement by declaring that the Celt insane is a much more demonstrative lunatic 
than the Saxon [and] although he drinks so much whisky, is peculiarly free from 
general paralysis.”40  Similarly, when Clouston and an ageing Daniel Hack Tuke 
attended a Dublin meeting of the MPA they quickly became embroiled in debate over 
the cause of insanity in Ireland, proposing that it was a result of industrial civilisation 
moving to areas inhabited by the Celts. Comparing case-notes from the Scottish 
country of Argyll with the statistics of Ireland, Clouston noted that: 
 
 It is known that primitive races [cannot] resist changes in their surrounding such as are introduced by 
civilisation . . . the more primitive portions of the Irish people have during the last fifty years been 
subjected to the influence of the ideas of the most advanced political people in the world, namely – the 
                                                 
37 Browne, ‘Endemic Degeneration’ Journal of Mental Science (1861) 7: 61-76. 
38 Alexander Cameron Miller, Insanity and the Neuroses, with special reference to their occurrence in 
the Highlands of Scotland, M.D. Thesis, 1888, University of Edinburgh, pp. 3 & 8 
39 ‘Thomas Smith Clouston: Obituary’, Journal of Nervous & Mental Disease, 1916, 43(5):487-488 
40 unmarked Liverpool daily newspaper, in LHB 7/12:5, p.267 
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Americans, with the result that they have not been able to adapt themselves at once to them, because 
adaptation would take three or four generations. 
 
Even the Association’s Irish President, Connolly Norman, was quick to commend this 
theory, adding that the primitivism of his rural Celtic patients left them quite 
incapable of assimilating their brains to technology and industry.41 It is clear that 
Scottish psychiatrists generally identified with this Teutonic block rather than the 
‘inferior’ Celtic race. 
 
Methodological problems aside, it must be said that, for purely pragmatic 
reasons, Scotland is a particularly good place to conduct a study of the messy topics 
of alcohol and degeneracy within psychiatry and the interrelationship between 
psychiatric and legal knowledge. As a relatively small country with a modest 
population, the amount of data available is not prohibitively large, making it possible 
to deal with key themes in a symphonic yet systematic fashion. Indeed there was 
contemporary awareness of the convenient nature of Scotland’s relatively limited 
population amongst nineteenth-century commentators; The Medical Press noted in 
1889 that forensic psychiatrists discussing Scottish material were at an advantage, 
since they were “able to collect and compare in Scotland more easily than could be 
done in England, the records and opinions on a variety of crimes implicated with 
more or less insanity.”42 In particular, Edinburgh housed a distinguished and well 
respected psychiatric community, whose leading figures were known to those 
working in the discipline across both Europe and America. Additionally, the relative 
scarcity of High Court cases where expert witnesses would be called to assist in 
determining the state of a person’s mind, coupled with a small industry in legal 
journalism, makes Scotland an ideal place to gauge the relationship between 
psychiatry and the law. It is therefore comparatively easy to amass sufficient data on 
                                                 
41 Reported in The Dublin Evening Herald, Jun 14, 1894 (LHB 7/12:5); In the ‘Notes and Comments’ 
section the Herald’s editor protested Clouston’s “ridiculous theory that a primitive people like the Celts 
were not able to stand civilisation”, noting that “unless we are now beginning to experience the visible 
and tangible results of mental degeneration which has been transmitted from generation to generation”, 
becoming progressively more severe, the hypotheses were unfounded. “The Irish”, he noted, “are not a 
‘primitive race’ any more than the English or Americans. They experienced the effects of civilisation 
before most existing races emerged out of barbarism . . . The true cause of the general increase of 
insanity is, in our opinion, the increased bitterness of the struggle for life.”  
42 ‘The Legal Aspect of Insanity’, in The Medical Press, Dec 18, 1889, in LHB Press Cuttings Book 
Volume IV, 1889 – 93 (p.45) 
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Scottish medical and legal practice to make claims representative of these practices as 
a whole.  
 20 
 
2. Literature Review and Theory 
 
2.1 The Rise of Social Pathology 
 
In his seminal work, Crime, Madness, and Politics in Modern France, Robert Nye 
notes at the outset that what had initially been conceived as a dedicated monograph on 
the criminology of late nineteenth-century France quickly became embroiled in issues 
of politics, medicine, psychiatry, heredity, alcohol, prostitution, and sporting culture 
with the scope of his research constantly expanding to accommodate the indistinct 
nature of the disciplinary boundaries relating to the object of his study. In abandoning 
his discrete focus on one kind of pathological discourse, Nye argued that the objects 
whose history he occupied himself with were rarely treated as isolated phenomena 
encircled by recognisable disciplinary boundaries by contemporary observers. Indeed, 
Nye writes, the conceptual association between various forms of unrest and pathology 
was taken for granted by many commentators writing in the late-nineteenth century, 
and “[t]here can be little doubt that the dominant concepts that related one form of 
deviance to another, and explained their origin and their nature, were biological 
ones.”43  
 
Nye’s approach was hugely influential for a generation of Anglophone 
scholars writing during the 1980s who turned their attention to the tendency of 
nineteenth-century commentators to biologise social problems, particularly in relation 
to the complex historical strands shaping the science and politics of France.44 While 
the family of pathologies that occupied this debate was vast, it was undoubtedly the 
concept of degeneration that served as its most visible and persistent presence, with 
Daniel Pick’s Faces of Degeneration standing as the most notable account of the 
theory in its broadest historical context (certainly in Anglophone scholarship). Pick’s 
study charts the circulation of degenerationist language in France, Italy, and Great 
                                                 
43 Nye, Crime, Madness, and Politics in Modern France: The Medical concept of National Decline, 
Princeton university Press, 1984, p.xi 
44 See, for instance, Ian Dowbiggin, Inheriting Madness, University of California Press, 1991; Ruth 
Harris, Murderers and Madness: medicine, law, and society in the Fin de cle, Oxford: Clarendon, 
1989; Pick, Faces of Degeneration: A European Disorder, c.1848-c.1918, Cambridge University Press, 
1989. 
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Britain, showing how the concept was applied in these three nations in response to 
internal tensions generated by the corresponding themes of Revolution (France), 
Unification (Italy), and Urbanisation (Great Britain). While the study of degeneration 
theory’s French roots had already been documented by scholars working on various 
aspects of the social, scientific, and literary history of the notion by the time Faces of 
Degeneration appeared, Pick’s account provided an original interpretation of French 
sources by focusing on the ‘accumulated traumatic memory’ that served as a powerful 
metaphor reflecting the nation’s sense of historical process. The recurrence of trauma 
in the social and political order, Pick argues, helped to popularise the notion that an 
indistinct pathological force served as the motor of history: The Revolution of 1789 – 
99, the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, the July Revolution of 1830, the 
Revolution of 1848, and, after Morel had published his first treatise in 1857, the 
Prussian War and the events of the Paris Commune of 1870 – 71, right up to the 
struggle between Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards in the 1890s, a seemingly endless 
procession of trauma to the French psyche that appeared to suggest a pathological trait 
was recurring in successive yet mutated waves of social destruction. Indeed, it is in 
this assumed anti-historicism of the French collective consciousness that Pick locates 
the work of the nominal father of degeneration theory, Bénédict Augustin Morel 
(1809 – 1873), in whose work “[t]he theory of dégénérescence was bound up with the 
problematic of the Revolution’s repetition . . . Morel’s treatise, with its procession of 
themes – alcoholism, cretinism, crime, pollution, insanity and sterility – spoke to, and 
displaced, deep concerns about the genealogy of history.”45 
 
While Nye had already shown that, toward the end of the nineteenth century, 
French psychiatry’s “shift in concern from the welfare and rehabilitation of the 
individual to the protection of the family and the social order” was shared with 
“scores of other disciplines and with the French intellectual elite”,46 Pick situates the 
change of referent of psychiatric thought from the individual to the race in the 
traumatic memory of a history that seemed itself to be pathological.  A key aspect of 
Pick’s account of degenerationist thinking in France then is that a widely held belief 
                                                 
45 Pick, Faces of Degeneration, p.59. Similarly, Ian Dowbiggin notes that the ‘failed experiment’ of the 
Second Republic (1848 – 1851) led to a widespread disenchantment with progressivism amongst 
Morel’s generation (Dowbiggin, Inheriting Madness, p.152) 
46 Nye, Crime, Madness, and Politics in Modern France, p.232  
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in an endlessly malleable though essentially invariable process of decline was able to 
give voice to the internal problems the nation faced, and while Morel undoubtedly 
provided the impetus for psychiatric discussions of degeneration, the theme of 
successive decline was by no means confined to his discussions. In fact, Pick seems to 
suggest, it was only when a later generation of commentators, such as scientific 
historian and critic Hippolyte Taine, took up with greater force the theory of 
degeneration as an historical movement, that its essential tensions were fully revealed. 
Taine, who shifted the focus of Revolutionary terror away from the acts of a fanatical 
minority to its germination in the minds of an otherwise passive mass (‘the crowd’) 
was to develop the French understanding of degeneration by linking the process of 
pathological history to “the vexed question of racial memory.”47  
 
If the French language of degeneration was deployed to account for the 
country’s eternal return of revolution and social pathology, Italian commentators 
living through a project of national unification sought an “ordered language for the 
containment of disorder” capable of formulating and defining “a political subject by 
elaborating ever more closely the criteria for political exclusion.”48 The central figure 
in this process, it is well known, was Cesare Lombroso (1835 – 1909), whose model 
of degeneration was, in contrast to Morel’s, not plastic. Lombroso’s language of 
degeneration, tied to his project of Criminal Anthropology, did not allow for the 
endless complexity of degenerate species offered by Morel’s discussion, but rather 
emphasised the “recalcitrance of certain specific anti-social lineages.”49 The lack of 
                                                 
47 Pick, Faces of Degeneration, p.70. Pick’s account here overlaps with earlier interpretations of French 
psychological thinking in the late nineteenth century. For instance, Jan Goldstein has argued that, 
during the 1880s, ‘imitative contagion’ (Gabriel Tarde) and ‘the era of crowds’ (Gustave Le Bon) 
became established principles of discussions of the mind, particularly as the professional elites turned 
against the principles of democracy and began to see ‘the masses’ as irrational and uncontrollable 
forces. [Jan Goldstein, ‘“Moral Contagion”: A Professional Ideology of Medicine and Psychiatry in 
Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century France’, in G. L. Geison (ed.), Professions and the French State, 
1700 – 1900, University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia, 1984, pp. 181 – 222] 
48 Pick, Faces of Degeneration, pp.138-39 
49 Pick, Faces of Degeneration, p.133. Lombroso was appointed as professor of legal medicine at Turin 
in 1876, a professional position from which he led the group of “ardent young doctors and lawyers” 
associated with the positivist school in Italy. This circle published a number of monographs dealing 
with criminal anthropology and, in 1880, began to issue the journal Archivo di Psichiatria et 
Anthropologia Criminale (Nye, ‘Heredity or Milieu’, p.336).  Lombroso’s own major contribution to 
this literature, L’uomo delinquente, was first published in 1876 and subsequently appeared in French as 
L’Homme criminel in 1887. The arrival of Lombroso’s key work in English was significantly delayed 
and it was through this French translation that the work would have reached most British readers. As 
Mary Gibson and Nicole Hahn Rafter explain in their critical introduction to a recent complete 
translation of Criminal Man, it was not until 1911 that Lombroso’s writings appeared in English, with 
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fluidity in Italian discussions of degeneration was essential to its political utility, since 
it allowed the revolutionaries, anti-clericalists, and armed unifiers to be absolutely 
distinguished from the anarchist or anti-social criminal whose behaviour could be 
projected onto a physiologically and philosophically different essence.50 While France 
and Italy differed in the particular formulation of degeneration theory, they were 
united insofar as the notion was bound up with processes of the state, whether 
accounting for its perpetual dissolution, as in France, or assisting in its formation, as 
in Italy.  
 
In Britain, by way of contrast, degeneration theory was less obviously a part of 
the political establishment or state function than it was on the Continent. Not only was 
there no “founding text” produced by a British author comparable to the works of 
Morel or Lombroso, but the very notion of ‘social theory’ remained suspect 
throughout the late nineteenth century.51 Undoubtedly there was an increasing 
                                                                                                                                            
two separate editions being issued in that year. The first, bearing the title Criminal Man, completed by 
the author’s daughter, was not in fact a translation of L’uomo delinquente at all, but a short 
compendium of Lombroso’s writings marked by distortion and oversimplification of the original 
arguments. The second, published as Crime: Its Causes and Remedies, offered only a partial translation 
of the fifth edition of Criminal Man, and hence omitted all the material from the earlier editions in 
which the foundations of Criminal Anthropology were laid. For further details of the composition of 
this important text, see Gibson and Rafter’s introduction to Lombroso, Criminal Man, Duke University 
Press, 2006. For details on the reception of Lombroso’s theories in Great Britain see N. Davie, Tracing 
the Criminal. British figures to have been ‘significantly’ influenced by Lombroso on Davie’s account 
include W. D. Morrison, author of Crime and Its Causes, S. A. Strahan, a medico-legal expert who 
worked as a lawyer in addition to serving as a physician at the Northampton County Asylum, the 
psychiatrists Henry Maudsley and Thomas Clouston, and Havelock Ellis, who was perhaps the most 
prominent British spokesperson for Criminal Anthropology.  
50 Michel Foucault pursued a similar argument in a lecture series delivered in 1975 (subsequently 
published as Abnormal) in which he argued that the Italian concern with fixed pathology emphasised 
the political need for a model of social analysis that could legitimately distinguish the ‘good’ rebel or 
political radical, such as Garibaldi, from the ‘bad’ rebel, such as the anarchist or socialist. In this way 
Lombroso’s system served to enumerate and catalogue the movements he wished to identify with, be 
they nationalist, republican, or anti-clerical, and distinguish them on the basis of physiognomy from the 
movements he opposed. Hence, as Foucault argues, the degenerate physical form of the ‘bad’ 
revolutionary subject indicated a physiognomic and political identity, an atavism common to under-
evolved biology and under-developed political ideology demonstrating that the movement they were 
representatives of “should be historically and politically discredited.” [Foucault, Abnormal: Lectures at 
the Collège de France, 1974-1975, Picador, 2003, p.154] 
51 Pick, Faces of Degeneration, p.176; Jose Harris writes similarly that “British social theorising [in the 
late nineteenth century] has been disparagingly compared with the powerful new schools of 
sociological analysis that were being generated on the Continent” and that, set against the work of 
French and German social theorists, “British attempts to understand the nature of society and the 
dynamics of social relations were shallow, eclectic, and methodologically naïve.” (Private Lives, 
Public Spirit: Britain 1870 – 1914, Penguin, 1994, p.221). However, she continues, the number of 
informal friendly societies, including trade unions, temperance organisations, literary and scientific 
societies, co-operatives, mutual associations, and savings societies that existed in Britain dwarfed the 
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visibility of degeneration discernible in British writings from the 1880s onward, 
particularly when it was deployed as a “counter-theory to mass-democracy and 
socialism.”52 However the fear of spontaneous social and corporeal change, along 
with the criminological implications of a marked class of degenerates, were always 
“diluted in the clash with a recalcitrant liberal conception of the individual” and, on a 
more general level, the ability of a degenerate substratum to precipitate “the direct 
destruction, extinction or impotence of the state was on the whole seen to be 
implausible.”53 Nonetheless, Pick argues, by focusing on the lack of ‘success’ British 
discussions of degeneration met with when they entered the official channels, 
historians have somewhat missed the point. The intriguing aspect of the language of 
degeneration in its British context was not that it had a palpable effect on legal 
process or led to the establishment of government funded criminological enquiries 
(though it did both of these things to a limited extent), but that it enjoyed a peculiar 
intractability across the spectrum of social discourse, producing what Pick calls a 
“structure of simultaneous avowal and disavowal” in British discussions.54  
 
Hence, Pick shows throughout his discussion of British degenerationist 
debates that while the existence of the degenerate or the born criminal was widely 
rejected, the same images of degenerates and born criminals pervaded the entire 
spectrum of Victorian thought when it came to consider the great industrial cities 
(though the greatest concern was with the labyrinthine streets of London, which was 
never heavily industrialised).55 Indeed “the language of degeneration continually 
returned” in the writings of British commentators, as for example in the 1904 Inter-
Departmental Committee on Physical Deterioration which, though it rejected 
                                                                                                                                            
presence of such institutions elsewhere, making the essence of British social life during this period 
more difficult to pin down for contemporary observers 
52 Pick, Faces of Degeneration, p.184 
53 Pick, Faces of Degeneration, p.211 & p.218. C.f. here Charles Pearson, who noted in 1893 that 
pessimism concerning the nation was a rarer species in Britain than it was on the Continent. However, 
he continued, while British commentators had been struck by the static level of the French population 
when compared to Germany and Great Britain, a fact that was commonly attributed to lack of vigour or 
‘immorality’, the French journalist Lucien-Anatole Prévost-Paradol had revealed that this lack of 
fecundity was in fact the product of an increased prosperity, and thus in Great Britain, where “the bulk 
of the population have adopted the views which Mr. Mill advocated, and prefer to preserve their 
position or their habit of rough comfort [than fulfilling] the need of the State for soldiers”, there was 
equal cause for alarm [Charles H Pearson, ‘The Causes of Pessimism’, Fortnightly Review, 54:322, 
1893, pp.441-53 (451)] 
54 Pick, Faces of Degeneration, p.180 
55 Pick’s account here draws substantially upon Gareth Stedman Jones’s Outcast London: A study in 
the relationship between classes in Victorian society, Pantheon, 1984 
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degeneration (or was cautious in accepting that Britain was degenerating), none the 
less couched its conclusions in degenerationist assumptions about habitual criminality 
and Booth’s submerged tenth. If degenerationist language was not often voiced within 
the offices of parliamentary officials, neither was it confined to marginal figures, and 
while theories of the hereditary criminal or a declining civilisation were never 
suggested as an answer to social problems, they were “continually disseminated as the 
question.”56 
 
We can see then that, in a more abstract sense, the internal tensions that 
shaped the social and political contexts of degeneration can also be applied to the 
degenerationist writings themselves, and the theory was always bound up with a sort 
of textual antagonism, producing a paradoxical situation where degeneration was 
often used as groundwork for its own critique. That is to say, throughout the late 
nineteenth century, degenerationist assumptions were involved in a constant process 
of reformulation in which writers would repudiate the tenets of degeneration in 
degenerationist terms. Pick’s analysis of degeneration (whether in psychiatry, 
literature, social criticism, or political debate) can therefore be summarised as an 
enquiry into the concept’s peculiar discursive buoyancy. Writers who tried to 
consciously submerge one of its ends would unwittingly see another emerge 
elsewhere to disturb the surface of their text. Indeed, the fluidity of degenerationist 
language meant that it could never be successfully repudiated and, in resisting the 
grasp of any particular group’s interests, became “more than simply an instrument” of 
the commentators who deployed it; even when a writer set out to consciously suppress 
the theme of degeneration it would inevitably re-emerge as “the imagined subject, 
cause and force of history” later in the same account.57  
 
 Across these three national contexts of degeneration, Pick treats the 
phenomenon in the broadest possible terms, resisting the temptation to analyse 
degenerationist thought as, say, the negotiation of a psychiatric theory or a response to 
rising levels of crime. As Pick observes, while one “could perhaps speak of ‘the 
interest’ of the medical and psychiatric profession in heightening the problem of 
                                                 
56 Pick, Faces of Degeneration, p.189 
57 Pick, Faces of Degeneration, p.199 
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health and reproduction in order to justify its own status and institutional expansion”, 
this strategy would only go so far in explaining the recurrence of degenerationist 
language in so many contexts and forums. Pick therefore places his explanatory 
emphasis on the “wider discursive context which was not merely ‘controlled’ as part 
of a project of medical professionalisation.”58 It is important to emphasise here that 
while Pick’s account relies on the biographies of prominent figures to situate 
degeneration theory in its national contexts (Morel, Lombroso, Maudsley), individual 
interpretations are deployed as mirrors reflecting a more general national 
consciousness. In this way Morel’s malleable version of degeneration appears as 
‘typically French’, Lombroso’s rigid criteria for exclusion as ‘typically Italian’, and 
Maudsley’s lifelong struggle to situate himself in regard to the great question of 
degeneration as ‘typically English’. A further consequence of this approach is that 
sources are not divided according to a vertical hierarchy running from the ‘official’ 
(parliamentary or penological) to the ‘scientific’ (anthropological or medico-
psychiatric) down to the ‘popular’ (journalistic or literary) but rather a variety of 
documents and authorial positions are allowed to address the question of degeneration 
thematically throughout his account. Of course Pick acknowledges that there were 
nuances and differences in form and style of argument across the various professions, 
media, and interest groups, but there remained “an identifiable shared language of 
degeneration”, and while his account is tied to the cultural and political specificities of 
each nation, he emphasises that the same themes were discernible across all contexts 
in which degeneration was present, with the “recurrent and shared discursive 
tensions” of degeneration “continually inflected, specified, re-formulated in different 
social and political contexts.”59 Hence, Pick shows how both the unprecedented social 
change that seemed to be propelling Europe to an inexorable break with the structures 
of its past encouraged the creation of pathological entities that could palliate internal 
tensions and how these creations instantly and unwittingly exceeded themselves, 
blurring the boundaries between the labouring classes and respectable society and 
creating a pathological continuum that circumscribed the whole social field.  
 
                                                 
58 Pick, Faces of Degeneration, p.200-201.  
59 Pick, Faces of Degeneration, p.235 & p.106 (italics in original) 
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While in this regard the account offered by Pick overlaps to a considerable 
degree with the work of Nye, there is also a significant difference between the two 
historians in terms of their stated methodology. While Pick acknowledges that his 
approach “suggests a certain eclecticism in the presentation of materials”, he excuses 
the fluidity of his analysis on the grounds that it allows him “to demonstrate the 
contiguity and convergence of models of degeneration across distinct forms of social 
commentary.” Hence, for Nye, disciplinary fluidity in the documents he examines 
functioned as an actor’s category, marking the lack of coherent reification of thought 
into distinct discourses, where as for Pick this same disciplinary fluidity is a tool of 
the analyst who chooses to ignore “the parameters of such fields of investigation as 
were drawn in the nineteenth century.”60 Though my thesis will focus largely on the 
discussions of alcoholism and degeneration that were produced by the psychiatric and 
legal professions, I follow Nye’s approach to the selection of documents, arguing that 
a study of such broad phenomena during this period inevitably calls for investigation 
of both discourses outside my immediate field of interest and other members of the 
great family of nineteenth-century social pathologies. This approach to the selection 
of documents is therefore rooted in a methodology that reflects the assumed reality of 
the objects of study: Nye’s understanding of the discourses he examines is that they 
were themselves referring to an object (social pathology) that had no precise lines of 
demarcation, a phenomenon Michel Foucault labelled ‘the psy-function’, that is, the 
series of discourses and sub-disciplines that were held together by a series of loose 
and sliding family resemblances encompassing psychiatry, psychoanalysis, 
psychopathology, but also certain modes of sociology, criminology, and penology.61 
Indeed, there was contemporary awareness that such disciplinary fluidity was 
particularly characteristic of discussions of degeneration, a subject which, according 
to a review appearing in the Athenaeum at the end of the nineteenth century, was not 
the domain of any particular branch of enquiry, but rather of “certain outlying 
provinces of biology, psychiatry, medicine and anthropology, not to mention 
criminology and the general theory of evolution.”62  
 
                                                 
60 Pick, Faces of Degeneration, p.43, italics added 
61 Foucualt, Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1973-1974, Palgrave, 2006, p.85 
62 Anon, ‘Review of [Eugene S. Talbot’s] Degeneracy: Its Causes, Signs, and Results’, The Athenaeum, 
3714, December 31, 1898, p.934 
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2.2 Psychiatry without Symptoms 
 
While these broad social histories are central to our understanding of degeneration 
and its allied phenomena, the breadth of perspective they offer can distract attention 
away from the micro-history of the concept’s application by actors pursuing concrete 
personal goals, particularly within the field of psychiatry.  One of the most recent and 
substantial contributions to our understanding of hereditarianism and degeneration 
within French psychiatry, Jean-Christophe Coffin’s La Transmission de la Folie, 
offers a counterbalance to these broader approaches by arguing that, while the 
utilisation of degeneration theory in popular discourse greatly increased its visibility, 
the “cultural resonance of degeneration” that recent socio-historical scholarship has 
focused on “somewhat obscures the fact that the notion is also an object within the 
history of medical science”, an imbalance Coffin seeks to redress by returning to the 
theory’s medical origins. This is not to say that Coffin circumscribes medical 
discourse as “a privileged and autonomous field”, simply that his account sets out to 
dispel the “suspicions” that have come to surround degeneration, particularly by 
historians of science who have followed the lead of Foucault in focusing too narrowly 
on the proscriptive dimensions of mental medicine in the nineteenth century, 
confining degeneration to a mawkish spectacle in the cabinet of cultural curiosities. 
Thus, Coffin seeks to “enter into the assumptions and concepts” of the historical 
actors he follows in an effort to appreciate their methods and arguments in their own 
terms, rather than against the pall of contemporary standards, tracing the 
“genealogical history” and “semantic shifts” associated with psychiatric discussions 
of degeneration. Hence, Coffin argues, the historiographically important moment of 
degeneration is not represented by its transformation into later nineteenth-century 
discourses concerning national decline or the eugenics movements of the early 
twentieth-century, but its origins in the 1860s, when the theory presented an 
expansive canvas for scientific exploration.63 Far from being the pseudo-scientific 
                                                 
63 Coffin, La Transmission de la Folie 1850 – 1914, Paris: L’harmattan, 2003, p.249-250. Elsewhere 
Coffin has argued that it is ‘more interesting’ to enter into the history of a concept at a point when its 
meaning has not yet been fixed by accepted usage and when those employing it are in the process of 
attempting to formalise a precise and systematic meaning; see Coffin, ‘Le Theme de la Degenerescence 
de la Race Autour de 1860’, History of European Ideas, 15, (4-6), 1992 : 727-732 (pp.727-28). 
Coffin’s remarks here can be applied with equal force to the significant complementary literature that 
has arisen since the 1990s addressing the role of nineteenth-century degenerationist ideas in 
adumbrating the eugenics movements of the twentieth century. The tendency of this scholarship to read 
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father of decadence and pessimism, Coffin argues, Morel sought only to “confront the 
central questions of medical and biological science in the second half of the 
nineteenth century: hereditary phenomena, the nature of madness, and the impact of 
living conditions or, more generally, the relationship between man and his 
environment.” Approached in this way, writes Coffin, the theory appears as “a 
marvellous discourse on pathological causes and processes” in which the “ancient 
metaphysical psychology” that had continued to dominate the psychiatry since the 
early nineteenth century was finally overturned by an account of the causation of 
mental disease consistent with the explanatory models of general medicine.64 
 
While the introduction of degeneration theory in Tratié des dégénérescences 
was instantly recognised as an important (if contentious) new dawn for psychiatry, it 
was, Coffin suggests, Morel’s second major work, Tratié des maladies mentales 
(1860),  that made explicit the ambitious project he wished to build around 
degeneration theory. Addressed to an audience of general practitioners rather than 
psychiatric specialists, Morel used his second treatise to attempt to harmonise the 
diagnostic models of psychiatry with those of general medicine seeking, as Coffin 
puts it, to “place the doctrine of degeneration at the centre of his general interpretation 
of pathological mental phenomena”, giving a more radical reinterpretation of the 
causality of morbid conditions than was present in his original treatise.65 In this 
second project Morel sought to capitalise on the growing sense of professional 
consciousness and unified mission amongst psychiatrists who, under increasingly 
frequent public criticism for their misapplication of the confinement laws, were 
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seeking to reorganise their systems of classification to take into account a growing 
concern with heredity.66  
 
Working with a notion of heredity that was much broader in scope than was 
typical for psychiatry and general medicine during this period, Morel created an 
account of mental and physical processes that made pathological inheritance the cause 
of illness in general rather than the vector along which specific conditions were 
transmitted. These features of Morel’s system “contributed to a new interpretation of 
the pathological” in general medical description: illness was no longer to be 
conceptualised as the distance from the normal, but rather the presence of an 
underlying pathological agent.67 As Coffin argues, Morel introduced two substantial 
“innovations” to psychiatry with his Tratié des maladies mentales: Firstly, he 
contended that all mental disease was to be understood in reference to the process of 
degeneration (a far more explicit claim than was to be found in his first treatise); 
secondly, he introduced a new method of classification emphasising aetiology rather 
than symptomotology.68 This latter move represented French psychiatry’s first 
significant break with the methods of classification employed by Pinel and the 
Esquirol circle, who had relied on systems of taxonomy that could be traced back to 
                                                 
66 Coffin’s approach here overlaps with the Anglophone scholarship that has focused on the SMP, 
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the classifications of eighteenth-century naturalists.69 Hence, in moving away from 
the nosological maps that had been drawn and redrawn since the start of the century, 
Morel favoured a system that reduced all symptoms to their underlying pathological 
cause, emphasising both the external somatic influence of toxins such as alcohol, and 
the internal somatic influence of the heredity taint.  
 
 Though degeneration theory was a pervasive presence in French psychiatry 
from the 1860s until around the 1920s, Morel’s ideas were subject to critical attention 
by members of his immediate circle, with the addition of folie héréditaire as a distinct 
category of pathological transmission provoking a lively debate amongst the SMP. 
While Morel’s early success in making psychiatry a respectable science marked him 
out as a leading figure of the SMP, his immediate contemporaries were generally of 
the opinion that the attempt to redefine psychiatric classification on the grounds of 
aetiology and heredity was unrealistic, particularly as the medical understanding of 
cerebro-anatomy was felt to be nowhere near sufficient to corroborate his 
assumptions.70 There was also a feeling among some members of the SMP that, if 
Morel’s line of reasoning were pursued to its logical conclusion, then the distinction 
between heredity and pathology would disappear (all disease could, according to 
Morel’s system, be recorded as the result of inheritance).71 Hence, while Morel’s new 
model of heredity became hugely influential from the 1860s onwards, Coffin cautions 
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historians against drawing the conclusion that the specific notion of inheritance 
psychiatrists worked with was stable or that such ideas were universally accepted 
throughout the nineteenth century, arguing that those who resisted hereditarian 
doctrines, though they were in the minority, have tended to be overlooked by 
historians of science searching for traces of the concept in the historical record, 
thereby losing sight of its critics and “accentuating the image of an epoch uniformly 
subject to fears of hereditary [degeneration].” Furthermore, Coffin argues, there was 
not, as some scholars have assumed, a single ‘hereditary moment’ in which the notion 
of pathological transmission of insanity burst into life and swept the whole of the 
medical profession along with an insurmountable force. Rather, Coffin emphasises the 
gradual development of knowledge of heredity in a process through which the unseen 
and the seen were linked one step at a time by doctors seeking to construct a plausible 
and consistent account of the pathologies they understood and diagnosed.72 
 
Following these remarks, we can say that degeneration entered a medical 
world that was initially divided between those doctors who continued to defend older 
models of disease transmission and a new generation who recognised in Morel’s 
proposal a means of overcoming the difficulties imminent to psychiatry’s account of 
insanity. A good example of this generational transition toward critical acceptance of 
Morel’s claims, and one which summarises much of what is said above, is provided 
by the historiographical opening lines of Études cliniques, an 1890 work written by 
Jules Falret, whose own father had, along with Morel, issued a definitive challenge to 
the Pinel-Esquirol method of classification by focusing on degeneration and 
heredity.73 Here Falret begins by noting that the “master doctors” Pinel and Esquirol 
had, for three generations, influenced psychiatrists content to occupy themselves with 
“perfecting the details [of their systems] without attempting to shake their 
foundations.” These foundations had, according to Falret, first been shaken by the 
“ever more detailed studies conducted on chronic and acute alcoholism since the work 
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of Magnus Huss” that began to “threaten the reigning classification by showing that a 
unique cause – the influence of alcohol – could print special characters to the four 
main forms of this classification: mania, melancholy, monomania, and dementia.”74 
Following the demonstrations of Huss, Morel had taken the ambitious step of 
breaking entirely with the older methods by proposing a classification containing the 
“largest and most contested” taxonomical device of the new psychiatric understanding 
of insanity, folie héréditaire, a proposal that had reportedly left the wider psychiatric 
community: 
 
stunned that we had been able accept such broad foundations. . . Nobody could understand how we 
managed to collect under one generic name states as different as had been gathered by Morel, 
including, in fact, all known varieties of insanity, from trivial acts of madness or errors of reasoning 
(representing the less pronounced forms of mental disorder witnessed in our schools, forms of madness 
that in fact come closest to the normal state of mind) to imbecility and idiocy, which are those degrees 
of madness lying furthest from sanity 
 
However, while Falret himself acknowledged that Morel had placed within the 
category of ‘folie héréditaire’ mental states that were so distinct as to render their 
inclusion under a single heading useless, he none the less believed that anyone who 
had read Morel’s writings would acknowledge that his ideas marked a new stage in 
the understanding of the role played by heredity in mental illness.75  The irony is that 
while a younger generation of psychiatrists largely embraced Morel’s model of 
heredity and finally conferred upon him the status of elder statesman of psychiatry, it 
was this same generation that abandoned the theologically informed model of race 
that had underwritten Morel’s entire system of degeneration, demonstrating both how 
tenuous the grasp is between an idea and its original progenitor and how the essential 
vagueness of degeneration theory in particular promoted its cross-generational 
stability as a psychiatric concept. It was in the 1860s, around the time of Morel’s 
engagement with the SMP over his model of heredity, that race became increasingly 
significant for French and British medicine, appearing, as Coffin puts it, at a time of 
“redefinition of essential terms in the scientific vocabulary” and “the proposal of new 
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concepts and doctrines” that continue to structure our mode of thinking about 
biological transmission.76 
 
It is important to remember therefore that degeneration did not function as a 
single idea or unified theory, but rather as a series of interpretations that could shift 
radically as doctors passed away and were replaced by a new generation educated 
according to a different tradition. Indeed, degeneration lived to be interpreted by a 
third generation in the early twentieth century (after which, appropriately enough, it 
became sterile). This second posthumous reinterpretation of Morel’s system tended to 
emphasise the nascent traces of organicist psychiatry that could be found within it, a 
move that became part of the historical record in France after the psychiatrist Georges 
Genil-Perrin published his eulogy to degeneration in 1913.77 John Ward has argued 
that it was in this way that the “idea of a comprehensive, organicist and universally 
applicable psychiatry emerged from the theory of mental degeneration in the 
nineteenth century” by adopting a “broad interpretation of heredity” that had “only a 
distant relationship to Darwinian laws.”78 However, Ward’s reading seems to assume 
that Darwinian currents ought to have been present in French biological thinking in 
the late nineteenth century, an assumption that has been challenged by recent work in 
the history of biology.  
 
For instance, Patrice Pinell has argued that, of the various theories of natural 
heredity under discussion in Europe during the late nineteenth century, it was not 
Darwinism but Weismannism – postulating the transmission of an invariable germ-
plasm from one generation to the next – that tended to be applied to the 
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degenerationist cause in France.79 Approaching this same problem from a North 
American perspective Ian Dowbiggin argues, perhaps unfairly, that “Darwin’s theory 
of natural selection made little headway in French science because of the fierce 
chauvinist allegiance to the transformist ideas [of Lamarck].”80 In a similar though 
slightly more charitable fashion Paul Rabinow writes that the causes for this rejection 
of Darwin were numerous and diverse, “ranging from simple French chauvinism to 
the more complex barriers provided by the internal structure of biological discourse.” 
Indeed, he continues, the humiliations that the nation had suffered leading up the 
instauration of the Third Empire “hardly put the French in a position to adopt readily 
Victorian hierarchies or mythological German races as matrices of history.” 81 A more 
detailed explanation is offered by Yvette Conry, who has argued that the theory of 
natural selection, along with the chaotic living world it implied, did not sit well with 
French medical theorists who preferred to emphasise an “ontological conception of 
natural economy” sustained by “laws of proportions, rules of exchange and principles 
of justice.”82 
 
This alerts us to an important historiographical difference that must be borne 
in mind when using the French model of degeneration as a putative standard against 
which to assess British discussions, for it should be noted that the term ‘degeneration’ 
could not readily take on the same meaning to French and British psychiatrists on 
account of the generally distinct theories of heredity reigning in the two nations. I will 
examine the specific sociological reasons for the general hostility toward 
Weismannism within late nineteenth-century British psychiatry in chapter four of this 
thesis, arguing in particular that degenerationist assumptions were inflected in a 
particular way to preserve the Evangelical and Reformist role of the psychiatrist as a 
public figure (an inflection which seemed to preclude Weismann’s theory of 
transmission).83 However, it should be noted that it would be inaccurate to portray 
                                                 
79 P. Pinell, ‘Degeneration Theory and Heredity Patterns between 1850 and 1900’, in Gaudillière & 
Löwy (eds.) Heredity and Infection: The History of Disease Transmission, Routledge (London), 2001, 
pp. 245-59 (250-51) 
80 Dowbiggin, Inheriting Madness, p.148 
81 Paul Rabinow, French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment, MIT Press, 1989, 
p.126 
82 Yvette Conry, cited in Harris, Murderers and Madness, p.66 
83 A wonderful example of this a priori sociological rejection of scientific theory was given by Dr 
Robert Jones, Superintendent of the London County Council Asylum, Claybury, in a speech before the 
British Society of the Arts in 1904. “There is no proof”, Jones told his audience, “that each cell in the 
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British theories of inheritance and degeneration as uniformly ‘Darwinian’ since, as 
historians of biology have indicated, ‘Darwinian theory’ was not a unified body of 
thought until the early twentieth century, but a variety of interpretations that chose to 
emphasise or eliminate various elements of the account presented in Origin of 
Species.84 Indeed it was not until Weismann and Galton had been successful in 
gathering support for the proposition that acquired characters were non-transmissible 
that a recognisably ‘non-Lamarckian’ Darwinism took shape in any country.85 Indeed, 
as Peter Bowler has argued, the much discussed ‘death of God’ was never really a 
problem in the mid nineteenth century, since the disappearance of the transcendent 
order was met with equal force by the emergence of the natural order, the progressive 
certainty of which assuaged the fears of social commentators in Europe and America. 
In this context, he continues, “Darwin had never been the undisputed leader of 
evolution, and his theory of natural selection was [from the 1860s onwards] 
challenged by a number of alternatives.”86 
                                                                                                                                            
germ plasm is predestined unalterably for a particular role on a predetermined plan . . . I believe that 
we can alter the physical and psychical characters through the influence of the environment – and 
school teachers acquainted with the family history of a child may be able to guard against the bad 
effects of a family heredity – otherwise where does the reformer, the sociologist, and the educationalist 
come in?”  [R Jones, ‘Physical and Mental Degeneration’, Journal of the Society of Arts, March 4th, 
1904, pp.327-342 (p.336, italics added)] 
84 See Thomas F. Glick (ed.), The Comparative Reception of Darwinism, University of Chicago Press, 
1988. In her study of the early years of the British Eugenics Society, Joanne Woiak argues that the 
theories of transmission held by prominent Society members were far more Lamarckian than has 
previously been acknowledged by historians of eugenics (though it is in fact common for historians of 
biology to remark that British biologists in the late-nineteenth century were ‘Lamarckian’, being almost 
as universal in their condemnation of natural selection as they were in their support of evolution). See 
Joanne Woiak, Drunkenness, Degeneration, and Eugenics in Britain, 1900-1914, Unpublished Ph.D. 
Thesis, University of Toronto, 1998 
85 One of Darwin’s younger accomplices, aware that his tutor had been at best ambiguous on the 
subject of transmission in his writings, claimed in his study of Wesimann’s theory that: “As far back as 
1874 I had a long conversation with Darwin himself upon the matter [of the transmissibility of acquired 
characters], and under his guidance performed what I suppose are the only systematic investigations 
which have ever been undertaken with regard to it . . . the idea of what is now called ‘the continuity of 
germ-plasm’ was [therefore] present to Darwin’s mind as a logically possible alternative to the one 
which he adopted in his theory of pangenesis – an alternative, therefore, which he was anxious to 
exclude by way of experimental disproof.” George Romanes, An Examination of Weismannism, 
London: Longmans, Green, 1893, viii. . Müller-Wille and Rheinberger (‘Heredity – The Formation of 
an Epistemic Space’, p.7) argue that Francis Galton, in his 1876 essay, ‘A Theory of Heredity’ 
(Journal of the Anthropological Institute) produced one of the “founding documents of modern 
hereditary thought.” It was here that Galton made heredity depend upon what they describe as an 
“underlying mechanism or enduring structure”; a “strip” (Galton’s own term) that would collect all the 
germinal material at the point of fertilisation within the ovum. This, Galton acknowledged, was a 
necessary inference, for though the microscope could capture some of the effects of this process, 
suggesting a transfer of hereditary data, it could not detect what that data was or how it served to 
maintain a constancy of form. 
86 P. Bowler, ‘Holding your head up high: Degeneration and orthogenesis’ in History, Humanity and 
Evolution, J. R. Moor (ed.), Cambridge, 1990, pp.200-239 (p.230) 
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2.3 The Political Dimensions of Heredity 
 
 
Psychiatrists had, by the middle of the nineteenth century, come to define their 
practice in reference to two main themes: Heredity and Hygiene. These two notions 
underwrote much of the degenerationist discourse employed within psychiatry and 
served as strategies that would allow doctors to define their activities in reference to 
political concerns. As Jan Goldstein argues, although the role of French doctors and 
scientists in controlling outbreaks of moral contagion had been an established part of 
the Ancien Régime, it was not until after the Revolution that doctors attempted to 
become a part of the fabric of the state by pursuing the promotion of ‘hygiene’.87 
Indeed, Goldstein argues, it was psychiatry, the most perilous of all professions, 
which gradually took on the rhetoric of moral contagion and social order in its bid to 
underwrite its place within the state apparatus. While these remarks are applied to a 
very specific social and political milieu (namely that of post-Revolutionary France), I 
will show in this thesis how Edinburgh’s psychiatric community, working under the 
direction of Thomas Clouston (1840 – 1915), were drawn to the same justification of 
psychiatry as a branch of public hygiene in which doctors would function as “priests 
of the body and the guardians of the physical and mental qualities of the race.”88  
 
 Similarly Ian Dowbiggin has argued that psychiatrists were “more 
preoccupied with legitimizing existing psychiatric practices than with carving out new 
social territories for medical intervention” and, as part of this strategy of 
legitimisation, “Morel’s theory of degeneracy was useful because it not only 
explained how therapy in the milieu of the asylum redeemed the moral authority of 
the alienist but also cast the alienist as the expert in social matters and public mental 
                                                 
87 Jan Goldstein, ‘“Moral Contagion”: A Professional Ideology of Medicine and Psychiatry in 
eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century France’, in Gerald Geison (ed.) Professions and the French State, 
1700 – 1900 (pp.181-232). For a corresponding general overview of the public health dimensions of 
Chadwick’s reforms in Great Britain, see Ackroyd et al., Advancing with the Army: Medicine, the 
Professions, and Social Mobility in the British Isles, 1790 – 1850, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 1 
– 21  
88 T Clouston, ‘Puberty and adolescence medico-psychologically considered’ Edinburgh Medical 
Journal, 1880, 26, 5-17, (10)  
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health.”89 Indeed, he argues, Morel had envisioned the psychiatrist as a type of 
specialist consultant to the state on issues of public health, one whose work would 
focus in particular on the hygiene of families. In this way the psychiatric interest in 
“family mental health was an indication of the alienist alignment with the burgeoning 
hygiene movement within French medicine”, a movement which paralleled the 
political dimensions of the ‘discovery’ of a materialised heredity mechanism in post-
Revolutionary French medicine.90  
 
On a general level, the changing conceptualisations of ‘transmission’ and 
heredity in the first half of the nineteenth century came to influence debates touching 
upon the law, anthropology, psychiatry, evolution, horticulture, and politics, 
transforming the intellectual landscape of modern Europe. Psychiatry was both a 
causal element of this change and one of the main beneficiaries of its effects, using 
the new language of heredity to situate its ambitions toward becoming an essential 
department of the state. For instance, Carlos López-Beltrán has developed a highly 
detailed account of the formation of the concept of heredity in the early nineteenth 
century that persuasively situates the development of a fixed mode of transmission in 
the political milieu of post-Revolutionary France.91 The political vacuum opened in 
the wake of the Revolution, López-Beltrán argues, led doctors to pursue heredity and 
hygiene as strategies that would “give their profession a major role in the 
reorganization of civil life.” All the leading medical figures of post-Revolutionary 
France, including the psychiatrist Pinel, took up the theme of heredity in their work, 
assiduously changing the focus of their pre-Revolutionary investigations to address 
the new vogues of heredity and hygiene in order to examine a problem that was novel 
to this new political order, namely, whether “socially damaging diseases, especially 
mental insanity, were indefinitely preserved within genealogical lines.”92  
                                                 
89 Dowbiggin, Inheriting Madness, p.143 & p.135. Dowbiggin argues that, in this regard, degeneration 
theory in France was a political tool identical to the phrenological movement promoted early 
nineteenth-century English alienists. On this see R. Cooter, The Cultural Meaning of Popular Science: 
phrenology and the organization of consent in nineteenth-century Britain, Cambridge University Press, 
1984 
90 Dowbiggin, Inheriting Madness, p.140. On the ‘discovery’ of heredity see Müller-Wille and 
Rheinberger, ‘Heredity – The Formation of an Epistemic Space’, in Heredity Produced, pp.3-34.  
91 See López-Beltrán, C. ‘The Medical Origins of Heredity’, in Heredity Produced, pp.105-133; 
‘Forging Heredity: From Metaphor to Cause, a Reification Story’, Studies in the History and 
Philosophy of Science, 25, (2) 1994: 211-35; ‘In  the Cradle of Heredity; French Physicians and 
L’Hérédité Naturelle in the Early 19th Century’, Journal of the History of Biology, 37, 2004:39-72 
92 López-Beltrán, ‘In the Cradle of Heredity’, p.46 
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The ‘reification’ of heredity as a technical term, López-Beltrán argues, 
initially carried pathological connotations which “became increasingly common in 
wider sectors of society, and began to ‘interact’ with the worries and ambitions of 
social thinkers and reformers.” General references to a process of ‘heredity’ 
encompassing both normal and pathological phenomena became increasingly visible 
after the 1840s, by which time doctors had realised that “the privileged status [they] 
were giving to hérédité as an explanatory tool” required support from “a fairly well 
organized collection of ‘normal’ physiological, zoological and botanical, and 
embryological facts.”93 This new nominal form of heredity “spread from medical to 
broader circles through the increasing weight it received as an explanatory resource in 
the technical, programmatic and propagandistic texts of post-revolutionary French 
physicians”, and was rapidly adopted by “[a]lienists, criminologists, hygienists, and 
other socially oriented branches of the medical profession [who] found the shift from 
an adjectival approach (‘héréditairé’) to a substantive one (‘hérédité’) a very attractive 
move.”94  
 
In Britain, the equivalent term ‘heredity’ did not enter dictionaries until much 
later, appearing around 1860. Of course, the relatively late arrival of ‘heredity’ into 
the English dictionary cannot necessarily be taken to indicate its absence in popular 
usage, for it was not until 1910 that an English dictionary offered a recognisably 
modern definition of race, though the language of race was of course a highly visible 
feature of Victorian social commentary.95 Galton claimed in his autobiography to 
have first introduced the term heredity into English (in 1869), though both Darwin 
and Spencer had already written of ‘heredity’, having probably taken the term from 
Prosper Lucas (suggested by the marginal notes in Darwin’s copy of Traité de 
l’Hérédité).96  However, in contrast to its French usage, which was commonly tied to 
the description of pathological conditions, this English ‘heredity’ was used only to 
indicate the idea of biological transmission more generally, and even after its 
                                                 
93 López-Beltrán, ‘Forging Heredity’, p.233 
94 Ibid.,, p.213. 
95 N. Hudson, ‘From “Nation” to “Race”: The Origin of Racial Classification in Eighteenth-Century 
Thought’, Eighteenth Century Studies, 29, (3), 1996, pp.247-64.  
96 López-Beltrán,’ Forging Heredity’, p.213 
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introduction into English, the term was not suggestive of a distinct parlance connected 
to a political project as it was in France. 97   
 
In slight contrast to this account of the rise of heredity, Ohad Parnes adds 
further complexity by arguing that the “establishment of heredity as a universal 
scientific category was the direct result of a wider epistemological shift” in the first 
half of the nineteenth century, reaching “far beyond the borders of biology.” 
Specifically, he contends, the “conceptualization of populations in terms of 
generations” – a new idea during the early nineteenth century – was responsible for 
the stability of ‘heredity’ as a referent in both popular and medical discourse.98 
Crucially, in Parnes’ account, degenerationist thinking (broadly defined) provides the 
impetus for the early nineteenth-century tendency to conceptualise life in terms of 
generations, coming at a time when a variety of ‘sociological’ writers (a term he uses 
as an acknowledged anachronism) were “motivated by a kind of intellectual 
desperation” concerning the turbulence of: 
 
knowledge, wealth, and human conduct – possibly even the living world. Historians, philosophers, and 
political thinkers were challenged to account for this new apprehension, to try to explain the 
unremitting transformation of society, the constant modification of commodities, the seemingly infinite 
growth of knowledge. 
 
 In this social and intellectual tumult, Parnes argues, notions of the individual or the 
family did not appear to be viable explanatory categories. The concept of generations 
alone could “explain both change and tradition, both revolution and stability.”99 While 
                                                 
97 However, John Waller has argued that models of disease based upon heredity became 
“unprecedentedly credible in the mid-Victorian period”, where “concerns over the quality of lineages 
[were] projected onto the national stage in the form of eugenical thought and fears of biological 
degeneration.”John C Waller, ‘Ideas of Heredity, Reproduction and Eugenics in Britain, 1800-1875’, 
Studies in the History and Philosophy of Biology and the Biomedical Sciences, 2001, 32, 3, pp.457-489 
(p.461). C.f. Waller, ‘The Illusion of an Explanation: The Concept of Hereditary Disease, 1770-1870’, 
Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences, vol.57, 2002, pp.410-48 (p.410); Waller, ‘Poor 
Old Ancestors: The Popularity of Medical Hereditarianism, 1770-1870’, in A Cultural History of 
Heredity II 
98 Ohad S. Parnes, ‘On the Shoulders of Generations: The New Epistemology of Heredity in the 
Nineteenth Century’, in Heredity Produced, pp.315-346 (p.316) 
99 Parnes, ‘On the Shoulders of Generations’, p.323. Parnes notes that the question of whether this line 
of reasoning first appeared in the social sciences and was subsequently imported into medical and 
biological thought, or whether it appeared in medical writing, and was subsequently popularised as a 
social metaphor, is both impossibly complex, and ultimately irrelevant to the fact of ‘generations’ 
appearing as salient category of social and biological analysis 
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these general explanations for the rise of hereditarian thought are of immense value in 
situating medical and psychiatric texts within a broader intellectual change, it is clear 
that, pace Parnes’ claims, medical writers played a leading role in the process of 
defining a new model of heredity. In particular, it was psychiatric authorities like 
Esquirol, foremost amongst Pinel’s followers and himself instructor to such figures as 
Georget, Moreau de Tours, and Morel, who “gave heredity the leading role as an 
influence for mental disease in his thirteen articles for the Dictionnaire [des Sciénces 
Médicales].”100  
 
However, it should be noted that, in these varying accounts of the growing 
importance of ‘heredity’ during the nineteenth century, scholars are not simply 
advancing a ‘weak’ hereditarianist explanation, postulating that, from the early 
nineteenth century onwards, there was an inexorable tendency for medical 
commentators to see disease as the product of heredity and nothing more. There was 
of course significant support during the nineteenth century for accounts of disease that 
did not rely on models of direct inheritance, particularly from social reformers who 
saw in hereditatian logic a determinism that violated the principles of self-
improvement. Yet it must be said these accounts relied upon the language of 
inheritance to make their claims plausible and that they nonetheless situated 
themselves in relation to the new concrete conceptualisation of heredity transmission. 
In other words, even if throughout the nineteenth century we encounter an equal 
distribution of statements concerning ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ heredity – or direct 
transmission and environmental influence – these statements all implicitly relied upon 
a working knowledge of a distinct heredity mechanism to render themselves 
intelligible.101 Furthermore, the opposition to ‘hard heredity’ was itself framed by 
appealing to an object – ‘environment’ or ‘milieu’ – formed by the same process of 
disentanglement that had led to the creation of the new medical model of fixed 
heredity. As Georges Canguilhem has shown, the concept of ‘milieu’ was itself a 
medical novelty in the nineteenth century, being used as a substantive in the singular 
                                                 
100 López-Beltrán, ‘In the Cradle of Heredity’, pp.45-47 
101 c.f. Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge, pp.133-142 on the rarity of statements in any given epoch 
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in the 1830s as part of the same process of re-theorising and re-organising of the 
living world that had shaped understandings of heredity.102 
 
2.4 Forensic Psychiatry 
 
Michael Clark and Catherine Crawford have argued that, by the end of the eighteenth 
century, almost all European nations – with the notable exceptions of England and 
Scotland – had established traditions of State and legal medicine, disciplines which 
had long been “regarded not as a speciality but as part of the professional duties of 
every medical practitioner.”103 It seems that the ‘British exception’ was therefore that, 
in the practice of medicine, it had not followed the ‘Absolutist’ states of Western and 
Central Europe – Bourbon Spain, France, Germany, and Austria – in developing a 
specialised branch of State medicine concerned with the accumulation of knowledge 
essential to the administration and perpetuation of governmental functions. It is also 
undeniable that this branch of study – commonly called ‘medical police’ – would 
have come to influence medical and psychiatric understandings of the role of the 
doctor as a public health official in those nations, and that this influence would be 
lacking in Britain. ‘Medical police’ is therefore a particularly interesting compound of 
the broader understanding of both ‘medicine’ and ‘policing’ in these nations; indeed, 
as Donzelot notes, the role of policing in Continental Europe from the mid-eighteenth 
                                                 
102 G. Canguilhem, ‘The Living and its Milieu’, Grey Room, 3, 2001: 7 – 31. Canguilhem argues that 
the term ‘milieu’ (au mi-lieu: in the centre of space), initially imported from Galilean and Cartesian 
mechanics into the biology of the late eighteenth century, was popularised in the life sciences during 
the early nineteenth century with the work of Lamarck and Comte. In French mechanics the term had 
served as an equivalent to Newton’s use of ‘fluid’, an etymology preserved by Comte’s biological 
usage which was intended to cover the “fluid in which a body is immersed”, though more broadly his 
understanding of milieu would account for the aggregate effect of external influences upon an 
organism as a distinct explanatory factor (i.e., it was around the 1830s that ‘internal’ and ‘external’ 
influences such as heredity and environment began to be prised apart as separate causal factors in 
biological thinking). Prior to this time, the understanding of environmental influence was caught in the 
same tangled causal web as heredity; as Canguilhem notes, “Even the notion of ‘climate’ in the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is a unified notion common to geography, astronomy, and 
astrology. Climate is the change in appearance of the sky [but] it is also the influence exercised by the 
sky on the earth.” (p.24) The process of disentangling internal and external causal domains in medicine 
and biology implicitly de-centred the organism, with mi-lieu no longer suggesting that something was 
at the centre of space, but ‘in the middle’ of two spaces, being caught up in the unfolding of extrinsic 
forces. Hence, the zoologist Louis Roule (1861 – 1942) was able to write in the late nineteenth century 
that “Fish don’t lead their lives themselves, it is the river that makes them lead it.” (p.12). This 
separation of causes and objects in the understanding of life had been completed by the late nineteenth 
century, where Hippolyte Taine was able to deploy ‘milieu’ alongside ‘race’ (a category including 
heredity) and ‘event’ as the three principles of historical explanation. (p.3) 
103 Clark and Crawford, ‘Introduction’, in Clark M. & Crawford C (eds.), Legal Medicine in History, 
Cambridge University Press, 1994, p.2 
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century to the late nineteenth-century was not framed in the narrow and repressive 
terms which we understand it today, but rather as a series of interventions operating 
across society which, in the words of an eighteenth-century treatise on the subject, 
took as their aim the promotion of “the good fortune of the state”, augmenting “its 
forces and its power.”104  
 
 In this particular case, it is necessary to separate England and Scotland since, 
during the early nineteenth century, Scotland (and particularly the administrative 
bodies located in Edinburgh) began to move toward the Continental tradition of state 
and legal medicine, distinguishing medical education and culture in the two nations. 
While doctors in early nineteenth-century England were aware of the lack of interest 
in the field of forensic medicine amongst their institutional writers, regularly 
complaining in the medical press that translations of the works produced by French 
and German doctors (which were of course applied to their native systems of codified 
laws) surpassed the meagre offerings produced by their compatriots, there remained 
no formal context for, or institutional interest in the Continental traditions of state 
medicine.105 In Scotland, by way of contrast, a tradition of legal and state medicine 
analogous to that of the Continent, coupled with a more expansive understanding of 
policing in general, led to a system of ‘medical police’ that broadly paralleled the 
French and German models. Though the subject of medical jurisprudence had been 
introduced to the Edinburgh curriculum in 1792, it was initially considered a 
reactionary, suspect, and broadly useless body of knowledge by the University’s 
deeply conservative medical faculty, who associated the importation of Continental 
ideas with politically dangerous Revolutionary sympathies. However, by 1825 
medical police had become a recognised and integral part of medical education in 
Scotland, helping to distinguish the medical schools of Glasgow and Edinburgh from 
those of England where, exceptionally amongst all the European nations, medical 
jurisprudence was still absent.106 
                                                 
104 Johann von Justi, Éléments généraux de police (1768) cited in Donzelot, Policing of Families, p.7                                          
105 C Crawford, ‘A scientific profession: medical reform and forensic medicine in British periodicals of 
the early nineteenth century’, in R French and A Wear (eds), British Medicine in the Age of Reform, 
Routledge, 1991, pp.203-30 (p.204) 
106 B White, ‘Training medical policemen: forensic medicine and public health in nineteenth-century 
Scotland’, in M Clark and C Crawford (eds.), Legal Medicine in History, Cambridge University Press, 
1994. Certain principles of medical jurisprudence were introduced to Edinburgh’s medical curriculum 
by Andrew Duncan with the publication of his Heads of Lectures on Medical Jurisprudence in 1792. 
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The development of forensic medicine and medical police in Scotland is 
consistent with the interest the nation’s lawyers had shown in European legal thought 
(discussed in chapter five of this thesis), and in both cases it was historic ties between 
Scotland and the Low Countries, Germany, and France that provided what White calls 
“a fertile medium for the spread of Enlightenment thought, and its examination of 
man’s relationship to society and the state.”107 Furthermore, the political and cultural 
peculiarities of Scotland’s administrative capital city meant that certain notions that 
had taken root in the European states characterised by what George Rosen termed 
‘administrative absolutism’ were able to gain a foot-hold in Scotland but not in 
England. As John Glaister Junior (who was, like his father before him, Professor of 
Forensic Medicine at Glasgow University) argued in the mid-twentieth century: 
 
Forensic medicine or medical jurisprudence may be defined as the science concerned with the 
application of medical knowledge to the purposes of the Law. Since administration of the Law is a 
principal function of the State, the close relationship which obtains between forensic medicine on the 
one hand and the State on the other becomes well established.  
 
This close relationship between doctors and state administrators, he continued, 
had begun in Edinburgh, where the medical profession had been granted a unique role 
in assisting with matters of state.108 Brenda White had noted that the unification of 
forensic medicine and public health within a single university course taught to all 
doctors (‘medical police’) demonstrated that Scotland, in matters of public health, was 
in many ways closer to the Continental system of governance than it was to the liberal 
traditions of England during the nineteenth century.109 Indeed, the Continental 
                                                                                                                                            
The first Chair (held by Duncan) had been instituted in 1806 by Lord Erskine, a radical Whig then 
serving as the Lord Advocate, a position that ensured he had an almost unchecked influence over 
Scottish matters in Westminster. The Faculty of Medicine, dominated by Conservatives, initially 
refused to allow the Chair to practice within their rooms, and the course was taught from the Law 
School where the powerful patronage of Erskine ensured its success. It was not until 1825, a year after 
Robert Christison had succeeded Duncan as the Chair of Medical Jurisprudence, that the subject was 
recognised by the Edinburgh Medical Faculty and gained acceptance as a formal branch of medicine. 
(pp. 146-151)  
107 White, ‘Training medical policemen’, pp.145-45 
108 Glaister, ‘Whither Forensic Medicine?’, British Medical Journal, 245 (8), 1952, p.473 (italics 
added) 
109 White, ‘Training medical policemen’, pp.145-49. The Act of Union “left Edinburgh as a capital 
without a royal court or the trappings of political power”, a situation that gradually gave rise to “an 
influential professional class” sustaining a “dense network of lesser nobility, lawyers, clergymen and 
doctors bound closely together by intricate familial relationships and political loyalties.” It was this 
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understanding of ‘policing’ more generally was established in Scotland following the 
Scottish Police Acts and the creation of a unified police force in Edinburgh in 1806. 
David Barrie has shown that, in Scotland, municipal police forces encompassed a 
broad range of civic functions including keeping social order, maintaining amenities 
such as lighting and paving, and ensuring dwellings were kept clean and safe.110 It 
was this notion of ‘policing’ in its broadest sense that informed the teaching of 
medical police to Scotland’s doctors, and the subject was always tied to a 
“fundamental concern about social order” amongst the ruling elite of Edinburgh, who 
wished in particular to develop a body of learned knowledge that could be applied to 
the understanding of crimes against property. As White argues, the figures who 
established medical police as an integral part of the Scottish curriculum: 
 
grasped the changing nature of society after the political revolutions in America and France and the 
onset of industrialization. They realized the ultimate value of inserting medical knowledge into the 
delicate balancing mechanism of the new social order. This explains their agitation for the formalized 
academic teaching of medical jurisprudence and police to combat the social evils of crime and squalor. 
The former offered medical expertise to protect the individual and his property, the latter offered 
medical aid to protect the health of the community.111  
 
This marks a significant context to the later nineteenth-century debates I will chart 
throughout this thesis, where psychiatry struggled to negotiate a place in this system 
of medical police in reference to discussions of physical and moral degeneration and 
habitual criminality. In addition, it suggests the importance of examining the debates 
which were produced at the intersection of psychiatry and the law. Psychiatrists, as 
members of Edinburgh’s medical community, were exposed to the influence of 
                                                                                                                                            
close proximity of the heads of municipal authority to the centre of power that allowed for the 
administration of public health programmes in Scotland long before the mid-century Chadwick health 
reforms in England.  
110 While police forces were also established in the major cities of England around this time, their 
function was restricted more narrowly to the formation of a constabulary presence. See Barrie, Police 
in the Age of Improvement: Police development and the civic tradition in Scotland, 1775-1865, Willan 
Publishing, 2008 
111 White,‘Training medical policemen’, p.149; The collectivist underpinning of medical police were 
underscored by Andrew Duncan, who wrote in the introduction to his Heads of lectures on Medical 
Police (1801) that the subject was even more important than medical jurisprudence, for while the latter 
protected the rights of the individual in society, the former was aimed at protecting the well-being of 
the whole population 
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medical police, encouraging them to think legalistically as well as medically, 






































From its first appearance in Morel’s 	des 
rescences (1857) the idea of 
degeneration attracted wide interest amongst psychiatrists throughout Europe.112 The 
essential elements of Morel’s system – postulating a progressive degeneration of 
certain family lines as a result of morbid heredity – are well known and have been 
covered extensively in the scholarly literature.113 As many commentators have noted, 
the unification of science and theology was a central concern for Morel, whose 
worldview was fervently Catholic, marked as it was by a general pessimism 
concerning the inevitability of human wickedness. Indeed, Morel opened his treatise 
with a discussion of Genesis before going on to argue that modern society had placed 
mankind in an unnatural situation replicating the conditions of the Fall, with exposure 
to toxins and industrial towns representing the original sin of the nineteenth 
century.114 Hence, while his system depicted a living world subject to immense 
change, it was at the same time kept in equilibrium, since the eventual sterility of a 
degenerate line served a compensatory mechanism through which natural law could 
combat human fallibility; as Morel put it, “by nature’s law of conservation, the 
individuals guilty of excess are struck with debility”, a punishment which would 
return in their offspring with ever greater intensity until the degenerate line was 
erased from history.115 Yet his system was at the same time permeated by optimism, 
emphasising that individuals could escape the cycle of decline through the 
intervention of psychiatrists. 
 
                                                 
112 B. A. Morel,  des 
rescences physiques, intellectuelles et morales de l’ce humaine : 
et des causes qui produisent ces s maladives,  Paris: J.B. re, 1857. 
113 See in particular Coffin, La Transmission de la Folie, pp. 25-45; Coffin, ‘Heredity, Milieu and Sin: 
the works of Bénédict Augustin Morel (1809-1873), in A Cultural History of Heredity II: 18th and 19th 
Centuries, Max Plank-Institut für Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 1993 Conference, Preprint 247: 153-164; 
Harris, Murderers and Madness, pp. 52-55; Dowbiggin, Inheriting Madness, pp. 116-120; Pick, Faces 
of Degeneration, pp. 44- 50. An excellent short overview of degeneration theory can be found in 
Francoise Bing, ‘La Théorie de la dégénérescence’, in J Postel and C Quétel (eds.), Nouvelle histoire 
de la psychiatrie, Toulouse, 1983, pp. 351.356. 
114 Morel, 	des 
rescences, p.vi. 
115 Ibid., p.95 
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In this discussion I draw upon the prominent themes raised by Morel’s 
discussion of degeneration, situating them both within the context of Morel’s treatise 
and the activities of the Société Médico-psychologique, France’s professional 
organisation for asylum doctors. I focus on the major ideas that were introduced by 
Morel’s text before turning to look at the role these played in the institutional 
environment of French psychiatry. I then turn to examine how these ideas were 
developed by another prominent psychiatrist, Valentin Magnan, outlining the French 
context for degenerationist debate that was taken up in Great Britain. Finally I 
consider a brief case-study, examining the restrictions placed on the psychiatric theory 
of heredity faced when it was advanced as evidence of insanity in courts of law. 
 
3.2 Alcohol, Heredity, and Degeneration in Morel’s First Treatise 
 
 Of the huge array of topics Morel introduced with his treatise, perhaps the single 
most important for psychiatry was the distinction between the natural and unnatural 
(morbid) modifications of the human being to its surrounding. Modification had been 
a familiar concept in the eighteenth-century French tradition of natural history 
stretching from Buffon (1707 – 1788) to Bichat (1771 – 1802) and, by the mid-
nineteenth century, was commonly used to provide an anthropological account of the 
elevation of the faculties and the development of moral sense without appealing to 
divine origins.116 The general form of this argument typically followed the theory of 
degeneration Buffon had outlined in his Histoire naturelle, the first three volumes of 
which had got him into a spot of bother with the Jansenists for making “reprehensible 
statements” on generation that ignored the account provided in Genesis. Keen to 
avoid censure through placement on the Index of Forbidden Books, Buffon altered his 
account to bring his theory into line with the ‘kinds’ of Genesis (Genesis, 1: 11-25), 
maintaining that each species bore an essential property which was attested by the 
cross-fertility of its formally divergent individual members.117 Buffon listed climate, 
                                                 
116 A concise yet detailed summary of this tradition can be found in Phillip Sloan, ‘The Idea of Racial 
Degeneracy in Buffon’s Histoire Naturelle’, in Harold Pagliaro (ed.) Studies in Eighteenth Century 
Culture, Vol. III., Cleveland, 1973: 293-321. 
117 F. N. Egerton, ‘A History of the Ecological Sciences, Part 24: Buffon and Environmental Influences 
on Animals’, Bulletin of the Ecological Society of America, 88 (2), 2007: 146-159 (146-147). For these 
reasons the historian Jacques Roger has argued that it is impossible “to see in Buffon a precursor of 
transformism”, for: “On the biological level, the products of degeneration were for him never, properly 
speaking, anything more than varieties within a species. One could relate the peccary to the pig and the 
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nourishment, and domesticity as causes of change in the constitution of animals – a 
principle that was extended to humans simply by substituting the influence of 
civilisation (custom, manners, and education) for domesticity – to provide a ‘natural 
history’ of each species.  
 
Elements of Buffon’s theory of variation remained in Morel’s system as an 
explanation for ‘normal variation’, and on this level the theory of degeneration 
continued to account for organic change within the framework of natural 
modification. For instance, Morel argued that Northern Europeans who had migrated 
to the tropics came to display certain physiological changes accompanied by a 
depression of vital functions – a degeneration serving as a sobering lesson for 
European colonisers – and discussed in his treatise the work of a Dr Yvan, noting that 
the Portuguese inhabitants of Malacca, descendents of Vasco da Gama living in the 
jungles around Mount Ophir, had degenerated under the influence of the foreign 
climate to their current “pitiable condition”.118 Yet at the same time Morel’s theory of 
degeneration was recognised by his contemporaries as a significant break with the 
tradition of natural modification, for he added the concept of a deviation that could 
introduce “abnormal conditions” into the species itself, producing “races capable of 
perpetuating themselves with a special typical character”.119 This was a point Morel’s 
colleagues in the medical profession were keen to draw attention to. As Philippe 
Buchez, Christian socialist minister and one of the leading figures of the Société 
Médico-psychologique put it, where Buffon had detected only the “simple 
pathological modifications” that were not “considered alterations of human nature”, 
Morel had gone much further in postulating a modification of the human that departed 
from the natural order.120 Thus, while the eighteenth-century tradition of natural 
variation had emphasised only those variations occurring within the fixed limits of an 
unchanging species, Morel’s treatise had introduced a new terminology of ‘unnatural’ 
                                                                                                                                            
jaguar to the panther, but that was all. . . . On a deeper level, that of the knowledge of nature, Buffon’s 
science required a permanent and immutable order, without which man could not know the reality of 
things, for that reality would be perpetually fleeting and temporary.” Hence, within the latitude allowed 
by genera and species, the fixity of forms was essential to Buffon’s theory since it “brought order to 
diversity and permanence to the succession of beings”, producing what he saw as a truly scientific (that 
is, ordered) account of the living world. J Roger, The Life Sciences in Eighteenth-Century French 
Thought, Stanford University press, 1998 (Trans., Orig. 1963), p.468. 
118 Morel, 	des 
rescences pp. 414-420. 
119 Morel, op. cit., p.4 
120 Cited in Pick, Faces of Degeneration, p.60 
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or ‘morbid’ modifications along with the notion of an organic form incapable of 
adapting to its environment. Once present these modifications tended to build an 
internal pathological momentum propelling the family line or race toward infertility, 
eventually severing degenerates from the essence of their humanity. As the British 
Quarterly Review noted in 1859 (the first discussion of these ideas in a British 
journal), Morel’s theory of natural and unnatural heredity provided a fresh exposition 
of the principles of Uniformity and Diversity that had been long been held in the 
natural sciences, though he still maintained that “the dwarf and the giant, the black 
and the yellow, the philosopher and the imbecile” resembled one another more closely 
than they did the ape.121  
 
While Morel’s attempt to dismantle the theory of fixed species was 
acknowledged as a significant contribution to natural philosophy by his 
contemporaries, the question presents itself as to why an asylum doctor working in a 
small institution in the Rouen was concerned with modifying theories of descent and 
transmission. Equally puzzling is the rapid recognition he received from his peers at 
the Société Médico-psychologique who deemed him to have rendered a great service 
to mental medicine. In order to answer this problem we must locate the significance 
of Morel’s concept of morbid modification within the structure of his first treatise, 
seeking to understand the role of maladaptation in reference to the three principal 
themes his psychiatry addressed: 
 
1. The delicate nature of the nervous system, poised between mind and body, 
which rendered it particularly susceptible to mal-adaptations and 
abnormalities. If the essence of human superiority consisted in a precarious 
balancing of the physical and the mental, understanding the processes capable 
of disturbing this balance would be of great advantage to medicine. 
2. In Morel’s system mental disorder presented itself only in the final stages of 
the degenerative process, with asylums for the insane collecting together 
various degenerations of the human race.122 The theory of degeneration 
                                                 
121 ‘Anon’, ‘Physical and Moral Heritage’, British Quarterly Review, 29 (57), 1859, pp.3-56. (p.5) 
122 Morel, op. cit., p. xxi 
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therefore allowed the asylum to serve as a laboratory for research into the 
causes and consequences of humanity gone wrong. 
3. Since the naturalist’s model of the species accepted a great variance between 
types it was necessary to develop a theoretical tool capable of distinguishing 
the natural adaptations observed in different racial groups from the abnormal 
adaptations constitutive of degeneracy. 
 
If psychiatrists could establish a link between fragile psycho-somatic balance, the 
aggregate of degenerate beings in their asylums, and the broader themes of descent, 
race, and transmission, then they could distinguish their discipline from general 
medicine. As such it was precisely the elements of Morel’s theory that seem 
speculative to a twenty-first-century observer that made it scientifically interesting to 
mid-nineteenth-century psychiatrists. Indeed it was the third, anthropological concern 
that really interested Morel, since it suggested that by measuring degrees of difference 
an essential quality could be determined. Medical writers needed to be sure that they 
were describing degenerations amongst European populations rather than natural 
adaptations to changing surroundings. To establish the essential difference between 
degeneration and variation was therefore to postulate a means of separating questions 
of qualitative difference – the distance between civilised and savage races – from 
quantitative differences – the distance between normality and degeneracy. While 
degeneration theory in Morel’s treatise rested upon the language of colonialism, it 
was not intended to pursue colonial ends, and it evoked colonial presences only to 
amplify the disorder, and danger, of Europe’s indigenous degenerates. As Daniel Pick 
has observed, the development of theoretical tools such as evolutionary anthropology 
and psychiatry were not only used to “differentiate the colonised overseas from the 
imperial race, but also to scrutinise portions of the population at home.”123 Thus, for 
instance, when Morel described the difference between “the luxurious Eastern and the 
energetic European” or, pursuing ever more distant anthropological speculations, the 
“Esquimaux who gorges himself with whale’s blubber in his hut of snow” and the 
“African starveling who pursues the lion under a tropical sun”, he was only seeking to 
widen the parameters of natural variation against which the European degenerate 
could be compared. In portraying the natural variations to which humanity was 
                                                 
123 Pick, Faces of Degeneration, p.39. 
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subject in such colourful terms he nonetheless took it for granted that the “intellectual 
inferiority” found amongst “primitive peoples” did not “necessarily involve the idea 
of a morbid state, as observed in true degeneration.”124 It was therefore necessary to 
distinguish between the “lowest forms of natural modification, such as the Hottentots 
and Bosjesmans” and the “true morbid degenerations” found in the insane asylums of 
Europe.125  
 
By reconfiguring the taxonomical systems of psychiatry Morel sought to draw 
attention to the relevant distinction between natural and pathological modification, 
emphasising the degree of difference between normal and abnormal states. This 
position nonetheless avoided facile racial stereotyping, and Morel was keen to point 
out that the “lowest Bosjesman” and the “most civilised European” were far more 
similar in their mental powers than were the normal and degenerate European. 
Furthermore, while the normal Bosjesman’s child was able to ascend the ladder of 
complexity under the right conditions, the born degenerate of any race could only 
hope for an “amelioration” in his condition, becoming temporarily relieved of the 
symptoms of a degeneracy whose “hereditary influence” would “always weigh upon 
his descendents” causing him to “remain all his life what he is in reality, a specimen 
of degeneration in the human race, an example of morbid deviation from the normal 
type of humanity.”126  
 
We can see that while Morel was not unduly pessimistic about the prospects of 
the ‘lower races’, the members of which could be elevated through education and 
civilising projects, his system of classification did not offer similar hopes for those 
degenerates found within a race or nation, designated with the label of “the dangerous 
classes” and requiring a different approach in both medicine and jurisprudence. Here 
Morel contended that degeneration created dangerous beings whose incapability of 
reform rendered psychiatric intervention in the field of state and legal medicine 
essential, yet at the same time the situation could not be a hopeless one if the expert’s 
remedial role was to be preserved. A paradoxical tension between degeneration and 
regeneration, intractability and therapy was characteristic of most psychiatric writing 
                                                 
124 Morel, op. cit, p.25. 
125 Morel, Ibid., pp. 40-44. 
126 Morel, Ibid., pp. 45. 
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in the second half of the nineteenth century. These tensions were nowhere more 
evident than in Morel’s discussion of the “deplorable confusion” in the medical 
treatment of degenerates, for on the one hand he advised psychiatrists that “moral 
therapeutics ought to be exercised” whenever a degenerate was discovered within 
their asylums, while on the other he spoke of the “sadly disappointed hopes” of those 
members of the profession who had directed “all the force of their medical powers 
towards the cure of unmodifiable beings” who were “not the representatives of any 
simple and isolated pathological condition, but of the entire degenerative elements of 
their ancestry.”127 
 
If the danger posed by such degenerations remained unclear to the public, 
Morel made his argument all the stronger by appealing to the noxious influence of 
alcohol upon the race. Morel, it must be noted, also considered the degenerative 
effects of various alimentary and environmental dangers, such as lead poisoning and 
inadequate diet, along with the consumption of drugs such as opium and hashish.128  
However, the discussion of these latter was rooted in an Orientalist account of 
Chinese and Near Eastern habits which served primarily to give his readers a “striking 
analogy” of foreign practices with European drunkenness (a pattern later writers, 
particularly Thomas Clouston in Scotland, would follow in their discussion of non-
European drug-induced states of mind.) This division of East and West was drawn 
from Morel’s former student, Moreau de Tours, who dealt in particular with the 
Eastern hashish eater, though the difference in patterns of indulgence was related in 
the former’s treatise to the “predominance of the lymphatic temperament” in the 
Orient, a temperamental difference which accounted for the “absence of those motives 
for over-excitement of the functions of the brain found in Europeans.”129  
 
While alcohol was part of a broader toxicological discussion of ‘racial 
poisons’ in Morel’s work, it remained the chief vector of European degeneracy, both 
                                                 
127 Morel, Ibid.,  p.487. 
128 Morel devoted 40 pages of his treatise to both the physiological effects and the hereditary 
consequences of alcoholism, 7 pages to hashish, 15 to opium, 15 to tobacco, and over a hundred to the 
various alimentary and environmental toxins and the statistical evidence for their influence on 
degeneration. Hence, alcohol was the single most prominent cause of degeneration discussed in his 
work, though his overall discussion was clearly tilted toward issues of ‘environmental’ degeneration. 
129 Morel, Ibid., p.561 For a discussion of the cultural resonance of these debates within and beyond 
French medicine in the nineteenth century see Tony James, Dream, Creativity, and Madness in 
Nineteenth-Century France, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 98-130. 
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biologically and socially. Morel acknowledged the contributions of earlier medical 
writers who had described the toxic effects of alcohol – in particular the Swedish 
physician Magnus Huss (1807-1890), from whom a large part of his own clinical data 
was borrowed – though he was quick to point out that the symptoms previous 
physicians had described were by no means the worst effects of the condition, since 
they were suggestive of “isolated facts, terminating with the individual” and 
overlooked the real dangers arising from alcohol’s tendency to infect the race itself. 
Huss had first described the condition of ‘chronic alcoholism’ in the 1840s by 
collecting the various physiological and moral complications caused by excessive 
drunkenness under a single diagnostic heading.130 While Huss’s descriptions of the 
pathology of drunken individuals were hugely influential amongst his contemporaries 
in the world of European medicine (in spite of his decision to publish in Swedish 
rather than French or German), he demonstrated little interest in aligning his ideas 
with debates about heredity diathesis or the fate of the European race. Rejecting the 
suggestion that the propensity to drink could be inherited, he exercised caution against 
painting an overly bleak picture of the alcohol problem. Such caution was not unusual 
during this period, indeed in 1849, when Huss received the Monthyon prize for his 
work on alcoholism, the President of the French Academy noted that “there are 
perhaps lots of drunkards in France, but fortunately there are no alcoholics.”131 
Similarly, when in the 1840s French doctor and hygienist Louis René Villermé 
published a series of influential discussions of the living conditions of drunken textile 
workers under the July Monarchy, he made no suggestion that the poor health and 
overindulgence of this group was the result of anything other than circumstance (this 
is not to say that the accounts of Huss or Villermé were not moralistic in tone 
however).132  
 
It was as part of this project of state-science that Morel’s treatise, presented as 
a work of physical and moral hygiene, attempted to render a “service to legal 
                                                 
130 On Huss see J. Sournia, A History of Alcoholism, Basil Blackwell, 1990, pp. 44-50. 
131 B. Dargelos, ‘Une spécialisation impossible: L’émergence et les limites de la médicalisation de la 
lutte antialcoolique en France (1850 – 1940)’, Actes de la recherche en sciences socials (156-157) 
March 200: La spécialisation de la médecine XIXe-XXe siècles: 53- 71 (54). 
132 For a discussion of these events, see Louis Chevalier, Labouring Classes and Dangerous Classes in 
Paris During the First Half of the Nineteenth Century, New York, 1973. 
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medicine” by assisting the “personal and hereditary” victims of alcoholism.133 Once 
again however, the paradoxical tension between degeneration and regeneration was 
raised, for while Morel indicated that his theory would serve both law and science in 
combating alcoholic degeneration, he also drew attention to the “almost utter 
impossibility of escape from the [degenerate] hereditary type once stamped upon the 
race”, going on to note of alcoholics that: 
 
When degenerates of this category have spent some time in a house of recovery they are restored to 
their higher faculties and sentiments and will solemnly promise to mend their ways if it will assist them 
in gaining health and liberty. In such cases, the intervention of [administrative] authorities or the family 
may force upon the doctor a decision which, in time, all concerned will come to repent. In my time 
presiding over such facilities I have never witnessed the recovery of a single alcoholic degenerate 
whose predisposition to drink was descended from parental vice. Upon leaving my establishment, these 
types invariably revert to their old habits and must once again be removed from society so that the 
same cycle can begin anew, each time precipitating the advance of degeneration in the race a little 
further. 134  
 
This statement reveals much about the inner workings of degeneration theory 
in psychiatry: notice, for instance, how many ‘political’ points are concealed within a 
simple description of the alcoholic degenerate. The concept of heredity had a long and 
politically engaged history in French medicine, and Morel’s own understanding of 
this term was clarified in a section of his first treatise discussing the “way of 
understanding the action of heredity in the production of degenerates”, a section in 
which he introduced the “law of double fecundation.”135 With this law Morel made 
two important clarifications concerning his use of the term. Firstly, he made it clear 
that when he described degeneration as a condition perpetuated through heredity, he 
did not mean to imply that it involved the direct transmission of a static malady from 
parent to child. Degeneration was rather the acquisition of an organic predisposition 
to develop similar abnormalities (diathesis). Secondly, he emphasised that imprudent 
behaviour could instigate this ‘heredity’ trait in an individual not otherwise 
                                                 
133 Morel, 	 des 
rescences, p.xxxiii & p.381 (c.f. also Morel, p.343: “I have been long 
accustomed not to think of mental alienation as an isolated phenomenon; this is seemingly a simple 
principle, though its application indicates the great complexity of the evil and the necessity to find a 
starting point [for our enquiries] which lies outside of the individual.”). 
134 Ibid., p.118 n.1. 
135 Ibid., pp.564 -572. 
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predisposed.136 Hence, the double fecundation of hereditary degeneracy meant there 
was no clear way for the lay observer to disentangle cause from effect; a drunkard 
may be causing degeneracy within the race, though she may also be merely acting out 
its consequences (a position with clear medico-legal significance).  
 
In concluding his discussion of the scientific significance of the discovery of 
double fecundation, Morel argued that alcoholic intoxication served as the most 
noteworthy example of its effect, since the children of alcoholics were prey to both 
constitutional abnormality and a moral environment that tended to encourage further 
vice.137 The public danger of this dual exposure to heredity and milieu was 
emphasised by the typical cases of ‘racial’ (familial) degeneration outlined in the 
treatise, proceeding from the first to the final generation in the following way: 
Depravity and alcoholic excess; hereditary drunkenness; systematic ideas of 
persecution and homicidal impulses; stupor, extinction of the race.138 Once again, the 
political dimensions of this sequence are manifest, particularly in the way that 
psychiatry’s service to public hygiene was underlined by connecting together petty 
acts such as alcoholic excess, immediate threats to the public order such as homicidal 
impulses, and the potential for racial dissolution. The immediate remedy to this 
situation required placing degenerates in asylums (though of course in a certain sense 
all of those in asylums were, according to Morel’s system, already degenerates). 
However, it is likely that the idea was directed more toward the realm of forensic 
psychiatry, underwriting the expertise of the psychiatric witness in the detection of 
criminals.139 Following the sequence Morel had outlined time and again in his treatise, 
degenerates were shown to be potentially dangerous to society, both directly in the 
presence of homicidal impulse and indirectly in their ability to transmit degeneracy in 
still more severe forms to future generations. In short, this was the ultimate expression 
of a psychiatric strategy that sought traces of danger in the slightest act, creating a 
                                                 
136 Ibid., p.565. 
137 Morel, Op. Cit., p.653. 
138 Ibid., pp.125 – 126: For instance, Morel outlines a family descended from a man killed in a drunken 
quarrel at the cabaret. His son inherited this moral lesson, which became subject to somatic heredity 
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139 As Ruth Harris has argued, “most of the medico-legal specialists [in France] placed an immense 
emphasis on the hygienic aspect of their work”, particularly as it related to the theory of degeneration; 
Murderers and Madness: medicine, law, and society in the Fin de cle, Oxford: Clarendon, 1989, 
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continuum between the minor offender and the decay of the race. According to this 
system, far from dealing with petty drunks, psychiatry protected the public from the 
future production of brutal murderers, and when it dirtied its hands with insane killers, 
it did so in service of the future of the race itself. Preventing the implicit 
consequences of this sequence of decline at an early stage suggested the necessity of 
psychiatry’s place within the modern state.  
 
It is clear from the portions of Morel’s first treatise discussed above that its 
author did indeed envision a prominent role for psychiatry within the constitution of 
the modern state, and that he used degeneration theory to emphasise both the social 
utility and scientific credibility of psychiatric knowledge. Morel’s two strategies for 
the control of degeneration, the promotion of the moral law and prophylaxis, mapped 
roughly onto the series of great polarities which structured nineteenth-century 
thought: Evangelicalism and Benthamism, Punishment and Reform, Heredity and 
Milieu, Man and Animal, God and Nature. While all of these themes were present to a 
greater or lesser extent in Morel’s work, they would only be drawn out fully by 
subsequent commentators, who saw in his system the means of restructuring 
psychiatry as part of a programme of public hygiene. However, as noted above, while 
Morel emphasised each of the elements in these polarities, his discussion already 
appeared as balanced toward one extreme. While the promotion of the moral law and 
prophylaxis seemed to mirror the popular missions that were spreading the idea of 
personal restraint and civilisation to the masses, Morel suggested that the moral law 
could only be implemented in those of a sound biological organisation, or that 
different degrees of abnormality perverted the moral instincts to a different extent. 
Thus, “the duty of the physician” did not end with the treatment of transitory cases of 
illness, but called for a perpetual intervention in the life of the masses. This perpetual 
intervention already suggested the predominant role that would be played by the 
second strategy of prophylaxis; if the moral regimens of the physician were destined 
to fail in more severe cases of degeneracy, he would be called upon to dispatch his 
patients to the prison or asylum, ensuring that society was relieved of danger. 
 
Morel did not see an intractable contradiction in this method of moving 
hopeless degenerates between freedom to participate in a moral therapy which they 
lacked the inner will to follow and compulsory detention for the benefit of the race, 
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but it is not difficult to see why later generations dispensed with his moral method of 
curing deviance and strengthened the rhetoric surrounding the second, eugenic 
method. Hence, perhaps the most obvious thing we can say about degeneration is that, 
in its deliberately vague formulation, it was left open to subsequent reinterpretation 
and reapplication by a future generation of doctors. The first of these reinterpretations 
was an almost inevitable development of Morel’s system itself, involving a gradual 
extension of his pathological metaphors to encompass ever wider social and medical 
phenomena. As Jean-Christophe Coffin has argued, the tendency of degeneration to 
draw on provocative images and metaphors far removed from neutral description of 
clinical facts ostensibly employed by psychiatrists made it an appealing framework 
within which to situate accounts of mental disease; indeed, it was perhaps the power 
of degeneration to free doctors from the sterility of these descriptions that led to its 
continuing popularity, particularly in the 1880s. Indeed, he continues, on the one hand 
it should not surprise us to see degeneration employed so widely by physicians and 
psychiatrists; doctors of the period were undoubtedly ‘moralists’, observing the social 
organism with all the anxieties characteristic of their age and experiencing little 
motivation to question the assumptions of an underlying general state of pathology. 
However, writes Coffin, it is surprising to note that the theme of degeneration 
favoured “an excessive production of fantasmic language and imagery”, creating a 
situation in which later writers, such as Arthur Bordier, could “evoke hospitals in 
which the entire population consisted of degenerates, scenes said to be described 
brilliantly by Morel, even though the latter had never said anything of the sort.”140  
 
Thus, following Morel’s proposal of degeneration theory, there was amongst 
French commentators an increasing tendency to describe threats to the national 
stability, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the intense period of crisis that 
shook the political and social order during the early 1870s. The social crisis following 
the Prussian siege and the Paris Communes of the early 1870s brought the French 
nation’s problems into particularly sharp focus. Military defeat at the hands of an 
emergent foreign power followed by the insurrection of the masses at home generated 
                                                 
140 Coffin, La Transmission de la folie, pp.118-119 Bordier penned the entry on degeneration that 
appeared in the Dictionnaire des sciences anthropologiques of 1884. Though Bordier’s article was not 
strictly psychiatric, his entry being for the most part a study in juvenile delinquency, he nonetheless 
displayed the extent to which broader anthropological, sociological, and philosophical concerns with 
degeneration were able to translate across the disciplines. 
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the widespread perception of a nation sapped of its vitality, a sentiment captured in 
Proust’s narrative recollection that, when the young Marcel had raised the subject of 
the Art for Art’s Sake movement in conversation with a diplomat, he had been 
rebuked for his preoccupation with insignificant topics at a time when France “may be 
overwhelmed at any moment by a double tide of barbarians, those from without and 
those from within our borders.”141  The social disturbances of the early 70s were 
followed by a significant change of political leadership during the following two 
decades, as the republicans rose to power and re-oriented the branches of the State, 
attempting to expunge Catholicism from the French intellectual landscape. While 
there had been a tradition of intimacy between the State and psychiatry dating back to 
the confinement laws of 1838, the political and ideological network that linked the 
concerns of psychiatry to those of the governing bureaucracy was to tighten following 
the republicans’ rise to political dominance, producing an “almost feverish 
collaboration” between psychiatry and the State.142 The anti-clericalism of the Third 
Republic was tied to a number of factors, particularly in its fear of the “clerico-
monarchist influence in certain sectors of the social elite, notably the officer corps of 
the Army”, a fact which weakened the ability of the “fledgling Republic” to defend 
itself from the internal and external threats it faced, though the influence of 
ideological re-orientation was also palpable in the State’s attempt to wrest the control 
of education from the Catholic institutions which had historically catered to the 
nation’s poor.143 The fact that huge swathes of the country did not speak French, or 
spoke it only as a second language without affiliating themselves with any particular 
‘French identity’, only served to strengthen the perceived need for a unified 
programme of reforms.144 This then was a process of ‘State creation’ and nation 
building under which psychiatry hoped to secure a prominent position.  
 
This process of constructing a national identity was not of course unique to 
France; as Eric Hobsbawm argues in reference to Britain, the function of primary 
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schools during this same period was, beyond teaching the “rudiments of literacy and 
arithmetic”, to “impose the values of society (morals, patriotism, etc.), on their 
inmates.”145 Yet in France the process expressed itself in almost all facets of 
institutional life, from education to medical administration the organs of the State 
were mobilised to denounce the Catholic ideals which had formerly policed the 
nation. Up to the eve of the Third Republic, psychiatrists had been kept under close 
surveillance by the clerical wing of the Bonapartist government, which was both 
sympathetic to the Church and reliant upon it to monitor the ideological purity of its 
civil servants. These clerical observers felt philosophical materialism to be 
particularly noxious, and went to great lengths to expunge it from the academy; for 
instance, a medical degree awarded by the Paris Faculty of Medicine in 1867 
discussing the penological implications of the non-existence of free-will was annulled 
by the University’s academic council when they discovered its materialist content.146 
Suddenly, under a Republic which rallied to Gambetta’s cry “Clericalism, there’s the 
enemy!” psychiatrists found themselves operating under a new ideological orthodoxy, 
one which not only struck the shackles from materialism, but actively encouraged 
them to launch excoriating attacks on the beloved ideals of the clerical 
establishment.147  
 
While Esquirol and his contemporaries had not insisted on somatic 
classification, the republican generation of psychiatrists began to discover a 
proliferation of somatic illnesses, gradually displacing moral and psychological 
explanations from their descriptions of insanity.148 Hence, psychiatrists and medical 
jurisprudists were offered a particular incentive to storm the Bastille of Free Will as 
the Republican backlash worked tirelessly to repudiate the ideas clericalists had so 
diligently preserved: a fact which goes some way to accounting for the sudden 
explosion of texts discussing mechanistic legal philosophy during this period. On a 
more general level, the presence of a codified system of laws in France defined 
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sharply the terms according to which psychiatry would be accorded its role as a legal 
speciality, producing a well regulated profession which clearly understood the rules of 
the game being played. While the 1838 law had formalised psychiatric dominance of 
the asylum network in France, requiring each of the country’s administrative districts 
to maintain a public asylum staffed by a medical superintendent, it simultaneously 
empowered and impeded psychiatrists. Firstly, and somewhat inevitably, it was never 
fully enforced.149 Secondly, and more damagingly, by allowing doctors unrestricted 
power of certification, it had dispossessed the traditional authorities of their right to 
oversee asylum confinement, creating a vengeful judiciary that instantly turned 
against the new institutional role of psychiatry. In the early 1860s, Jules Falret 
complained at a meeting of the Société Médico-psychologique that; “The law of 1838 
and the asylums for the insane are being attacked on all sides. In the press, in books, 
at scientific congresses . . . It is proposed to overturn everything, destroy everything . . 
. A veritable crusade has been preached for some years against the present-day 
organisation of institutions for the insane.”150 Thus, when Morel spoke about the 
‘fact’ of rising insanity, and denounced any attempts to relate this to an increased use 
of the 1838 laws, he was “merely reiterating a consensus view” shared by members of 
the Société Médico-psychologique.151 It was against this context that French 
psychiatrists sought to change their rhetoric and appeal for clemency from a hostile 
public. Far from being omnipotent asylum-keepers willing to lock up innocent 
citizens, they began to send out the message that they were public health officials 
engaged in a war against the scourges of French society – crime, alcoholism, 
madness, and above all, racial degeneration.  
 
Furthermore, as Bertrand Dargelos had shown in regard to the French anti-
alcohol campaigns, an increasing number of physicians and surgeons working in 
France around this time argued that widespread alcoholic intoxication was to blame 
for their occasional professional failures, a move coupled with a growing sense 
amongst the members of Academy that they possessed no effective means of 
combating public drunkenness. Indeed, Dargelos notes, it was not within the asylums 
of France, but at the Académie de médicine, “temple” of the elite university hospital 
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system, that the standard account of the “danger of alcoholism in a process of 
degeneration of the ‘race’ [was] modified, discussed, and formulated officially.” 
Thus, a little over a decade after Morel had first proposed degeneration as a theory 
within the field of psychiatry, it had made the jump to other branches of pathology 
and social commentary, and in 1870 professor Verneuil, a member of the Academy’s 
surgical pathology section, was denouncing the alcoholic degenerate as a blight upon 
the surgical profession who ought to be removed from the statistics, arguing that most 
instances of surgical failure were not due to medical incompetence, but to the 
degenerate body’s unsuitability for medical intervention.152 This popularisation of 
degeneration was a mixed blessing for psychiatry. Certainly it seemed to provide a 
wider medical support for psychiatric claims concerning degeneration, alcoholism, 
and heredity, but at the same time it tended to inflect psychiatric terminology with so 
many other background assumptions and tacit understandings that the specificity of 
the psychiatric contribution to this debate became distorted. Hence, a later generation 
of French psychiatrists, led by Magnan, had to begin a new struggle to reclaim the 
alcoholic and the degenerate for clinical psychiatry.   
 
3.3 Valentin Magnan: The St. Paul of Degeneration Theory 
 
The evocations of a host of commentators outside the field of clinical psychiatry show 
that while Morel had founded a new system of thought, its very success took it 
quickly away from its origins in the world of the asylum. In both the medical 
discussion of alcoholism and the reshaping of degeneration theory it was the tireless 
work of Valentin Magnan (1835-1916) that sought to re-establish these fields as an 
integral element of psychiatric discourse.153 Coffin has argued that Magnan’s 
importance to psychiatric history is based primarily on the introduction of two 
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developments to degeneration theory which, without being completely novel, none the 
less marked out a distinctive place for him amongst his peers. Firstly, he emphasised 
that the progressive deterioration of a degenerate could be witnessed within a single 
patient (whereas, for Morel, it was only the transmission of the condition which 
caused it to become progressively more severe).154 Hence, the sequence of 
degeneration became a condition of perpetual remission and relapse within the 
affected patient. In 1894 the General Council of the Seine decided to heed Magnan’s 
campaign for special medical facilities to deal with alcoholics and voted to construct 
France’s first special asylum for alcoholics with mental symptoms, the Maison 
Blanche. The pragmatic solution to classification eventually adopted at this institution 
relied on assessing the number of times a patient had lapsed back into their old ways 
following an initial cure. Secondly, Magnan extended the field of application of the 
concept of degeneration to include ‘normal’ patients, an extension that was to have 
medico-legal significance in later years (hence, he made it a truly clinical theory 
rather than an element of intra-national anthropology as it had previously functioned).  
 
Though Magnan’s role in the Société Médico-psychologique has been 
discussed in many historical accounts of psychiatry, his importance is, as Ian 
Dowbiggin has argued, often understated.155 Magnan’s role in spreading degeneration 
theory was entirely different to Morel’s: He wrote no grand tomes, but instead 
published many important articles based on his lecture series which he periodically re-
worked for publications in collected volumes. Magnan was regarded as an eminent 
clinician by British commentators (rather than a philosopher or theorist) and his ideas 
on both alcoholism and degeneration were significant to the development of British 
psychiatric thinking on these topics.156  He was awarded his doctorate in medicine in 
1866 and in the following year rose to prominence at the Paris Hôpital de l'enfant 
Jésus where he treated Louis Napoléon’s son, convincing the authorities presiding 
over the newly constructed Sainte-Anne Asylum to appoint Magnan as chief 
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administrator of the central office in the following year.157  This asylum, set in a 
remote rural location outside of Paris, incorporated teaching facilities in a bid to 
compete with the more prestigious Parisian asylums, and it was here that Magnan 
began to deliver lectures on the clinical aspects of mental and nervous diseases. In 
addition to serving as a leading figure of the Société Médico-psychologique, Magnan 
published selections of his work in the Journal of Mental Science and was elected 
honorary member of the MPA in 1897 at a meeting held in Edinburgh.  
 
In 1871, along with a colleague at the admissions bureau of Sainte-Anne 
named Bouchereau, Magnan submitted two articles to the Annales médico-
psychologiques – by far the most important medico-psychiatric publication in France 
at the time – providing the authors with their first major exposure to the world of 
theoretical psychiatry. In these early publications, Magnan and Bouchereau offered a 
description of the symptoms of chronic alcoholism they had encountered in Sainte-
Anne by adhering to a traditional nosological system derived from Esquirol; they 
distanced themselves from the prevalent notion that political events such as the Paris 
Commune and the popular revolts were related to a rise in madness and went so far as 
to advise their elder colleagues against rushing into such speculations.158 On the basis 
of these two articles, Magnan presented his candidacy for membership of the Société 
Médico-psychologique, which was granted in 1872. In the same year his descriptions 
of the clinical symptoms of alcoholism won him prizes from the Academy of 
Medicine and the Academy of Sciences, encouraging him to develop his ideas into a 
treatise on the subject (compiled from previous lectures and papers), which appeared 
in 1874. It was around this time that we see Magnan develop a particularly strong 
interest in both degeneration and the role of heredity in the causation of mental 
illness, an interest that was to span right up to the 1890s, when he was elected 
president of the Société Médico-psychologique.  
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Valentin Magnan’s collection of lectures, On Alcoholism (1874), was instantly 
recognised as a major addition to the medical literature on intemperance both in 
France and Great Britain.159 As the London-based physician William Smith 
Greenfield wrote in his preface to the English translation of 1876, while existing 
British medical literature discussing alcoholism had been almost exclusively 
concerned with the physiological effects of alcohol on the body, Magnan had gone 
further by addressing “the more remote questions of the effects of drinking in the 
general deterioration of the population, and the association of drunkenness, crime and 
insanity in the offspring of drunken parents.”160 Though Greenfield followed other 
British commentators in expressing a degree of scepticism over the centrality of 
absinthe in Magnan’s discussion, he suggested that the prominence of this 
quintessentially French scourge ought not to disqualify the author’s conclusions from 
the interest of British doctors, particularly as the work had already circulated amongst 
German, Spanish, and Russian medical communities, suggesting that it contained 
features of general interest.161 Furthermore, Magnan’s position at Sainte-Anne 
Asylum, “an institution to which no exact parallel exists in England”, gave him the 
advantage of “seeing the same patient in successive attacks, and of watching the 
progressive effect of continuous alcohol”, a clinical opportunity denied to his British 
counterparts.162 Thus, while there were certain contextual differences between French 
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and British doctors called to treat chronic inebriet (particularly the lack of absinthism 
in Britain), Greenfield argued that the heavily distilled nature of absinthe would 
simply magnify the results of general alcoholism one would expect to see in patients 
habituated to less extreme forms of the poison, contracting the period of clinical 
observation necessary to form conclusions without changing their nature.163  
 
In contrast to his earlier papers with Bouchereau in which he disputed the link 
between social upheaval, insanity, and alcoholism, Magnan opened his first solo 
publication on the subject with an introductory note referring to the communard 
barricades, arguing that: “Recent events have sufficiently proved that the united 
efforts of all, physicians, philosophers, and legislators, have not been too great to 
oppose the urgent danger which threatens health, morality, and society.”164 While this 
already suggests a certain change of attitude, the key innovation of this work was the 
introduction of a threefold classification of inebriety which divided the severity of the 
condition according to both the clinical symptoms and the suspected cause.165 In the 
first class Magnan placed ‘Patients affected with alcoholic delirium, with easy, 
complete, and rapid convalescence’, a group consisting of occasional or moderate 
drinkers who had simply gone too far in their indulgence as a result of circumstance. 
The second class contained ‘Patients affected with alcoholic delirium, of slow 
convalescence and with ready relapses.’ While this latter group required greater 
clinical skill to detect, since the delusional ideas induced by alcoholism would only 
reveal themselves to repeated and skilful questioning, it was similarly composed of 
‘simple’ drunkards who, though they had no hereditary tendency to drink, had 
repeatedly over indulged – a class he had frequently met with during the Prussian 
siege of Paris, which had forced citizens of the garrisoned city to subsist on a diet of 
brandy and wine. As Magnan’s stance on degeneration hardened in subsequent years, 
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his recollection of the siege changed somewhat, and when in 1890 he came to 
consider the suggestion of a doctor who had argued that, in a “generally comfortable” 
country like France, and especially in Paris, alcoholism was to be taken as a sign of 
the ease of life and not of social misery, Magnan insisted that he had diagnosed many 
cases of chronic alcoholism during the Franco-German war and the Commune when 
poverty and misery were rife, indicating that, even when faced with immediate 
necessities of survival, the degenerated organism could not resist the lure of 
alcohol.166 The members of the third and final class, containing ‘Patients specially 
predisposed’, were affected with the heredity maladies described by Moreau de 
Tours,167 Laborde,168 and Morel.169 The “cerebral inferiority of these persons”, 
Magnan noted, “finds its most frequent cause in heredity.” However, repeating 
Morel’s law of double fecundation, he went on to note that this was a “group of 
individuals who, thanks to repeated excess, create for themselves, so to speak, a 
morbid predisposition.”170 Hence, the fluidity of cause and effect was underlined as an 
essential part of the nosological system and the patients belonging to this third group 
displayed a pathological history that was consistent with the effects of degeneration 
on the family line:  
 
[The degenerate] descends in succession the various degrees of the intellectual scale, and in the third or 
fourth relapse we very often find weakening of the faculties behind the alcoholic delirium . . . In this 
class of patients alcoholic drinks act in a manner different from that on other subjects . . . there is not 
the correlation between the physical and the intellectual symptoms which we find in the generality of 
cases.171 
 
While the ‘normal’ action of alcohol in animals, including humans, was to produce 
“physical and intellectual phenomena which ordinarily advance together”, in the third 
class of drunkards, he noted, “the nervous system seems to divide itself” with the 
correlation between physical and mental functions becoming dissociated.172 The 
dissociation of the mental and physical processes of the nervous system in hereditary 
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alcoholism was not developed in any further detail in this work, though in subsequent 
years, particularly as the republican demand for somatic and materialistic medicine 
grew during the 1880s and 1890s, Magnan staked this territory out as his own, 
publishing a series of highly influential papers and engaging in an ongoing debate 
with the French psychiatric profession over the boundaries of both alcoholism and the 
hereditarian psychiatry toward which he was increasingly drawn. From his early 
rejection of the more speculative elements of degeneration theory, Magnan developed 
an influential theory of both alcoholism and degeneration which marked him out as 
one of the leading figures in psychiatry. While during the early phase of Magnan’s 
career heredity formed but one element of the tripartite classification of alcoholism, it 
gradually developed into a central theme of his work. In a lecture given at Saint-Anne 
in 1890 (the year of his election to the presidency of the Société Médico-
psychologique), he noted that: 
 
 The question of alcoholism is more important than ever, imposing itself on the thoughts of all: 
philosophers, moralists, hygienists, economists, doctors and so on. Indeed no one, especially in our old 
Europe, can remain indifferent to the presence of this invasive scourge that sapps the lifeblood of the 
populace and which, according to the expression of M. Claude, has become a social danger. It takes 
hold of the individual, transforms him in both body and mind, and strikes his descendants with the 
deepest stigmata of physical, intellectual, and moral degeneration.173 
 
Around this time Magnan fought a seemingly endless battle with the other members 
of the Société Médico-psychologique to maintain what he saw as both the correct 
definition of degeneration and the role heredity and alcoholism should play within it. 
His campaign to stabilise the referent of degeneration was directed in equal measure 
at the members of his own profession who took a dissenting view and those broader 
fields of medicine that had attempted to contribute to the debate. Hence, with the 
popularity of the concept secured, he tried to render degeneration a theory specific to 
clinical psychiatry. In particular we see a flurry of interest in ‘stabilising’ 
degeneration theory at the Société Médico-psychologique meetings from 1886 
onward, no doubt a consequence of the First International Congress of Criminal 
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Anthropology having been held in Rome in the previous year.174 The picture we get 
from these lectures and discussions is one of Magnan as a Saint Paul figure, a tireless 
campaigner for an ‘orthodox’ psychiatric understanding of degeneration theory, 
seeking to attract converts and correct their interpretive errors. However, the interest 
he showed in circumscribing the parameters of debate was in evidence before these 
wider international medico-legal debates had begun. For instance, at a meeting of the 
Société Médico-psychologique in 1885, during a discussion of the physical, 
intellectual, and moral signs of hereditary insanity, he reports the heretical position of 
Jules Falret, who is said to have: 
  
exposed, with his usual clarity, the state of the question concerning hereditary insanity, indicating a 
diverse range of opinions amongst those assembled. For some, heredity played a big part in aetiology, 
but only as a predisposing cause. For others, the influence of heredity was felt to cover a variety of 
mental forms, leaving its imprint by giving them a special appearance. Thus, the general paralytics, the 
alcoholics, the chronically delusional, the epileptics, the hysterics, and the hypochondriacs displayed 
peculiar characteristics when they fell within the scope of hereditary influence. Finally, for many 
doctors today, there exists a form of hereditary insanity which is independent from other mental 
forms.”175 
 
We can see here that the longstanding ambiguities surrounding the term ‘heredity’ 
were still a notable feature of discussion, and it remained unclear whether ‘heredity 
insanity’ marked a special form of illness that was directly transmitted, a 
predisposition to acquiring an illness that could affect those without the taint, or the 
tendency to develop a general illness in a special way. However, Magnan’s reply was 
both revealing and ingenious. “It goes without saying”, he told them, “that the patients 
suffering from the madness we label ‘hereditary’ – an improper expression which we 
keep only because it has been adopted by several authors – do not have a monopoly 
on hereditary influence, or an exclusive duty toward their descendents on account of 
their neuropathological and psychopathological dispositions.” Heredity was, he 
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assured them, active in all forms of insanity; it was simply a question of degree. Since 
all insane conditions had, to some extent, been influenced by pathological inheritance, 
it was necessary to reserve the term ‘heredity’ for those forms of insanity that were 
most glaringly and unquestionably a product of the diathetic taint. Fortunately, the 
physician’s task was facilitated by nature, since this group of the hereditary insane 
displayed, from birth, a mark of their origins: “the physical stigmata, the 
psychological stigmata, which allow them to be distinguished from the general class 
of insane.” Of further importance here was that these signs, though ostensibly present 
at birth, became intensified in childhood, at around the age of four or five, during 
which time physical deformities would become apparent and peculiar sexual or 
compulsive character traits would be displayed, a subject Magnan did not believe he 
needed to elaborate upon, since he assumed those assembled had all had “the 
opportunity to see young degenerates fall prey to obsessions, to impulses, to 
psychopathic disorders of a diverse kind.”176 The existence of these infamous stigmata 
of degeneration was of course a subject of intense dispute amongst medico-
psychiatrists and criminal anthropologists of the late nineteenth century, though 
Magnan reinvigorated the idea somewhat by attempting to claim that the obsessions 
and ‘impulsions’ of the degenerate were to be labelled stigmata, a move that allowed 
him in later years to unite the sexual body of the deviant with the existence of 
pathological sexual desires.177 
 
Hence, in presiding over these meetings, Magnan attempted to ‘save’ heredity 
insanity from the problems associated with inaccurate terminology through a strategy 
of acknowledging dissent while insisting on the propriety of maintaining a specialised 
vocabulary. This in effect allowed psychiatrists the advantages of malleable technical 
language in which a term like heredity could retain its non-specific application ‘since 
it was in common use’ while preserving its power of specific scientific designation.  
Maintaining Morel’s law of double fecundation, Magnan emphasised that heredity 
insanity could also be acquired, for instance, “as a result of acute illness in very young 
subjects”, in which case the arrest of intelligence and mental degradation was said to 
be “analogous to a condition of idiocy, imbecility, mental debility, or even a 
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hereditary disequilibrium.”178 Thus, serious illnesses such as typhoid fever, small-pox, 
and scarlet fever could produce lesions analogous to those acquired during the period 
of uterine growth, with identical results to the developing brain. The fact that 
predisposing cause (heredity) and occasioning cause (illness) could produce the same 
symptoms was in fact fairly common to French psychiatry at this time: As Ian 
Hacking notes apropos of Charcot’s hysteria diagnosis, while females were generally 
found to suffer from the condition following a period of nervous or moral shock 
which had triggered their hereditary disposition, the same disorder could be induced 
in males suffering from physical trauma to the head.179 None the less, in Charcot’s 
work the means of acquiring symptoms were generally kept separate (male hysteria 
was the production of similar symptoms through different causes), while Magnan 
insisted upon the identity of the condition irrespective of its mode of acquisition, since 
in both cases the organism was brought into disharmony or disequilibrium – a notion 
which was perhaps the central aspect of his reconfiguration of the concept of 
degeneration.180  
 
A few months after this discussion of the heredity mechanism, Magnan 
addressed the members of the Société Médico-psychologique again on the same 
subject, noting the “interesting submissions we have received concerning the 
hereditarily insane and degenerate demonstrate the importance of the issue”, a fact 
confirming that it was appropriate for the Society to “open the debate” on the subject 
once more.181 However, criticisms of the pathological dragnet were again raised, in 
particular Falret complained that Magnan had extended “the group of hereditary 
degenerates to its limits; he [Falret] would leave out certain abnormal individuals who 
possess only a few quirks of character.” In response, Magnan proposed to examine the 
abnormal subjects placed at the frontiers of madness; if these subjects did in fact 
“display characteristics analogous to those shown in recognised insane degenerates” 
he asked them, “then should we not then align ourselves with the [expansionist] 
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school?” In outlining the broader pathological species existing on the peripheries of 
degeneration, and appealing to the doctors gathered to include them within the same 
taxonomical group, Magnan argued that the “main advantage of the synthetic study of 
hereditary degenerates” was that it united “under the same framework syndromes with 
different modes of expression.” Hence, the borderline cases of degeneration such as 
oniomania – the compulsive desire to shop – were not dubious cases or ‘unscientific’ 
extensions of sound theory, but the very cases which gave scientific meaning to the 
concept of degeneration in the first place. Once again, Magnan drew attention to the 
lack of novelty in his theoretical approach, hoping to demonstrate the conventionality 
of his claims by suggesting that the members of the Société Médico-psychologique all 
recognised a common source of instability, and that this source was “none other than 
the state of mental heredity already described by Falret, the very same disequilibrium 
which I myself strove to delineate in my first submission.”182 Hence, while heredity 
and degeneration remained central to the taxonomical systems of the members of the 
Société Médico-psychologique who disagreed with him, Magnan’s bid to ensure 
professional consistency saw him pursue a combined strategy of repetition, never 
defecting from the party line, and ecumenism, incorporating as many positions as 
possible while taking care to rehearse them in synchrony with his own doctrine; as, 
for example, when he concluded the Society’s discussion of the subject by noting: 
 
In summarising the various opinions on the aetiology of mental degeneration, we can see that the 
question has been studied in all its aspects. For Dr Falret, it is the hereditary influence of ancestors 
which must be taken into account. Dr Christian insists in particular that the state of the parents at the 
moment of conception be considered, Dr Bouchereau stops at the affinities developed during foetal life, 
while Dr Cotard blames the illnesses of youth.  I, for my part, recognise the existence of all these 
causes, but on considering the facts, I cannot help but attribute a significant role to the hereditary 
influence. In any case, this discussion shows clearly that, if we differ as to the limits which may be 
assigned to the aetiological conditions, on the clinical side, that is to say, when we come to consider 
who should be included within the group of hereditary degenerates, most of us are in accord; If I may 
speak personally, I am thankful that in these new discussions the Société medico-psychologique has 
taken a step forwards in a study as important as that of mental degeneration.183 
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Finally, it must be clarified that, for all his insistence on the centrality of heredity and 
degeneration in psychiatry, in many ways Magnan remained cautious in his use of 
these ideas, particularly as they related to notions of criminality and responsibility. 
For instance, he was highly sceptical of the existence of ‘born criminals’ and, like his 
compatriot Charles Féré, did not attribute an “ancestral origin” to crime.184 While it 
was in the context of the Paris Congress of Criminal Anthropology (1888) that 
Magnan first voiced his suspicions of this typically Italian position in criminal 
anthropology, there was something in Magnan’s scepticism which moved beyond 
simply aligning himself with the national consensus.185 It is clear that Magnan’s 
rejection of the idea that primordial or germinal forms of crime were “natural 
attributes” was rooted in medico-psychiatric theory and did not follow the logical and 
methodological challenges coming from the legal delegation who had disputed the 
practicality of applying such theories in court. However, in a slightly nuanced way, 
Magnan’s argument against the cruder methods of criminal anthropology was 
legalistic, since it relied on placing ‘perverted’ instincts at the centre of the psychiatric 
examination. For Magnan, instinct and will were tied to ontogenesis that ran from the 
vegetative state, to external awareness (the opening of “increasingly clear sensations 
covering the periphery of the body which allow for more complete and intimate 
relations with the external environment”), and finally on to the ability to manipulate 
this environment volitionally toward certain goals. This progressive evolution of 
mental function, Magnan argued, leads to the ability to distinguish good and bad 
actions as a natural property of development, hence, the “normal individual is not 
naturally predisposed to crime: if he becomes a criminal, whether occasional or 
habitual, he does so under the influence of vicious passions or a wanton education.” 
Additionally, criminals “bring into the world themselves, through nervous heredity, or 
the insanity or alcoholism of their ancestors, not a natural predisposition toward 
criminal acts, but a pathological defect, a degeneration causing disorder in the 
cerebral functions.186 Degenerates, the study of which was “the exclusive 
responsibility of the clinic”, could be subject to greater temptation, but were not born 
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criminals. Thus, while he acknowledged that physical stigmata were “well known” to 
psychiatrists, he added that they “need not insist upon them; they are, in any case, 
symptoms of secondary importance” and that “a more useful study is that of the 
anomalies of cerebral development.” The point then was to preserve the skill-set of 
the psychiatrist against the reductive theories of criminal anthropology that tried to 
conduct a new pathology for each type of act:  
 
the crime itself is not important: the physician’s considerations remain the same, going beyond the 
criminal acts: the enquiry covers all aspects of the subject’s life, his ancestors, his physical defects and 
the intellectual, moral, and emotional changes which resulted. Such detailed analysis, such careful 





The development of degeneration theory in French psychiatry has been examined in 
this chapter in order to highlight the major themes that coalesced around it as a part of 
psychiatric discourse. While Morel’s initial project was caught between politico-
theological conservatism and State-based hygienism, his theory of degeneration 
brought together a range of formerly free-floating ideas within a single rhetorical 
field. In particular Morel’s idea united three prominent themes and allowed them to 
address one another in the name of a common psychiatric project. Firstly, the term 
‘degeneration’ identified the gradual changes which the notion of heredity and 
predisposition had undergone in pathological description and gave doctors a technical 
idiom to describe these processes. In fact, this move had been instigated by 
contemporaries Jacques-Joseph Moreau (de Tours) and Jean-Pierre Falret, though 
Morel’s terminology was strikingly more popular.188 In particular, Falret advanced the 
notion of ‘the condition’ (état), a state that was not in itself an illness, but led to the 
genesis of syndromes or deliriums; an idea that was differentiated from the older 
medical model of predisposition since it was not tied to any specific illness and 
rendered the bearer ‘abnormal’ (formerly, one was said to be predisposed to a specific 
condition yet could be perfectly normal). The condition, as Falret formulated it, was a 
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different matter insofar as it possessed “an absolute, total etiological value” and could 
produce any illness at any time.189 Hence, by drawing upon this trend within French 
psychiatry and general medicine, Morel was able to capture a new way of describing 
disease. Secondly, the language of degeneration was able to tie this understanding of 
pathology to the dangers of alcoholism, describing both the social threat and the threat 
to the individual this presented. Thirdly, the notion of the ‘dangerous classes’ more 
generally was brought within this field, suggesting a new model of governance that 
would rationalise the social response (particularly in the relations of these dangerous 
classes to the existing systems of law). As I will show in the next chapter, this was not 
simply a development taking place within France. Indeed, when Morel’s ideas were 
first discussed in Great Britain, there seemed to be an instant recognition that a theory 
capable of unifying heredity, alcoholism, and the need for legal reform was of great 
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4. From Peculiar Insanity to Insane Peculiarity 
 
4.1 Pathological Consolidation 
 
We have seen that while Morel’s work on degeneration came to occupy a hugely 
important (though by no means uncontested) place in French psychiatry, he was not 
the first figure to draw attention to the significance of heredity in the classification of 
illness, nor to associate the range of social pathologies with this heredity mechanism.  
For instance, the relationship between criminal conduct and heredity was already 
widely accepted by scientists and natural philosophers and, by the middle of the 
nineteenth century, the germinal traces of criminal anthropology, biologically 
determinist thought, and ideas concerning hereditary drunkenness were already 
present in British periodical discussions. However, these discussions seem at the same 
time to have been tied to an older multi-causal theory of heredity, with degeneration 
representing an “unfavourable omen” that progeny were likely to suffer from the same 
constellation of pathological causes rather than a direct transmission, let alone 
transmutation, of drunkenness and crime.190 Thus, if Morel’s general ideas were not 
exactly novel – the criminal classes, the born drunkards and the significance of 
heredity had all been discussed with increasing frequency since at least the early 
nineteenth century – the pathological discourse that predated his work lacked a 
convenient means of communicating with one another, and while the discussion of 
heredity drunkenness or criminality was not unique to Morel’s work, the theory of 
degeneration nonetheless provided a convenient way of conceptualising their 
interrelation, ensuring that from the publication of his treatise onwards these would be 
recognised as degenerationist discourses. 
 
The first major review of Morel’s ideas to appear in the British press was 
contained in the British Quarterly Review which, in 1859, set out at length to consider 
the significance of hérédité (‘heritage’) in a broad ranging article focusing on the 
philosophical implications of degeneration theory.191 One gets the sense instantly in 
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this journalistic commentary that Morel’s early impact consisted in clarifying and 
systematising various strands of thought that had, up to the publication of his treatise, 
been only loosely connected. Furthermore, as the British Quarterly Review noted, 
Morel had gone beyond these earlier studies to offer a “frightful additional testimony 
to the ineradicable nature of an inherited tendency to drink”, linking the heredity 
mechanism, alcoholism, crime, and insanity together in far more systematic terms 
than had previously been attempted to demonstrate that “without special attention to 
the rules of hygiene”, these various species of social pathology would inexorably 
“increase in gravity and intensity from generation to generation.”192  The most 
important problem presented by this new approach to the hygiene of the masses was 
Morel’s recognition that the essence of degeneracy was contained in those whose 
condition did not amount to “insanity in the eye of the law.” Hence, the article 
continued, while heredity criminality and drunkenness had been recognised as social 
pathologies by a range of nineteenth-century commentators, these same ideas had 
been just as near unanimously ignored by the “moralists and legislators” who had 
either dismissed the significance of heredity outright or insisted on “ex post facto 
considerations” surrounding the practical difficulties of implementing such 
knowledge.193  Given that the degenerate’s threat to the social order was not contained 
by the legal tests of capacity, the journal noted that social commentators and radical 
publicists should “not hesitate to [oppose judges and] say that these constitutional 
defects may be (and daily are) so combined as to produce almost complete 
irresponsibility”, ascribing to the process of degeneration: 
 
that strange insoluble problem of our race – the existence of what are called the ‘DANGEROUS 
CLASSES’; a people who seem set apart to fill our gaols, our penitentiaries, our houses of correction, 
our penal settlements; a people at war with their kind – natural enemies of their brethren; a leaven 
leavening, and infecting, and drawing into the vortex of its own corruption even the comparatively 
sound elements of society; the pariahs of humanity, the despair of philanthropists, the opprobrium of 
legislation. 
 
Here the rationale of the law was not only portrayed as an archaism, but as a danger in 
itself, since the punishment it awarded to degenerates “far from curing, chiefly 
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exacerbates.”194 Five years later, when the journal returned to this same question, it 
again noted that the degenerates and the dangerous classes had, for decades, served as 
the “stumbling-block, in the way of all effective legislation” and that if “the theory of 
their production” advanced by Morel was correct, these people should no longer be 
considered “individually criminal” as the law maintained, but helpless victims of a 
diseased collective.195  
 
4.2 The Rusting Lancet: From Disease to Constitution 
 
During the nineteenth century medical theory underwent a gradual shift in emphasis 
from disease to population. While Edinburgh physicians of first quarter of the century 
such as Thomas Trotter (1760 – 1832) and William Pulteney Alison (1790 – 1859) 
had argued that a general change from sthenic to asthenic illness could be observed 
and that nervous ailment had replaced fever as the dominant illness, in 1892 The 
Scotsman was predicting “from known physiological and psychological facts, that we 
are entering a period of ‘low vitality’ in the population generally”, a period that 
“would be marked by excessive drinking, and a fresh reinforcement through this 
means of the ranks of the insane”196 The language of constitutional change that had 
characterised the ‘golden age’ of Edinburgh medicine found its way into practically 
all the English-language treatises on the physiology and pathology of drunkenness 
issued around the middle of the nineteenth century (many of which were produced by 
Edinburgh-trained physicians). Major works like William Carpenter’s The Physiology 
of Temperance and Total Abstinence (1853) and Charles Wilson’s The Pathology of 
Drunkenness (1855) relied on the theory of asthenic illness to situate their 
toxicological and clinical data in a broader theoretical context. Here the heredity 
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nature of the alcohol craving, the damage wrought by alcohol to the offspring, the 
racial consequences of drunkenness, and the connection between alcohol and suicide 
were all taken up as apparently well accepted dangers of intemperance, indicating that 
the major themes of degeneration were already well established in British medicine by 
the mid-nineteenth century. However, as with the discussion of habitual criminality 
and the dangerous classes, these themes were held together by a vague theory of 
general decline that struggled to align the various warnings behind a single cause 
without extensive caveats or arcane and irreducible levels of technical detail.197  
 
In response to the theoretical complexity generated by these works, the 
Scottish Temperance League issued a call for a “homely exposition” of the medical 
case for the Total Abstinence Movement, seeking to address the failings of the 
existing medical literature on intemperance that was, they felt, marked by the type of 
excessive detail that placed it beyond the reach of a general audience. This call had 
been answered by James Miller, President of the Medico-Chirurgical Society and 
Professor of Surgery at the University of Edinburgh, who in 1858 published Alcohol: 
Its Place and Power, a low-cost general readership work on the subject of 
intemperance.198 Given that it was Miller’s explicit intention to avoid theoretical 
complications in this book, it is not surprising that we find little evidence in it of the 
debates referenced above. However, when The Scottish Review (a temperance 
publication aimed at a well-educated readership) discussed Miller’s work they 
explored the historical and scientific context of his assumptions by noting that “for 
about the last twenty-five years there [had] prevailed an unusual tendency to those 
forms of disease which are designated as ‘adynamic’ or ‘asthenic’”. Some medical 
commentators, they continued, were suggesting that there had arisen a new asthenic 
constitution causing the European body to resist all pain, a suggestion that certainly 
explained why ‘lowering’ treatments such as bleeding had become intolerable. Others 
had “even gone so far as to affirm that [the increase in asthenia] indicates a gradual 
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degeneration of our race, and to predict that it will increase until we have all been 
swept from the face of the earth, unless we make radical changes in our mode of life.”  
 
The journal, acting as a vehicle for the Scottish Temperance movement, did 
not support this new school of thought, and instead reinforced the older notion that 
“there are waves of time through which the sthenic and asthenic characters of disease 
prevail in succession, and that we are at resent living in one of its adynamic phases.” 
Crucially, they insisted that these waves of time undulated through disease and not the 
body, cutting short the nascent degeneration panic and ensuring an eventual return of 
the therapies of the golden age. Doctors, the journal surmised, could happily 
anticipate a future in which “lancets now rusting in their cases” would once again 
spring into use.199 However, it was the theory of degeneration along with the assumed 
transformation of European bodies that gradually came to dominate medical theory 
from the late 1850s onwards, with degenerationist language able to link disparate 
though well defined themes of decline to the established discourse on sthenic and 
asthenic disease, a fact which, however tentatively, suggests why its deployment in 
Scottish medical literature was so prevalent.  
 
As an example of this process I will consider here the first volume of William 
Aitken’s Science and Practice of Medicine (1868). According to the British Medical 
Journal this compendious and hugely important work was “for a long time the 
favourite textbook of students, and in its day the work most consulted by general 
practitioners throughout the kingdom and in every colony where English is the 
language of the people.”200 Aitken (1825 – 1892), who submitted his M.D. thesis to 
the University of Edinburgh in 1848 and subsequently took up membership at the 
city’s Royal College of Surgeons, had trained during the bloodletting controversy and 
was aware that the acceptance of sthenia’s transition to asthenia, whether located in 
disease or the body, preserved the unbroken line between the medical cultures of the 
first and second halves of the century. Hence, in this work he set out to dismiss the 
suggestions of his more sceptical contemporaries (such as William Orlando Markham 
and John Hughes Bennett) who had argued that the fashion for describing 
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constitutional or pathological change was merely a ruse doctors had advanced to 
account for changes in medical practice. Positioning himself against this scepticism 
Aitken wrote his manual in defence of the generation of students who saw themselves 
as torch bearers for both the golden age of Edinburgh medicine and the new age of 
heredity transformation by declaring that not only asthenic disease, but “the 
degeneracy of the human race, as a whole, is in some respects advancing.”201 
 
Hence, Aitken noted, while the continuationists were right to trace their 
lineage back to the early nineteenth century, they were wrong to follow the 
interpretation provided by their mentors, for it was not disease but “the human body 
[that was] capable, from causes known as well as unknown to us, of undergoing 
various alterations as regards not only to its physical, but also to what has been termed 
its medical constitution.” There were, he continued, “certainly good grounds for 
believing that elements of constitutional degeneration exist in such abundance, 
especially in the communities of large towns.”202 For Aitken then, “the insidious 
mode in which many of those truly CONSTITUTIONAL diseases and 
DEGENERATIONS make their appearance” could be “regarded as constituting a 
peculiar characteristic of the diseases of our times.”203 Aitken’s contemporaries on the 
Continent had gone even further still, with Dr Pollitzer of the Children’s Hospital of 
Vienna arguing that the diseases of the times were not merely the result of a 
mysterious and uncaused constitutional shift, but the unforeseen product of medicine 
itself. In particular, Pollitzer contended, the extension of the hospital system in 
‘civilised nations’ had stemmed mortality without encouraging a proportionate 
increase in vitality, perpetuating a weak and enfeebled breed in whose forms he saw 
inscribed the first lines of a “sad memorial to modern civilization.”204 Pollitzer’s 
charge that allopathic medicine held the power to facilitate the extinction of the 
human race was in all likelihood not novel; certainly it would be repeated by various 
figures for at least a hundred years (right up to Ivan Illich’s Medical Nemesis), though 
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it was reduced by Aitken to the less dramatic claim that “the boundaries between 
health and illness [were] becoming less and less marked.”205  
 
While this blurring of boundaries did not exactly entail the obliteration of the 
race, Aitken nonetheless believed that it complicated the task of the physician by 
creating conditions in which the body deviated from the “healthy standard” without 
deviating from the frame of “relative health” (that is, individual health relative to that 
of the populace at large). The act of diagnosis had therefore to contend with the 
appearance of a general form of sickness spreading throughout the populations of 
Europe and producing a pervasive ‘technical’ illness that did not equate to a 
comparative illness. Aitken’s argument, situated between the rise of asthenic disease 
and constitutional degeneration, therefore made explicit another of the great 
transformations that had taken place at the heart of medicine during the nineteenth 
century – the transition from health to normality. As Foucault notes in Birth of the 
Clinic, up to the end of the eighteenth century doctors tended to refer in their 
descriptions to the qualities that had been lost in the presence of an illness (qualities 
such as “vigour, suppleness, and fluidity”). In the re-organisation of medical 
knowledge that took place in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
however, the notion of standard structure and function became paramount, bringing 
formerly marginal and abstract studies such as physiology to the centre of medical 
knowledge while placing ‘life’ in a series of oppositions between health and 
morbidity (or normality and abnormality). As such, the range of objects medicine 
concerned itself with – national groups, races, individual organisms, or mental 
balances – were no longer conceptualised (at least primarily) as internally organised 
entities, but as entities that could be situated in reference to “the medical bipolarity of 
the normal and the pathological.”206  
 
The point then is that, under the system of medicine in which illness was 
always relative to some norm rather than a disinherited quality, the implication that 
the degeneration of the European race rendered a whole population deficient were that 
illness that could no longer be reached by differential diagnosis. Thus, Aitken 
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suggested, doctors who had formerly concerned themselves with studying the typical 
course of a disease in the individual were obliged to consider disease as something 
that affected masses, with different forms of disease being peculiar to each race (to 
the limited extent that British doctors of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries had attributed change to the organism, their discussions were confined to 
family lines rather than the race or nation, as for instance in Sir James Clark’s 
Treatise on Pulmonary Consumption, which had remarked on the tendency of disease 
to become progressively worse as it descended the generations of a single family).207 
For Aitken then, it was quite explicitly the overall decline of health had led to the 
increased medical attention to the diseases of nations and the proliferation of works 
investigating the problems of race. Chief amongst these was of course Morel’s own 
contribution, drawing doctors’ attention to the “abnormal states of existence which 
have special relations with the occurrence and existence of physical and moral 
degeneracy in the world . . . consistent with the asthenic phase of present 
existence.”208  
 
For Aitken, these new racial diseases highlighted a process of general decline 
that would be particularly threatening to the younger generation who fell prey to 
physical and metal disease as the average standard of health sank with the trough of 
asthenic time while simultaneously liable to inherit diseases from parental germs that 
had been damaged by exposure to environmental toxins. Of the list of causes that 
could promote degeneracy by far the most prominent was of course the effect of 
alcohol on the blood and brain. Morel, as we have seen, had arranged alcoholic 
degenerates into two categories: those who were physically and mentally crippled by 
the effects of the poison, and those who, though they had suffered grave physical 
degeneration, were able to pass on their reduced physical vitality to a future 
generation. Alcohol therefore produced states akin to insanity in the individual, and 
the condition of degeneration transversally in the race, and Aitken was keen to 
emphasise to British readers the role of heredity in modifying both the form and 
prognosis of disease, noting that when the “tendency toward alcoholic excess is of 
hereditary origin, the cure of the dipsomaniac is generally impossible.”209  
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 Thus, Aitken argued, the growing recognition of this change was not so much 
a concern for the general physicians as it was for the custodian of public health, and it 
fell upon “all civilized governments anxiously to enquire” whether physical and 
mental degeneration was leading to a “continued increase of suicide . . . increase of 
crimes against law and order . . . the monstrous precocity of young criminals . . . 
abnormal conformations of the skull, and the tendency to the union of the cranial 
structures, which prevail among criminals” along with a “general diminution of the 
intellectual powers [and] the increase in inmates of asylums and prisons.” 
 
Once again we must be cautious not to conclude from the high visibility of 
degeneration theory within these debates that it served as a cause of the discussion of 
racial pathology in the second half of the nineteenth century. Parallel (though less 
explicit) transformations in the relationship between heredity, race, and alcohol were 
hugely prevalent during the same period, with manuals like James Whitehead’s On 
the Transmission from Parent to Offspring of some Forms of Disease (1857) – one of 
the first systematic discussions of heredity in the English language – noting the racial 
dangers of alcoholism in very similar terms to Morel.210 Throughout Europe there was 
an increased discussion of heredity diseases and the problem alcoholism presented to 
the race, though we can nonetheless accept that, following Morel’s work, these 
concerns were gradually displaced from the realm of general medicine to become the 
exclusive concern of doctors and psychiatrists working on the problems of public 
health as a distinct speciality. 
 
Indeed Aitken’s own distinguished career in public service placed him firmly 
within this school of medical theory. He had been appointed as Assistant Pathologist 
to the military for despatch to the Crimea by Lord Panmure in 1855, a position that 
subsequently landed him the job of Professor of Pathology at the newly opened Army 
Medical School in Chatham where, in 1862, he wrote On the Growth of the Recruit 
and Young Soldier, a manual that unified his concerns over military and juvenile 
health as collective goods that could be threatened by degeneration.211 Thus, in 
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addition to the diagnostic problems raised by degeneration, he was particularly 
concerned with the bearing of these issues on the health of children and soldiers, 
especially as the “degeneracy of the human race” had already produced localities in 
which, he complained, “the inhabitants can no longer fulfil the conditions required for 
military service.”212 Aitken is in fact precisely the type of public figure who Jacques 
Donzelot appears to have had in mind when he wrote that “the emergence of the 
psychiatrist from his institutional preserve was ordered by an imperious summons 
issuing from two social apparatuses in full expansion: the army and the schools.”213 
This is not of course to claim that Aitken can strictly speaking be placed amongst the 
psychiatrists (though as we have seen, this label is a hugely problematic one unless 
analysis is confined to institutional writings), but that he was part of the same broad 
and ill defined strand of medical writing that occupied itself with documenting illness 
in relation to the growing discourse on public hygiene.   
 
4.3 Pathological Continuity 
 
It is clear then that the discussion of asthenia offered an important foothold for 
degeneration theory in British medicine by producing an understanding of disease as 
constitutional change. We have also seen that while the initial response of British 
asylum doctors was to focus on the elements of Morel’s system that were closest to 
their own concerns and debates – principally the credibility that should be invested in 
different systems for classification of insanity – the wider medical community saw in 
his ideas a means of unifying the various currents of thought that had been developing 
since the first quarter of the century. However, it was not long before these same 
broader themes of degeneration theory entered into Scottish psychiatry. In the 
following chapter I will examine in great detail how Morel’s ideas were adopted and 
shaped by Scotland’s most prominent psychiatrist, Thomas Clouston, here I will 
merely introduce this discussion by looking at a short paper published in the 1870s by 
the Senior Assistant Physician at the Royal Edinburgh Asylum, Strethill H. Wright, 
who followed Aitken in sewing together the stands of asthenia and degeneration to 
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produce an account of insanity that was entirely novel when compared with the 
traditional approach of alienistic medicine.214  
 
In this paper Wright set out to explain that the growing significance of 
hereditarian thought had radically transformed the discussion of insanity by dividing 
predisposing from occasioning causes, particularly in “irremediable cases [where] the 
asthenic condition of the constitution generally, but especially of the nervous system, 
is congenital.” This congenital form of constitutional disease – “a true evolution of 
individual organisms of deficient vital vigour” – possessed “an entirely different 
significance, as regards many important questions, from those cases in which the 
asthenic constitutional condition which leads to mental disorder induced by influences 
extrinsic to the organism.” It is perhaps redundant to observe that Wright’s discussion 
appeared at a time when psychiatrists in Britain were beginning to draw out the 
developmentalist themes that had been implicit since the middle of the nineteenth 
century by distinguishing between normal and abnormal evolutionary development, 
though it is significant to note how the notion of ‘relative health’ that had appeared in 
Aitken’s work was used in Wright’s discussion to place illness and abnormality 
within the context of evolution. This was a hugely problematic move insofar as the 
‘individual’ was already evolutionarily peculiar (representing a member of a species 
that invariably contained a variance of traits). This was in fact one of the most 
intractable problems degenerationist psychiatry faced, and by 1900 the U.S. army 
doctor and pioneer of trans-cultural psychiatry Chas Woodruff could still be found 
arguing that because the laws of organic evolution proceed by variation, there could 
be no such thing as a ‘normal type’ in living organisms, and psychiatry could not 
construct the ‘average man’ as a composite of his race when attempting to define the 
degenerate. Following these caveats, Woodruff argued that psychiatrists could none 
the less “separate the normal from the abnormal” by simply defining the degenerate as 
“an abnormal man whose variations or stigmata are developmental and due to an 
unstable nervous system” (a solution that was not too far from the one adopted by 
Scottish psychiatrists).215  
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 For Wright, the problem of reconciling a theory of random distribution of 
peculiarities with the desire to define pathology on the basis of abnormality (in effect 
a return of the problem of differential diagnosis in psychiatry) was to be solved by 
arranging what he termed the “individual evolution” of peculiarities as a hierarchy 
ordered on the basis of their intensity. As an example of this arrangement Wright 
drew attention to the then recent anti-revival protests in Galashiels in which a riotous 
mob was caught “doing much mischief in attempting to preach a gospel, the bearing 
of whose teachings they [were] by education rendered unable to appreciate, and as 
preachers of which, they [were] most of them constitutionally entirely unfitted to act.” 
These rioters were, Wright argued, characteristic of all mobs (be they anti-revivalist, 
socialist, or Chartist), since they were formed of “men of small capacity in every 
respect: their only motive power being the monomaniacal impression that they were 
bound to teach others”, a preaching mania that “acted as an exciting cause of the 
uncontrolled animal propensities of these inferiorly developed intelligences, the 
roughs.” This crowd of roughs offered a chilling demonstration of the danger 
presented to society by “a class of sanely peculiar individuals, which approaches very 
closely what must be looked upon as insanely peculiar individuality; and which, with 
very slight disturbing case, afford manifestations of insanity.”216  
 
Here we see the fundamental break introduced by degeneration framed not in 
terms of its impact on systems of classification, but in terms of psychiatry’s access to 
the essence of insanity: no longer was insanity to be presented as the presence of an 
insane peculiarity, but as the extension of a sane peculiarity distributed beyond an 
average. The message here was clear: the asthenic and precariously balanced 
constitution of modern society, coupled with a lack of civilisation and organisation 
could, under the influence of an inciting social or political doctrine, trigger the animal 
propensities of the crowd toward mob violence. The fact that such discussions were so 
frequent during the second half of the nineteenth century, returning with an ever 
greater force until the wave of degeneration finally broke in the first decades of the 
twentieth century, only serves to highlight the hypothesis that psychiatrists of this 
period wrote with three fundamental ambitions in mind: firstly, they sought to 
legitimise their profession by alloying their account of insanity with the medical 
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theories of heredity; secondly, they sought to underline the social utility of their 
knowledge by drawing reference continuously to the dangers it was able to uncover; 
and thirdly, they sought to present this hybrid of medicine and public service as a 
necessary adjuvant to the State whose foundations were being constantly undermined 
by a retrograde and unscientific legal system.  
 
 Returning to Wright’s paper, we see all these elements mobilised within the 
space of a few short pages, with further cases of sanely and insanely peculiar 
individuals introduced to emphasise a hidden pathological process endlessly 
generating citizens “not fit to play a part in the common-wealth” and representing a 
“herd of mortals more or less ignorant” who were liable to fall prey to complex 
doctrines that would only mislead them into a destructive rage. Writing of a case that 
came to his attention at the Royal Edinburgh Asylum he describes “the brutality of [a] 
woman who savagely attacked her husband. Doubtless, the woman had often done the 
like, and many of her sisterhood were in the habit of occasionally doing the like under 
the influence of drink, or any other exciting cause of their uncontrollable appetites – 
emotions we cannot call them.”217 Similarly there was the case of ‘M’L’, whose blunt 
yet pregnant medical history merely records: “His mother was a dipsomaniac, etc.” 
This patient, Wright continues: 
 
is the most sane man who is able most clearly to recognise, and most thoroughly to fulfil, his 
obligations – obligations which vary in nature according to a man’s lot in life; in extent and magnitude, 
according to the amount of intelligence with which he may be gifted for their recognition. There is no 
sharp boundary line between ‘sane’ and ‘insane.’ The measure of sanity is a question of individual 
evolution. Although it is easy to recognise the wide gulf between the abnormality of a markedly insane 
individuality and the normality of an ordinary sane individuality, still, there are numerous individuals 
of a peculiarity gradually increasing.218 
 
It is worth dwelling on this statement, which begins by noting that an asylum patient 
is “the most sane man”, continues to argue that there is in any case no “sharp 
boundary line” separating sanity and insanity, and concludes by warning of the 
gradual increase of peculiarity in individuals who are not technically insane. In this 
transition from peculiar insanity to sane peculiarity we see the traditional categories of 
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psychiatry abandoned once and for all, with mental responsibility placed on a 
continuum that would allow for a range of pathologies, from drunkenness to mob 
violence, to be explained in reference to degeneration.  
 
In considering how British asylum doctors, journalists, and general physicians 
looking to France responded to the initial impact of Morel’s ideas, it is important to 
note that the gaze was returned from the other side of the channel, with Liverpool, 
London, and Wolverhampton all discussed in Morel’s treatise as centres of urban 
degeneration. Indeed, shortly after Morel’s treatise was published, the Scottish 
psychiatrist James Crichton-Browne (who was then coming to his final year as 
Superintendent at the Crichton Royal Asylum in Dumfries) compiled an overview of 
the theory for a British audience in which he was led to conclude that the “very hearts 
and foci of [Britain’s] wealth and enlightenment” were known on the Continent 
“chiefly as the hotbeds of fever, pestilence, and general degradation.”219 Hence, while 
British authors typically looked to the Continent when discussing degeneration, the 
French would look to Britain when discussing urban decay. As with Monet’s Houses 
of Parliament series depicting a view from the Thames rendered opaque by sulphur 
and fog, the French fixation with British ways of living was revealed in the interest 
the country’s medical writers showed in the degeneration they suspected was taking 
place there, and just as the allure of bordellos and anonymity drew the English mind 
to Paris, a fascination with gas-lights and crowded streets drew the French mind to 
London and the industrial cities beyond. A work dealing with the ‘English’ fight 
against degeneration, produced by Boulenger and Ensch, two visiting French doctors 
who had come to assess the situation in Britain following the 1904 Interdepartmental 
Committee on Physical Deterioration, bears out the phantasmal elements of this vision 
of British degeneration:  
 
The mind of the traveller disembarking in one of the major manufacturing cities of England or 
Scotland: – Birmingham, Liverpool, Glasgow – is struck by the dull and dreary atmosphere, which is 
uniformly grey in these centres of industry. The mists, as we know, are nigh perpetual in the British 
Isles, but the excessive industrialism of the late nineteenth century came to add, in the large 
conurbations, a legion of belching factories, spewing from their mouths an acrid and thick smoke 
covering whole towns with a uniform layer of soot and making the air, if not quite unbreathable, at the 
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very least deadly . . . the sun is a near myth in these towns, the discovery of which necessitates taking 
flight to the distant suburbs.220  
 
From this vignette of the urban centres of Britain and its “swarm of miserable and 
stunted” inhabitants, the authors move on to the question as to whether:  
 
Industrial life, the great urban centres, and the city factories, are fatal to the human being; whether they 
sap and gradually erode the physiological means of resistance, and whether, from generation to 
generation, they sew and cultivate disease, hereditary degeneration, and death for each and every class. 
The alarm raised by the hygienist who contends that; ‘The Anglo-Saxon race is degenerating’ would 
not be in vain if one considers that three quarters of the population is consigned to these devouring 
cities.221  
 
Thus, they hoped, the results of their trip to Britain would be of use “not only for 
doctors, but all those who are care for social waste, coming into contact with the 
backwards, the abnormal, the degenerate.”222 In particular, foreign observers were 
drawn toward the work of the town planning movement, with figures like Edinburgh’s 
Patrick Geddes leading the fight against urban degeneracy. Geddes, who remains 
well-known for redesigning large swathes of Edinburgh, was chiefly interested in 
combating the “dirt and disorder the ruder industrial age [had] carried with it”, leading 
“not only to disease, but alcoholism with all its consequences of insanity, crime, and 
vice.” Geddes hoped that “the degeneration which the bio-pessimist has shown as 
well-nigh overspreading Nature” could be combated not only by redesigning cities, 
but by redesigning bodies, with the psychiatric theories of heredity and hygiene 
capable of leading mankind out of despair. Thus, he continued, the “incipient 
development of hygiene” and the psychiatric hygienist – “an unfamiliar figure, a 
professional type not yet classified or understood” – brought him hope that the 
modern citizen could break the cycle of alcoholism, insanity, degeneration, and 
misery.223  
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In his opening remarks of the Lectureship on Mental Diseases instituted at the 
University of Edinburgh in 1879, the first British psychiatric lectures of their kind, 
Thomas Clouston told the assembled students that in pursuing a career in psychiatry 
they were undertaking a duty to ensure “brains that by inheritance [have] a tendency 
to . . . disease” were “subjected during their development and education to the right 
sort of hygienic and preventative influences.”224 These two themes, heredity and 
hygiene, would structure Clouston’s work throughout his long and distinguished 
career, exerting an influence on everything he said and wrote between this inaugural 
lecture and his final book, The Unsoundness of Mind, published in 1911, a year in 
which he was knighted for his services to medicine.225 Repeating tirelessly that the 
public health foundations of psychiatry were central to its place in society and that the 
scientific study of heredity would justify psychiatric intervention in the social order, 
Clouston drew his influence, perhaps more than any other British psychiatrist, from 
the degenerationist writings of France, mobilising heredity and hygiene as 
legitimising elements in psychiatric knowledge and practice. Indeed, in his Clinical 
Lectures of 1884, his most widely cited publication, Clouston wrote that the “two 
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great French alienists, Morel and Moreau de Tours have told us nearly all we need to 
know about the subject”, and that their work had laid the foundations for a science 
that would base itself on a defence of public health, directing its sanitising mission 
against the “unfavourable conditions of life [promoting] human degeneration [such 
as] the excessive use of alcohol.” Developing the ideas of his inaugural lecture, he 
anticipated the impending incorporation of psychiatric knowledge into the fabric of 
modern life, noting that:  
 
When our profession becomes, as it should be, and as I have no doubt it will in time become, the 
guardian – by prophylaxis – of the physical and mental well-being of the people, and the great source 
of authority for the regulation of the conditions of life, such questions will come far more to the front 
than they do at present, and they must then form an important part of medical study.226 
 
Situating his own anti-alcohol campaign in relation to the degenerationist themes of 
heredity and hygiene, Clouston spoke frequently against the racially destructive 
effects of intemperance in a wide variety of lay and scientific forums (though he was 
not himself a temperance man). At a meeting of the Edinburgh University Total 
Abstinence Society in 1882, he estimated that 17,500 people in the British Empire had 
been rendered insane as a direct consequence of drinking, and that these were just the 
extreme cases meriting committal to an asylum. For every person committed due to 
alcoholic insanity there were, he explained, several more at large who ought to be 
committed, a fact which, when combined with “the power of alcohol in producing 
race degeneration”, indicated the need for doctors to take a more active role in leading 
the temperance cause in the interests of public hygiene.227 Returning to this same 
theme at the close of the century, he told the British Medical Association’s 
Temperance League that at Morningside he had witnessed the devastating effects of 
alcohol on patients who offered evidence of “a great deal of that sort of degeneration 
of mind, body, and race which alcohol undoubtedly caused in the world.” These 
patients, “handicapped . . . by neurotic and insane heredity”, were “especially liable to 
be taken hold of by alcohol, and have their control diminished”, producing in their 
turn yet more heredity degenerates to add to the asylum populations of Scotland. This 
fact alone, quite apart from the social problems surrounding alcoholism, demonstrated 
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the most “terrible instance of the effects of alcohol on the individual and the race.”228 
Writing in a temperance publication aimed at university students, The Young 
Abstainer, Clouston outlined once again the hereditability of degenerate conditions, 
drawing particular attention to Kraepelin’s experiments with alcohol, experiments 
which had demonstrated that: 
 
it is an important fact that the taste for alcohol is transmitted from generation to generation, no 
thoughtful man or woman can pass over this aspect of the question. An alcoholic race tends to be a 
degenerate race. Take the modern French, for instance. In the large towns – in Paris – the working 
people have taken of late years to the stronger forms of alcohol, and all the French physicians say there 
is now taking place in the working classes a manifest degeneration . . . crime is more common, and 
race-degeneration is setting in. 
 
Thus, he told his young readers: “The whole medical profession is dead in earnest, 
and is at one in demanding certain changes in our laws in regard to the use of alcohol 
from the medical and social point of view, and especially from the bodily and 
stability-of-race aspect of the future of humanity.”229  
 
As we have seen, Clouston was keen to show that his research programme was 
following developments in French psychiatry, and the similarities were not confined 
to selecting alcoholic degenerates as a worthy object of study. On the theoretical level 
there were a remarkable series of parallels between Clouston’s concerns and those of 
French degenerationists, while even his classification of alcoholism resembled the 
system Magnan had set out in On Alcoholism (see chapter three). Clouston’s 
classification, most clearly outlined in a lecture given at the University of Edinburgh 
in 1883, loosely followed Magnan’s in enumerating the five main stages of alcoholic 
degeneration as: 1) mental degeneration of a slight type; 2) weakening of the power of 
self-control frequently associated with the commission of crimes “caused in persons 
not of the criminal class”; 3) Alcoholism, marked by more severe mental symptoms 
and “brain storms”; 4) absolute insanity, a de facto insanity accounting for between 
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fifteen and twenty per cent of all cases in the British Empire, and; 5) family and race 
degeneration. This final stage had of course been first described by Morel, a “great 
French physician . . . of a philosophical turn of mind” who had entered “into an 
extremely elaborate scientific investigation into what he called ‘human degeneracy’ 
[listing] the degenerations that are constantly taking place in families, in nations, and 
in races, through the lowering of the body and of the mind, and the tendency to fall 
into various diseases”, in short, “the sinking-down process” that was also taking place 
in Britain’s cities “to a huge extent.”  
 
Alcohol – “the greatest single factor in human degeneracy that is yet known” – 
was, Clouston told his audience, producing in Britain a mass of degenerate beings that 
filled “the asylums, goals, and poorhouses, as well as the slums of our large cities” 
and creating “people who cannot help themselves – those weak, nerveless, evil-
disposed, characterless beings, with no power of action, no power of keeping 
themselves right, no desire to be better or higher, the sort of people of which we are 
hearing so much now.” In particular, he suggested, the Scottish race ought to abstain 
from alcohol altogether, since while it was possessed of a great many qualities, a 
sober ancestry was not one of them, and there “may be something in the blood or 
brain that only needs a little alcohol to light it up into a disease or a demon.” Alcohol, 
with its power to lower the race physically and morally across successive generations 
was therefore: 
 
opposed to all the qualities that constitute a great and enduring people. This is especially the case in 
large cities if combined with other unfavourable conditions, an actual race degeneration being then 
rapidly produced. This is, as all publicists and socialists know, one of the great questions of our 
civilisation: How can we raise the race, prevent it from being lowered, make every man a better man, 
make his sons and daughters better men and women, not in a religious or moral sense merely, but in an 
extendedly human point of view, looking at man as a whole, body and mind, making him bigger, 
stronger, better thinking, better feeling, longer lived?230 
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The suggestion that alcohol played a decisive role in producing a range of social 
pathologies was not novel. This line of thinking spanned from the second half of the 
nineteenth century to at least the 1920s, producing a string of works from Benjamin 
Richardson’s Diseases of Modern Life (1876) to Héricourt’s Social Diseases (1920), 
bookends to a genre of medical literature addressing public hygiene and the need for 
the State to restrict individual liberty.231 More broadly we find evidence that the 
proselytising campaigns against alcohol were seen as central to the endeavours of the 
medical profession as a whole, with even student theses calling upon doctors to wage 
“energetic and sustained warfare” on alcoholism in an effort to uphold “the honour 
and dignity of all civilised nations” from the victims of intemperance who “crowd the 
prisons, hospitals, and asylums [encouraging] the progress of pauperism to keep pace 
with the physical and moral deterioration of the people”. In short, the medical 
profession were seen by Clouston and his contemporaries as “advocates of hygiene” 
and “the natural custodians of public health.”232 However, even against this profuse 
body of literature Clouston’s name stands out as a notable one, and his tireless quest 
to combat degeneration was revered outside both his own nation and his own science. 
As the Medical Press and Circular noted in 1893, in spite of the vociferous 
campaigns against alcoholism and degeneration, Clouston was “one of the few public 
medical officials who has the ear of the profession and that of the public also.”233 
 
Clouston’s writings therefore present us with a fascinating window into the 
ways in which degenerationist assumptions were taken onboard and reworked in 
British psychiatry. In addition to his frequent references to Morel and Magnan 
Clouston’s work serves as an intriguing case-study in the reception of degeneration 
theory for four main reasons. Firstly, his theory of insanity was, as we shall see, 
bound up with the formation of ‘insane peculiarity’ and vitiated self-control, a 
principle that was generally derived from degeneration theory. Secondly, the 
mobilisation of heredity within this model of insanity offers us an interesting insight 
into the contributions made by psychiatry to wider life sciences in the late nineteenth 
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century, demonstrating in particular that the British ‘empiricist’ rejection of 
Continental a priori methods was largely rhetorical. Thirdly, Clouston’s discussions 
of prophylaxis, hygiene, and the effects of alcohol indicate that he conceptualised 
psychiatry not as a narrow medical specialism, but as a form of social policing in the 
broadest sense, substantiating the claim that degeneration was central to late 
nineteenth-century psychiatric theory, even in contexts where it has generally been 
supposed to have exerted little influence. Finally, we will see that, like so many of his 
colleagues, Clouston did not wish to remodel psychiatric notions of insanity for 
taxonomical reasons alone, particularly as such systems of classification were seen as 
somewhat arbitrary and having little impact on practice. Rather, his wish to modify 
the criteria according which psychiatry divided between sane and insane was directed 
toward the law, and his discussions of heredity and alcoholism reveal a constant 
preoccupation with questions of juridical reform that had very little to do with the 
psychiatric practice.  
 
This study of Clouston’s writings is therefore intended to supplement the 
overall portrait of degeneration theory within Scottish psychiatry, to demonstrate the 
implicitly legal nature of much nineteenth-century psychiatric discourse, and to 
indicate more broadly that psychiatrists such as Clouston were part of a proto-
modernist project to define the subject of the future, a concern with the coming man 
that, while not quite as finalised as the vision of homo sovieticus, was suggested by a 
letter submitted to Clouston from an American named Wallace Wood, soliciting 
contributions for a series on the “Herald’s Symposium of a select number of 
authorities in all parts of the world on the anthropological and ethical subject of the 
‘Coming Man’”, with copies of the letter “sent to men of eminence in every civilized 
country.” A follow up letter begging Clouston’s contribution demonstrates just how 
eminent a circle he was placed within: the Symposium had already received the 
contributions of Max Müller, Cesare Lombroso, Oliver Wendell Holmes, William 
James, John Addington Symonds, Henry Maudsley, Lord Randolph Churchill, and 
Walt Whitman.234  
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5.2 Manias Old and New 
 
Clouston’s first substantial psychiatric publication, a textbook of Clinical Lectures 
(1883) based upon the major elements of his course at the University of Edinburgh, 
contained within it a lengthy theoretical section on ‘the insane diathesis’ in which he 
outlined the degenerationist notion that insanity was nothing more than an abnormally 
weakened power of control.235 Here Clouston set out to examine the various 
manifestations of deficient and paralysed control in response to the post-Darwinian 
question that had troubled psychiatrists of the period – namely the relationship 
between normal and abnormal states (or the question as to whether ‘normal’ was a 
mere statistical average or an inherent condition of the organism) –  by arguing that 
perfect or absolute control was a norm derived not from the average (since it was 
rarely present) but from an impossible ideal toward which civilised humanity must 
nonetheless strive. The species of insanity resulting from deficient control (rather than 
the influence of an occasioning cause) were therefore marked out as the special class 
of ‘Inhibitory Insanities’ of evolution or development, a classification that was further 
subdivided into those forms of defective inhibition that were recognised by the law 
and those that were not, a fact suggesting the principal motivation here was not purely 
psychiatric.  
 
The first class of (legally recognised) Inhibitory Insanity consisted of 
automatic acts whose insane nature was inferred from the lack of “conscious desire to 
attain the object”. In these acts the presumed paralysis of self-control accompanied 
bestial desires to pursue worthless goals that could not have served as an aspect of the 
rational consciousness, cases, Clouson notes, where there had been something like a 
compulsive desire to steal articles of negligible value to the thief or the desire to 
                                                 
235 Clouston, Clinical Lectures, Philadelphia: Henry C. Lea & Sons, 1884 (‘The Insane Diathesis’, pp 
.231-259). Clouston was here following the definition of diathesis offered by his former professor, 
Thomas Laycock, who had used the term to indicate “such an innate hereditary constitution of the body 
that, in the course of the vital actions, there will arise at various periods of life, under varying 
circumstances, local or general diseases, having a common resemblance, either as to etiology, 
symptomatology, or pathological anatomy” (Laycock, Lectures on the Principles and Methods of 
Observation and Research, Edinburgh: Adam & Charles Black, 1856, p.88). 
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masturbate in married men.236 The presumption here is plainly formulated in medico-
legal terms: if the “conscious desire” of the thief is to “attain the object” of his crime, 
then it must be presupposed that the object has a value to him. Similarly, if the natural 
object of male lust is the female body, a married man who discharges his lust toward 
an imagined object could not logically have intended his actions, a formula which 
effectively states ‘where there is no desire, there is no question of insufficient 
resistance or will, and where there is no question of will, there can be no presumption 
on an evil will’ (the target of the judge). Hence, the first class of legally recognised 
impulsive acts were the numerous inexplicable tendencies that had been 
“distinguished by distinct names” – the desire to “dig up and eat dead bodies 
(necrophilia)”, to “wander from home and throw off the restraints of society 
(planomania)”, or to “act like a wild beast (lycanthropia)” – in short, all the instinctive 
monomanias (homicidal, suicidal, epileptiform, destructive, and so on) that had found 
a place within the legal system solely by virtue of their unintelligibility. This then was 
the established form of impulsive insanity corresponding to both the logic of legal 
irresponsibility and to a generally accepted psychiatric account of animal and organic 
retrogression that encompassed the “perverted instincts, appetites, and feelings shown 
in urine drinking, eating stones, rags, clay, nails etc” along with “masturbation, 
sodomy, rape on children, bestiality” – conditions that seemed to indicate the 
‘improperly evolved’ monomaniac was at the mercy of bestial atavisms.237  
 
While this type of insanity had become more or less established in courts of 
law (though it was on occasion still denounced by High Court Judges), it was the 
second class of generally unrecognised and legally punishable impulsive insanities to 
which Clouston wanted to draw attention. In contrast to the automatism of 
inexplicable monomania, this second form of impulsive insanity operated on a 
conscious level, appearing in potential and real criminals who were aware of their 
desire to commit insane acts. Patients belonging to this class would frequently suffer 
from Rat-Manesque neuroses, making declarations such as “My God! If I could get 
                                                 
236 Clouston, ibid., p.236. 
237 ibid., p.244. The (Chicago) Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases noted in its review of these 
lectures that Clouston’s “monomanias are usually amplifications of the old French ideas about 
monomania . . . The author has not a philosophical mind, and as a result his observations are of value 
chiefly as detached facts.” ‘Review of Clinical Lectures’, Journal of Nervous & Mental Disease. 1885, 
12(1):84-89. 
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these thoughts out of my head, what would I not give? . . . [the brutal desire] comes 
on me in one instance, and some day I will not be able to resist it.”238 To define such 
desires as ‘insane’, or as part of the notorious and ever-expanding ‘borderland’ 
between normal and abnormal states of mind, had been “called in question by a priori 
sociologists [and] ridiculed by journalists” with “the dangers of admitting its 
existence painted in dark colors by lawyers.”239 Clouston accepted that the degrees of 
control rendering responsibility a continuum rather than a discreet state could not be 
readily applied by the “medico-legal witness or adviser” who must take into account 
the “social and legal aspect and effect of his opinions.” Legal authorities were 
therefore likely to demand “other evidence of disorder of the mental function, in the 
shape of insane delusion or incoherent speech, before they [were] willing to put 
forward the plea of diseased want of self-control in mitigation of punishment.”240 
However, Clouston argued, anyone who had “actually seen the terror and agony of a 
mother conscious of an impulse to destroy her child, and striving against it with 
vehement resolution” could not dispute the existence of this class of insanity so 
readily. To corroborate this contention he cited a letter from a former patient of his, a 
fellow doctor who was conscious of certain overpowering morbid temptations. When 
on a train he was overcome with an urge to jump out of the windows, when in a 
station he was overcome with the urge to jump under the train, and when at his 
practice he would feel compelled to use scalpels and forceps for purposes that would 
see him struck off the medical register. His confession was startling:  
 
When I sat down at my table I used to have horrible impulses to cut my children’s throats with the 
carving knife . . . I took opium several times from no deliberate intention but by a sudden impulse that I 
could not resist when I was working with it in the surgery, but I vomited it. My brain feels quite dead, 
with no feeling in the scalp; my eyes seem as if something were dragging at the optic nerve continually. 
 
As Clouston concludes, this frantic and desperate account of morbid desire “is either a 
tissue of lies, or the thing ‘homicidal impulse’ exists.”241 We can see here that while 
Clouston explicitly defines insanity in reference to powers of control, his implicit 
target is the legal equation of knowledge with conduct (since the patient’s knowledge 
                                                 
238 Clouston, Clinical Lectures, p.246 & p.237. 
239 Clouston, ibid., p.236. 
240 Clouston, ibid., p.233. 
241 Clouston, ibid., p.245. 
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did not necessarily translate into a capacity to resist). In later sections of this thesis I 
will consider in greater detail how this second class of consciously insane impulse 
fared in Edinburgh’s legal circles, though we get a sense of the strength of resistance 
to the type of claims made by Clouston from the fact that 30 years after he had 
published these lectures a student of medical jurisprudence submitted a thesis to the 
University of Edinburgh outlining the legal case for their rejection. Here the student 
drew upon the very examples discussed above, arguing that Clouston’s case studies 
did not amount to a proof of irresistible impulse, since a person may feel impelled 
toward homicide and yet commit no crime (as with Clouston’s medical 
correspondent). Hence, he noted: 
 
the value of this letter [to Clouston] would have been very greatly increased if it had contained a 
statement of the feelings or considerations that had such an influence with the writer as to keep him 
from performing the acts which he know, intellectually, would be legally wrong for him to do but 
which he had such abnormally strong impulses to do. Such a statement might have thrown a flood of 
light on the subjects of threats and punishments and responsibility.242  
 
However, the terms in which this author’s opposition to the theory of irresistible 
impulse was formulated suggested at the same time that such notions had met with 
some success in court, for he noted that “in many instances the only possible defence 
to save a man’s neck is the plea of irresistible impulse”, a plea in which an expert 
medical witness would be called so that the criminal’s family history could be 
“ransacked to the third and fourth remove, directly and laterally, in order to find out 
whether there was not some ‘hereditary tendency,’ whatever that may mean, since 
care is taken not to define it.”243 
 
 While it is clear then that these aspects of Clouston’s theory of insanity were 
framed as a part of legal medicine rather than as an attempt to re-order psychiatric 
descriptions on purely aetiological or nosological grounds, a question still remains: 
What function did this apparent desire for modified relations with the law serve and 
what did it have to do with the theory of degeneration that Clouston was so drawn to 
around this time? There is in fact a ready-made answer to this question when we 
                                                 
242 W. Ramsay Smith, Medical Jurisprudence from the Judicial Standpoint, Unpublished M.D. Thesis, 
University of Edinburgh, 1913, p.271. 
243 Ibid., p.272. 
 101 
consider the entry on ‘degeneration’ that appeared in Tuke’s Dictionary – the standard 
work of reference amongst British psychiatrists at the end of the nineteenth century – 
three years after the Clinical Lectures had been published. This entry, written by Tuke 
himself, argued that an acceptance of degeneration theory would necessitate a 
modification of the existing legal relations of psychiatry, particularly as the 
syndromata defined by Legrain (a prominent member of the SMP and author of the 
entry on ‘Alcoholism’ in Tuke’s Dictionary) tended to: 
 
displace the old conception of monomania as so many morbid entities. They are signs, or, as Magnan 
terms them, stigmates psychiques, of mental degeneration. On analysis he finds that each may be 
reduced to one of two phenomena – obsession or impulse – that is to say, they are at the bottom of 
every monomania. 244  
 
We can see then that psychiatrists in both France and Great Britain were acutely 
aware that approaching insanity from a degenerationist perspective entailed removing 
the either/or notion of responsibility that had defined the work of earlier generations 
of medico-legal commentators. In displacing the singular definition of monomania 
(exceptionality) into a continuous study of the impulses covering all criminal and 
insane acts, psychiatry attempted to move away the model of cognition toward a 
definition of insanity that, as Tuke reported, considered the “three factors – instability 
of the intellect, that of feeling, and more or less paralysis of the will – which go to 
constitute the mental state of the degenerated.”245 
 
                                                 
244 D H Tuke, ‘Degeneration’ in D H Tuke (ed.) A Dictionary of Psychological Medicine &c., London: 
J . A. Churchill, 1892, pp. 331-332. Tuke’s Dictionary was a development of the earlier Manual of 
Psychological Medicine (1858) Tuke had co-authored with Bucknill. While this earlier work “ran to 
four editions and dominated British psychiatry for nearly a quarter of a century”, the Dictionary was, if 
anything, more ambitious, containing contributions from 128 authors (though there was a high degree 
of theoretical continuity between its contents and those of the Manual). On this see A Beveridge, ‘The 
Odd Couple: The Partnership of J. C. Bucknill and D. H. Tuke’, History of Psychiatry, 22, 1998: 52 – 
56 (52). On Tuke’s Dictionary see W. Bynum, ‘Tuke’s Dictionary and psychiatry at the turn of the 
century’, in G. E. Berrios & H. Freeman (eds.) 150 Years of British Psychiatry 1841 – 1991, London: 
Gaskell, 1991,  pp. 163-179.  
245 Tuke, ‘Degeneration’, p.331. Tuke himself was cautious of the French approach to defining 
degeneration, both because he saw a danger of deploying the term in “so comprehensive a sense as to 
comprise forms of mental disorder under one head which differ widely in their form, their prognosis, 
and their treatment” and because its overall connotations offended his optimism by conveying “the 
impression that the condition of the patient is necessarily downwards, for this is by no means the case, 
recovery frequently taking place in some divisions of the group.” (p.332). 
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Tuke’s Dictionary offers further evidence of Clouston’s degenerationist 
project in its article on homicidal monomania, written by Paul Garnier and Henri 
Colin.246 The French authors of this article noted that it was “almost superfluous to 
remark that the doctrine of monomania has had its day”, particularly as the idea of a 
“distinct clinical entity” characterised by a single criminal impulse was no longer 
accepted by psychiatrists. The work of Morel, along with that of the Falrets père et 
fils, had demonstrated that “mental states, until they are regarded as distinct maladies, 
are in reality only symptoms” (explaining the emphasis placed on the break with 
symptomatological classification in the work of these authors). Once patients 
“degenerated through heredity” had been recognised and catalogued by psychiatrists, 
“the reign of monomania [had] come to an end”, with Magnan’s grouping of 
“episodical syndromes” as epiphenomena of the underlying condition (heredity 
degeneration) putting the final nail in the coffin of the formerly ubiquitous 
monomania diagnosis. However, they continued, the general idea of a diagnosis in 
which homicidal impulse was only the most prominent symptom of the underlying 
condition was still useful, since the ‘monomania’ could be re-defined as “a syndrome 
directly connected with hereditary moral degeneration” and characterised by the 
desire to commit certain deeds “without any intellectual disorder or passion”.  
 
According to this new definition a satisfactory diagnosis of homicidal 
monomania would require the “persistence of consciousness” and “anxious struggle 
against the besetting impulse”: exactly the concomitants Clouston had introduced in 
his discussion of the subject. Garnier and Colin therefore elevated it to a “duty of the 
medico-legal expert to prove [that] the persistence of consciousness and lucidity does 
not exclude morbid mental conditions.” The forensic applications of this theory were 
clear: if “the homicidal fixed idea always connotes a subjacent morbid condition of 
                                                 
246 Garnier & Colin, ‘Homicidal Monomania’, in Dictionary of Psychological Medicine, pp. 593-599. 
Garnier (1845 – 1905) was employed at the Infirmerie Spéciale of the Paris Dépôt de Police and was, 
according to the Journal of Mental Science, one of the best known amongst French psychiatrists to its 
British readers. Garnier’s reception room at the Infirmary was, the journal noted, “most instructive for 
those studying Parisian methods”. Here all criminals displaying signs of mental peculiarity were 
inspected and, if necessary, transferred to associated institutions such as Magnan’s wards at Sainte 
Anne. Colin (1860 – 1930), who was made an honorary member of the MPA in 1920, had worked first 
under Garnier at the Infirmerie Spéciale and later under Bouchereau and Magnan at Sainte Anne where 
he eventually became Chief Physician. [‘Garnier: Obituary’, JMS, 1905, 51, 449; Henri Colin’, JMS, 
1930, 77 (316):1-3]. 
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mental degeneration, of which it is only a symptom”, then any “patient labouring 
under homicidal impulse is as unable to free himself from this fixed idea as a lunatic 
is to get rid of his imaginary conceptions or hallucinations”. Given these conditions, 
they concluded, psychiatrists should not “hesitate to declare a man, who thus makes 
an attempt on the life of another, to be irresponsible before the law.” Evidently the 
doctrine of monomania had not ‘had its day’ and neither in Garnier’s and Colin’s 
article nor in Clouston’s Clinical Lectures was the essential idea of monomania 
abandoned. Indeed the only major change between the old and new definition of 
monomania appeared to consist in the role a criminal’s biography would play in 
expert examination; in contradistinction to the classical monomanias, which were 
essentially inconsistent with the criminal’s former character, the episodical syndromes 
of degeneration would ostensibly have been betrayed by numerous portents. Garnier 
and Colin therefore advised that the examining psychiatrist should “look at the 
antecedents of the patient for abnormalities, which are mostly found in great 
numbers” while the presiding magistrate should continue to follow the older logic of 
monomania in calling for “the examination by a medico-legal expert of every criminal 
whose attempt does not seem based on the ordinary motives of most crimes.”  
 
We can see how this article, intended no doubt as a condensed and canonical 
formulation of the problem of monomania in the age of degeneracy, covers much of 
the same ground Clouston had passed in his discussion of the condition. Here the 
medico-legal balance is clarified in the bluntest possible terms: the magistrate must 
call in the psychiatrist when he can impute no motive and the psychiatrist must seek 
the heralds of danger in the criminal’s former conduct by working with the 
assumption that “in every insanity there may be a direct or indirect danger.”247  Aside 
from the social defence model of law this formula psychiatry was implicated in this 
formula – the patient’s dangerousness being invoked to legitimise the need for 
psychiatrists in court – we also get a sense as to why the disorders of adolescence 
were becoming so interesting to psychiatrists (and particularly Clouston) during this 
period. If, as degenerationists alleged in court, their expertise consisted in the ability 
to detect the portents of homicidal rage in the peculiarities of the criminal’s 
biography, then surely they ought to be able to apply this retrospective diagnosis in 
                                                 
247 Garnier & Colin, ‘Homicidal Monomania’, pp.593-5 & p.598 
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the present, deciphering the clues of future homicidal monomania in the syndromata 
of the young. According to Clouston, both degeneration and the insane diathesis arose 
mutually from “complex and different combinations of unusual developments”, 
producing a field of abnormality that was impossible to pin down within a medical 
work yet was ubiquitous in society. Here Clouston could rely on the picture of 
insanity and degeneration that increasingly belonged to popular culture, one had 
“merely to read the works of the modern psychological novelist” to study the 
abnormal types that could result from bad heredity.248 However, in Clouston’s theory 
of insanity the search for signs of danger operated in two ways. Firstly, though he 
continued to cite the ‘convenient’ monomanias that would only ever be invoked in 
serious or highly peculiar cases (species like necrophilia, planomania, and 
lycanthropia), his justification for accepting the existence of this type of insanity was 
given in reference to fairly trivial offences or non-criminal acts (petty theft and 
masturbation). Hence, the exceptionality of monomania, or the ‘convenience’ of the 
condition that had fallen on the side of the law rather than on the side of medicine, 
was removed, bringing trivial unconscious acts into its orbit. Secondly, he wished to 
imply that the unconscious monomanias the court had been accepting all along were 
no different from conscious impulsive crime, since it was the obsessive or impulsive 
nature of a particular crime that defined it as a monomania. Clouston’s discussion of 
morbid control and the insane diathesis therefore follows quite precisely the 
degenerationist strategy of eroding the two main distinctions the law had drawn with 
regard to insanity: the distinction between extravagant (pardonable) and petty 
(punishable) crimes, and that between conscious (punishable) and unconscious 
(pardonable) acts.  
 
5.3 Manias Interesting and Banal 
 
As we have seen, in the last third of the nineteenth century new forms of mental 
illness were proposed at the crossroads of psychiatry and the law. Clouston’s interest 
in alcohol as a cause and effect of degeneration was very much a part of this concern 
with the legal implications of psychiatric knowledge. Indeed, the notion of a specific 
‘mania’ for alcohol was developed in synchrony with a model of stable biological 
                                                 
248 Clouston, Clinical Lectures, pp. 257-58. 
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craving that was increasingly deployed in medical, psychiatric, and legal writings 
against the classical notion of volition.249 One of the earliest uses of this model 
appeared in Johann Ludwig Casper’s Handbook of the Practice of Forensic Medicine 
(1861), a hugely important work of medical jurisprudence that was frequently 
discussed by British psychiatrists and lawyers. Casper argued that, for all the good 
work of Temperance Societies, a diminution in alcohol consumption was generally 
met with an increase in the consumption of other ‘stimulants’ (such as tea and opium), 
a fact tending to suggest that the underlying craving was not removed but merely 
redirected in persons predisposed. While Casper acknowledged that to regard opium-
eating as a displaced form of dipsomania would not satisfy temperance advocates – 
after all, one could label this a vice to be added to that of alcohol consumption – their 
appeal to volition could not, he argued, explain the documented dependence regular 
opium users had developed. As corroboration he cited a “recent and remarkable case” 
of unintended dependency on chloroform that had developed in a patient after the 
substance had been administered as a sedative, affording “an unequivocal proof of the 
truth of the existence of a morbid impulse to intoxication from purely physical causes 
without the slightest trace of ‘vice.’” Furthermore, Casper claimed, Temperance 
Societies could not logically demonstrate that any individual capable of resisting 
alcohol purely by his own volition was at the same time suffering from this morbid 
impulse (i.e. addiction), and while he did not wish to join “that class of authors who . . 
. always elevate what is corporeal and deny the power of mental energy to control the 
immoral passions and desires”, he doubted the worth of social movements in 
                                                 
249 Mariana Valverde has argued that the continued commitment to a voluntaristic language of the will 
on the part of doctors tended to undercut their disease definition of alcoholism. See Valverde, ‘“Slavery 
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Freedom, Cambridge University Press, 1998. See also Terry M. Parssinen and Karen Kerner, 
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medicalisation of alcoholism in ‘The Edge of Hope: Social Policy and Chronic Alcoholism 1870-
1900’, J. Hist. Med., July, 1967: 215-45; On the temperance movement more generally see Brian H 
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Temperance Movement in Nineteenth-Century Scotland, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1977. 
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Louise Foxcroft, The Making of Addiction: The ‘Use and Abuse’ of Opium in Nineteenth-Century 
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controlling dipsomaniacs who became intoxicated “only from the compulsion of an 
internal necessity, and never for any other reason”, a fact which rendered their 
responsibility a question for medical witnesses rather than lawyers. 250 
 
 This recognition of dipsomania by medical jurisprudists, in addition to the 
established links between alcohol and violent crime – which, as we have seen, was 
noted by lawyers and social commentators as a particularly pressing problem for 
Scottish society – meant that a stable notion of dipsomania was important for 
psychiatry’s relations with the law. Yet it was at the same time a difficult condition to 
define, for not only was it necessary to distinguish its nosology from both simple 
drunkenness and alcoholic insanity, but it was, somewhat strangely, rejected by many 
members of the psychiatric profession as neologistic fraud. Given the potential 
importance a demonstrable alcoholic mania had for psychiatry some preliminary 
remarks are necessary on its general absence in theoretical texts. The problems 
surrounding the term ‘dipsomania’ – “the most difficult [subject] to discuss of all 
branches of insanity” – had been noted in the early 1870s by Henry Hayes 
Newington, then Senior Assistant Physician at Morningside Asylum. Writing in the 
same year Magnan had published his compiled lectures on alcoholism (sections of 
which had already appeared in translation, but would have in any case been known to 
British psychiatrists through their publication in the AMP), Hayes Newington noted 
that there were generally two “relations between drink and insanity”: hereditary 
alcoholism or degeneration, in which the tendency to take alcohol was “more a 
symptom of alienation than a cause”, and delirium tremens, a condition which “rarely 
[found] its way into asylums in [Scotland]”, though it remained “a form of mental 
disease just as much as acute mania or any other variety.”251 
 
Delirium tremens was in fact almost universally recognised as a form of 
insanity at this time (see chapter six) and did not find its way into asylums simply 
because general hospitals were set up to receive patients suffering from the physical 
symptoms of acute alcoholism. This was made clear in a thesis submitted in 1890 by 
                                                 
250 J. L. Casper, Handbook of the Practice of Forensic Medicine, The New Sydenham Society: London, 
1865 (orig. 1861), pp. 268-69. 
251 H. Hayes Newington, ‘Observations on Mania A Potu’, reprinted from Ed. M. J., Dec. 1874 
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the Hour Physician at Ward 6 of the Edinburgh Royal Infirmary, a ward that was, as 
in Chekhov’s story, reserved for the consignment of hopeless cases, “mainly however 
for those brought on by alcoholism.” In this largely clinical thesis describing the 
effects of prolonged drinking the author suggested that, in order to ensure there could 
be no confusion between self-inflicted drunkenness and uncontrollable somatic 
response, lawyers seeking a medical certificate of irresponsibility would typically 
demand evidence that the symptoms of delirium tremens had supervened three days 
after the patient had stopped drinking.252 It was in this legal recognition of delirium 
tremens, but not of other species of alcoholic mania, that figures such as Clouston saw 
a fatal ambiguity in the law, since, as he argued in an Edinburgh legal journal, an 
“alcoholic murder [may] send a man to the gallows or the hospital according to 
whether the murderer took the whisky the day he did the deed, or the week before.”253  
 
Hence, while delirium tremens offered demonstrable evidence of the 
psychiatric claim that alcohol was a frequent cause of insanity, it was never really a 
concern for psychiatry, firstly because it tended to appear in the wards of the general 
hospital and had a well understood aetiology in clinical medicine (the effects of 
alcohol on the structure and function of organs, including the brain, were not 
disputed), and secondly because it presented a type of what Hayes Newington 
described as “overt insanity” in which the disturbance wrought by alcohol was so 
clear that it was not necessary to “pause to enquire into other causes such as 
hereditary predisposition, for that is not at all necessary, though it is often present.” 
Psychiatrically more interesting cases were therefore found in patients amongst whom 
the compulsion to drink was “both a cause and an effect or symptom of insanity”, 
striking only the class of habitual drunkards that had “attracted considerable attention, 
especially on the part of Continental writers” such as Magnan.254 During the early 
1870s this type of alcoholic insanity had been described by British psychiatrists as 
‘dipsomania’, a problematic usage since the term had, for a long time, been employed 
in psychiatric descriptions to indicate only “the craving for drink” itself.255 Hoping to 
                                                 
252 Dawson F. Duckworth Turner, Observations upon Alcoholism, Unpublished M.D. Thesis, 
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clarify the description of alcoholic insanity, Hayes Newington suggested that the 
MPA adopt the term ‘Mania a potu’ to refer to any condition that was both a cause 
and effect of degeneration and in which the symptoms were “the manifestation of the 
effects of drink, which rapidly pass away as a rule”.256 According to this new 
understanding alcohol could produce “violent mania in two shapes”: delirium 
tremens, marked by the presence of overt accompanying bodily and mental 
symptoms, and mania a potu, marked exclusively by the manifestation of immoral or 
criminal conduct. It is clear that the species of insanity Hayes Newington labelled 
mania a potu was devised in the realm of forensic psychiatry: its explanatory power 
was useless in non-criminal cases, it had no diagnostic value beyond the retrospective 
understanding of crime, and, by Hayes Newington’s own admission, it would rarely 
be encountered in asylum practice until the symptoms (i.e. the violent outburst) had 
passed. Once again, it was the medico-legal dimensions of the condition that provided 
a framework for its existence, with the symptoms and portents raising questions in the 
field of criminal law that were even more sharply defined than those accompanying 
dipsomania: Could the person be detained once the attack of mania had passed? 
Should they be sent to an asylum or a prison if they committed a crime as the result of 
an attack? Could they receive legal pardon for crimes committed under the mania 
given the lack of concomitant bodily symptoms? Mania a potu therefore re-
introduced what Michel Foucault has described as the ‘untenable paradox of 
monomania’257 to psychiatry, describing an insanity only evinced in the crime or 
violent outburst, while its symptoms, following the logic of degeneration, could be 
correlated with the underlying heredity condition. 
 
Furthermore, this new diagnosis was to be reserved for special, psychiatrically 
interesting cases and would be confined to certain individuals, particularly “persons 
with brains ripened for an explosion by various causes [that] do explode after taking a 
quantity of alcohol that is utterly inadequate to produce either the so-called 
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dipsomania, or delirium tremens.” This move was central to psychiatry in the last 
third of the nineteenth century insofar as it allowed doctors to profile the offender, 
creating a differential diagnosis between simple and complex forms of alcoholic 
insanity that would allow mania to be reclaimed from the law. Hence, while the brains 
of this class of maniac provided the pathological locus of the condition, the 
degenerate drunkard also conformed to a marked character type: “wanderers of the 
earth” separated from their families and unable to furnish a reliable record of their 
heredity, young men and women of a generally opaque character who displayed no 
marked symptoms of insanity, rootless itinerants known only to the police officers or 
asylum doctors of the town they pitched up in (parallels with the ‘wandering Jew’ 
here only served to reinforce the implied ‘racial’ dimensions of the diagnosis). 
Examples of this profile, drawn from Hayes Newington’s own case-books, 
demonstrated the typical features on the condition. A young woman who had “been in 
prison many times for violence and theft. Very little is known of her family history, 
and no trace of heredity. She is a woman of the very lowest character when outside”, 
though when detained in the asylum she would become calm and show concern for 
the other patients. “A male; former soldier; well known to the police; little known 
family history; calm when sober, a maniac when drunk.” Or, from a case submitted to 
Hayes Newington by a surgeon based on a prison transport vessel bound for Australia, 
a man who was generally calm and temperate, though prone to sudden bursts of 
violence when drinking: “immediately before an explosion there would be some 
twitching about the mouth, and an excited eagerness of countenance” demonstrating 
that the mania was “not the result of prolonged indulgence, as is often sought to be 
proved when a case comes before a court of law.”258  
 
 This proposal of a new form of alcoholic mania therefore provides an 
important insight into the broader significance of the changing relations between 
psychiatry and the law in the second half of the nineteenth century even though, as 
with so many proposals for reform during this period, Hayes Newington was 
ultimately unsuccessful in garnering support for his new species of mania and the 
term ‘dipsomania’ continued to be used, and abused, by psychiatrists in Great Britain. 
Indeed, just two years after this proposal was made, John Charles Bucknill (1817 – 
                                                 
258 Ibid., pp .4-7. 
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1897), founder of the Journal of Mental Science and co-founder of Brain, was 
disputing the value of the term ‘dipsomania’ with Thomas Clouston at the Rugby 
Temperance Association.259 While both doctors were settled on the need to combat 
alcoholism in order to ensure the future of the race and the progress of the nation, they 
were not agreed on the role of speculative alcoholic manias in psychiatric descriptions 
of insanity, and although both had been impressed with “Magnan’s chapter on 
Dipsomania in his remarkable work on Alcoholism”, they differed in their 
understanding of its significance in medico-legal theory. While Clouston had 
emulated his French contemporary in distinguishing between simple (that is, 
theoretically uninteresting) alcoholism and the fascinating cases of hereditary 
monomania of drunkenness presented by monomanie ebrieuse or dipsomania, 
Bucknill could not follow “the eminent author” Magnan in accepting “the prevailing 
theory that dipsomania is a particular form of instinctive monomania, arising, most 
frequently, from heredity, while alcoholism is a simple state of poisoning, manifesting 
itself in the same manner in all, even in the brute as in man.” 
 
Bucknill, who had a longstanding interest in law and was less inclined to 
attack the legal regulations placed on asylum doctors than many of his peers, was 
clearly not prepared to accept a form of psychiatric logic postulating a “class of 
lunatics affected with the instinctive monomania of drunkenness, with complete 
absence of other signs or indications of unsoundness of mind.” He followed a judicial 
approach to the framing of insanity by arguing that “Dipsomania is either a vice 
leading to disease in the ordinary pathological sequence, or it is an actual and 
recognisable form of disease of the brain, with evidence of its existence more cogent 
than the mere desire for drink.” Furthermore, he argued, the evidence Magnan himself 
had provided for this type of distinct mania could simply be re-interpreted, with 
patients suffering from the special “monomania of drunkenness” divided into either 
“common periodic drunkards” who had concealed the extent of their indulgence to the 
physician or patients not merely “in a state of monomanie ebrieuse, or the moral 
insanity of drink, but [suffering from] real aberration of mind”. In this way he 
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contended that even within Magnan’s descriptions and cases this ‘real aberration of 
mind’ betrayed itself by evidence beyond the compulsion to drink, as for example in 
Magnan’s discussion of a female dipsomaniac who, aware of her insane craving 
toward drink, had defecated into her glass, a measure that was still not sufficient to 
overcome the allure of its contents. Here at least it is difficult not to sympathise with 
Bucknill’s response to this case: if she “had actually mixed excrement in her drink she 
was probably quite insane already.”260  
 
This was precisely the kind of medico-legal species Clouston wished to 
advance however, with the various forms of impulsive insanity redefined as conscious 
or unconscious monomania in which special clinical signs were capable of 
determining the boundary between responsibility and irresponsibility. For instance, in 
his Clinical Lectures dipsomania appeared as a morbid and uncontrollable craving for 
any form of stimulant, with “the confirmed opium eater, the inveterate haschisch 
chewer, [and] the abandoned tobacco smoker  . . . all in the same category.”261 These 
manias were therefore the ‘interesting’ cases for psychiatry, and while simple 
‘Alcoholic Insanity’ continued to be described as a form of mental disturbance 
sharing common characteristics with other marked and legally accepted insanities, 
this was a ‘normal’ insanity representing only the terminal stage of a well understood 
interaction between alcohol and nerve tissue. Dipsomania, on the other hand, was 
reserved for those with “brains predisposed by heredity” as an underlying condition 
that itself caused the symptom of insufficient resistive power toward stimulants 
(resembling the syndromata of Magnan).262  
 
In this way, psychiatrically uninteresting common insanities distinguished 
only by the cause of their onset were separated from the symptomatically similar but 
causally more complex and contentious species of mania. Furthermore, these manias 
were often restricted to certain character types that would allow psychiatry, at least in 
principle, to pursue a strategy of prophylaxis. For instance, there was the “typical 
dipsomaniac”, generally a person of neurotic and insane heredity, an habitual flesh-
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eater who displayed lubricious habits in childhood that quickly gave way to a wanton 
and uncontrollable desire for alcoholic or narcotic stimulants in adolescence, a 
disposition that was rarely improved by the therapies aimed at drunkards – “long sea 
voyages, a colony, isolation in a doctor’s family” – none of these would alter the 
dipsomaniac’s condition, and a gradual descent into mild dementia or some other 
recognisably insane state was all but inevitable. Such people, Clouston noted, were 
offered no protection by or from the law, and “the sooner they drink themselves to 
death, the better. They are a curse to all who have to do with them, a nuisance and a 
danger to society, and propagators of a bad breed.” It is clear then that, at least if we 
follow Clouston’s text here, the role of alcohol in these theoretical descriptions of 
insanity was not merely to claim a new object for psychiatry (the dipsomaniac), 
particularly as this type of patient was generally unwelcome in the asylum. Indeed, 
while Clouston argued that psychiatry ought to accept the definition of dipsomania he 
had offered, he quite explicitly removed the dipsomaniac from its field of concern, 
arguing that: “Lunatic asylums are certainly not proper places for them, and when sent 
there they cannot be kept long enough. What we want is an island where whisky is 
unknown; guardianship combining authority, firmness, attractiveness, and a high 
bracing moral tone.”263 
 
In the years that followed the Clinical Lectures, Clouston developed his theory 
of dipsomania and of alcohol’s relation to insanity more generally, continuing to draw 
both implicitly upon the degenerationist notion of disordered control and explicitly 
upon the works of French degenerationists. In 1889 he set out at length in his Annual 
Report from the Morningside Asylum to explain how unregulated control in relation 
to alcohol and the other stimulants (as they were considered at the time) would 
produce insanity.264 The contents of these Reports were frequently covered by both 
local and national press with The Scotsman in particular often repeating their claims 
verbatim, publishing lengthy extracts for the yearly Reports with Cloustonesque 
warnings that while “nothing is more common than the boast that ‘our family at least 
is quite free from insanity’” such mistaken assumptions would be ultimately 
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prejudicial to the race.265  As such, Clouston’s Annual Reports cannot be read as 
factual descriptions of the year’s events, but should be seen as a means of transmitting 
the prophylactic and pastoral role of psychiatry to a wider audience. For The 
Scotsman these Reports offered a “register of the mental and physical health of the 
community. The patients are the sick and wounded in the struggle for existence, and 
the admissions are in some sense a measure of the severity of the battle.”266 The 
Courant, an Edinburgh daily, noted of Clouston’s Annual Asylum Report that “the 
general public seem to enjoy it as an authoritative expression of the progress which is 
being made in the treatment of the insane”, adding that “the medical profession can do 
little these days without bringing the lever of their opinions to bear on the public 
mind, and there can be no doubt that morally they are bound to educate the public on 
all matters relating to the prevention of disease, mental or otherwise.”267 Similarly, the 
Evening Dispatch wrote that the Annual Reports were the product of “a sound 
investigator and an able administrator” and contained an important source of 
information concerning insanity for non-specialists, with “perhaps no set of statistics 
annually submitted to the public” being as eagerly anticipated (though they were 
critical of Clouston’s growing alliance with the “pseudo-statistical pessimists, who 
have recently been making the most reckless and unreasoned assertions about the 
moral degeneration of the Scottish people.”)268 These pessimistic assertions about 
national degeneration had come to a head in the 1889 Report which, wrote the 
Evening Dispatch, contained “a mass of information with regard to the effects of 
intemperance” that was “sure to attract considerable attention, since the drink question 
is so much to the front at present.”269 
 
The sombre tone the drink question had cast on Clouston’s 1889 Report united 
his old concerns over heredity with the issue of national deterioration. Here alcoholic 
excess was described as not only the “most frequent single exciting cause of mental 
disease” in a direct aetiological sense, but one that was “closely connected 
hereditarily in many cases. The children of drunkards sometimes become insane, and 
the children of insane people still more frequently become drunkards.” Part of the 
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reason for Clouston’s concern with alcoholism was undoubtedly a rise in the 
admission of chronic alcoholics at his asylum; aside from 1876, no other single year 
had seen more cases admitted to the RAE as a result of alcohol (with 81 cases, 
representing 25% of the intake, related to drunkenness). Yet this fact alone would 
hardly explain the longstanding interest Clouston had shown in the problems of 
drunkenness and degeneration, and while he attempted to offer a local explanation for 
the rise in alcoholic patients by suggesting that an increase in wages amongst the 
labouring classes had provided them with a “temptation to break with the laws of their 
being, which they are unable to resist”,  the Report itself had little to do with these 
labourers and focused for the most part on the Habitual Drunkards Act (1879) which 
had been made permanent by a parliamentary bill passed in the previous year.  
 
The terms of this Act, Clouston argued, had left ambiguous its relation to the 
existing confinement laws, raising a series of pressing questions for the psychiatric 
profession: “[Would] habitual drunkenness be considered and treated legislatively as 
if it were a form of insanity?”; Would the Act cover only habitual drunkards or could 
it be used to detain “predisposed subjects” who had succumbed to repeated bouts of 
drinking (that is, could it be used in line with psychiatric rather than legal definitions 
of insanity); Would existing asylums be used for this purpose and would subjects be 
detained according to “the machinery provided by the Lunacy Acts?” Clouston 
questioned further if this new legislation would force asylums to accept dipsomaniacs, 
a measure which would render asylum management impossible since “the insane and 
the Dipsomaniac do not consort well together”. This of course brings us back to the 
paradoxical nature of the psychiatric discussion of alcoholism in the late nineteenth 
century. While many doctors supported increased legislation in light of the anarchic 
dangers posed by alcoholism, and while they typically insisted on what Clouston 
labelled the “real connection between the two conditions [of drunkenness and 
insanity]”, when the government came to legislate in their favour they fell back into 
emphasising the need to keep apart drunkards and the insane. Indeed, the lack of 
interest psychiatry had with the alcoholic or dipsomaniac (which contrasted with the 
great interest it had with the symbolic importance of the dipsomaniac’s condition) is 
demonstrated by the two lines of legislation suggested by Clouston: either legislate for 
dipsomaniacs by excusing all impulsive crimes as acts of temporary insanity, or 
legislate against all “incorrigible drunkenness” and create special extra-asylum 
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facilities for the purpose. It is clear then this was not a bid to ‘gain control’ of the 
alcoholic: after all, these two lines of legislation would either see dipsomaniacs 
released as innocent or placed in special facilities outside of the asylum. Why then 
were psychiatrists like Clouston so insistent on the problem of dipsomania?  
 
So far we have seen two main themes protrude from Clouston’s discussion of 
dipsomania, themes that have little to do with the discussion of the condition itself 
and much to do with justifying the theoretical assumptions of his broader system. 
Firstly, the consequences of this mania were addressed almost exclusively toward the 
law while, secondly, dipsomania was used to entrench claims concerning insanity 
within an array of evolutionary, anthropological, physiological, and neurological 
assumptions. In this way, the theory of self-control formed two parallel continuums 
within psychiatry: the power of control present in the members of the race allowed for 
the distinction between healthy and sick individuals on the basis of their arrangement 
in a comparative sequence, with a further comparative sequence formed along the 
racial and evolutionary hierarchy itself. While the first continuum allowed psychiatry 
to discuss insanity in the absence of ‘disease’ (legally recognised conditions such as 
delusion), the second continuum emphasised the social importance of psychiatry by 
contrasting the degree of control present in an “animal or a simple barbarian” with the 
intense yet subtle cravings of civilisation, which promoted desires in a thousand 
directions and bombarded the brain with constant demands for gratification (“as man 
rises in the scale of mind and civilization . . . his brain [becomes] an organ of a 
hundredfold more delicacy and complication, as compared with that of the savage”).  
The modern citizen therefore required new techniques for maintaining a power of 
restraint, calling upon the hygienic mission of psychiatry to prevent the civilised 
nations from extinguishing themselves. As public guardians, psychiatrists were placed 
within this process of development on both the individual and racial level to preserve 
the mental hygiene and heredity qualities of the public and prevent the exponential 
stimuli of industrial life from precipitating “death and social anarchy in a 
generation.”270 
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In this same year (1889) Clouston published the first part of a lengthy article 
on ‘Diseased Cravings’ in the Edinburgh Medical Journal in which the 
anthropological aspects of his theory of insanity were drawn out in great detail.271   
Once again dipsomania – “the non-existence of the power of control” expressed as a 
craving for alcohol – was theorised not as the presence of any peculiarity within the 
brain, but as the lack of an impossible ideal, with morphinomania, cocainism, 
chloralism and so on similarly representing manias of deficient control expressed 
toward other stimulants. However, while the European craving for alcohol was 
formed “out of ordinary habits and needs of mankind” (particularly the need to foster 
bonds between warring factions), the taste for morphine or cocaine was placed in the 
range of artificial cravings. Anthropological puzzles such as the Chinese love of 
opium could not therefore be explained solely on the grounds of deficient control over 
a natural craving, but would require a further, sociological explanation. Clouston’s 
solution to a problem of his own making was to suggest that the taste for opium was 
born of the search for release from the uniformity of thought and action in that 
“stagnant, overcrowded country” (the Boxer rebellion and the British imposition of 
the opium trade were, of course, not considered). The “political heredity of a 
Chinaman”, he conjectured, must have prohibited mirth and free thought to such an 
extent that opium alone could induce “an artificial and purely subjective state of 
mind” taking “the Chinaman out of China, where no man has any choice to speak of, 
into a paradise where there are no mandarins, no struggles for existence under the 
most unfavourable conditions, and where there is unlimited scope to live.”272 
 
This was not merely a piece of abstract anthropological theorising however, 
for it allowed Clouston’s position to be distinguished from that of Henry Maudsley, 
who had suggested in Body and Will that the thirst for intoxication, whether in savage 
or civilised man, resulted from the intensely human longing for the elation attained in 
freedom from consciousness.273 The idealistic longing for freedom, Clouston 
contended, could only operate on individuals who had been exposed to such ideals:  
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The savage and many of the congenital dipsomaniacs and habitual drunkards among our labourers and 
our criminals cannot by any use or abuse of alcohol have any ideal opened to them. We must seek a 
lower motive than this for the craving and the inability to resist it. Maudsley’s description exactly 
applies to De Quincey’s motive for giving himself up to opium. It does not apply to the Red Indian or 
to the Whitechapel victims of ‘Jack the Ripper.’ In them the motive is more analogous to that which 
prompts the stallion to seek sexual congress with the mare – it is a simple organic craving of great 
intensity.  
 
Hence, while more refined European inebriates were placed alongside the culturally 
rich though politically stagnant Chinese opium smoker in chasing a lofty ideal and 
seeking to escape the banality of the real, the degenerates were impulse-machines 
resembling the savage in their incapability of attaining self-mastery.274 In all manias, 
whether natural or artificial, civilised or savage, it was the role of heredity in storing 
the organic memory of desire that allowed the condition to be described as an insane 
or irresponsible one, a fact demonstrated repeatedly in the cases psychiatrists 
encountered. 
 
These anthropological speculations served to reinforce the division of 
interesting and banal manias in psychiatry, with heredity and development allowing 
doctors to distinguish dipsomania from “true alcoholic insanity and alcoholism 
generally.” Again, it is on the face of it puzzling that Clouston continued to describe 
dipsomania at all: the condition had “never satisfactorily been defined”, was used “in 
the loosest way both in the [medical] profession and out of it”, and had a tangled 
nosology and aetiology, since the compulsion to drink, even if it was the most 
prominent symptom in a patient, was not necessarily the underlying condition itself. 
Furthermore, a number of diseases frequently met with in clinical psychiatry could be 
confused with dipsomania through their tendency to produce a morbid craving for 
alcohol: folie circulaire; simple melancholia, dementia, delusional insanity, general 
                                                                                                                                            
sympathy, a freedom of mental power, an exaltation of the whole nature, mental and bodily, are 
obtained thereby which are denied to it by the real. The low savage does not care for the taste of rum, 
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effects whenever he has the opportunity.” H Maudsley, Body and Will: An Essay Concerning Will in its 
Metaphysical, Physiological, and Pathological Aspects, New York: D. Appleton & co., 1884 (2nd ed.), 
p.274. 
274 Clouston, ‘Diseased Cravings and Paralysed Control’, Part I, p.516. 
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paralysis, brain syphilis, and a range of “brain softenings” or organic lesions that 
encouraged the morbid craving for alcohol were all complicating factors in the 
diagnosis. Even when psychiatrists encountered cases with every hallmark of 
dipsomania, Clouston advised, they should not diagnose them if there was “clear 
evidence that a morbid brain elevation preceded the tendency to drink; and that [the 
patient] had lost control in many directions besides drinking”. Undiagnosed epilepsy 
was particularly troublesome here, since it tended to produce morbid cravings similar 
to dipsomania and Clouston noted that he had “many epileptics in the Asylum that I 
cannot let into town on pass simply because they cannot resist the craving for drink”, 
though they were not to be defined as dipsomaniacs on this basis.275 Indeed, a medical 
thesis examining the relations between alcohol, epilepsy, dipsomania and transitory 
mania was submitted to Clouston in 1889, its author arguing that while alcohol could 
serve as a useful aid in the diagnosis of epilepsy it was first expedient to develop an 
adequate theory and means of identifying dipsomania, since this condition, if present, 
could complicate the diagnosis with its tendency to produce “a loss of self-control or 
mental inhibition [in the presence of alcohol], which in ordinary individuals is still 
retained to a greater or lesser extent.”276  
 
In order to overcome these problems while addressing the anthropological 
dimensions of degeneracy, Clouston proposed a fresh means of dividing up the 
various insanities caused by alcohol into four main classes: 1) Developmental or 
regressive dipsomania; 2) the dipsomania of neurotic diathesis; 3) somatic 
dipsomania; 4) the dipsomania of excess. The first two classes, by far the most 
interesting theoretically, resulted from developmental failure and encompassed those 
“whose higher inhibition had never been developed as a brain faculty.” While the 
other classes were similarly marked by “characteristics of the neurotic diathesis” 
(heredity taint was suspected but not proved), they did not conform to any special 
“psychological or physical type that would lead one to predict this likelihood of 
dipsomania.” Once again we see that the speculative and legally dubious cases of 
‘insanity’ were the ones that attracted attention, with the developmental failure of 
childhood, a failure rendering the European individual the mental analogue of the 
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savage, allowing psychiatry to distinguish dipsomania from other insanities in which a 
craving for alcohol would be present. This failure to develop was tied to both an 
absence of the standard legal proof of insanity (lack of understanding) and to the 
general popularity of the theory of phylogenic succession, since these patients: 
 
knew quite well intellectually that the excessive indulgence in drink meant social disgrace, and that 
such excess was morally wrong [but] after disease of the brain had broken down the power of 
inhibition, the lower animal liking for drink overcame the higher motives. It is now pretty generally 





The European dipsomaniac had therefore regressed down the evolutionary scale to the 
level of the savage who similarly lacked powers of restraint, a regression offering an 
“instructive analogy between the dipsomania of the unevolved Indian and the 
dipsomania of ‘reversion’ in the civilized man” that, for Clouston, had “not been 
sufficiently dwelt on.”278 
 
The analogy between the ‘unevolved’ and the ‘degenerate’ that Clouston drew 
was in fact part of a wide discourse already taking place in the life sciences and 
psychiatry during the late nineteenth century. As Stephen Jay Gould notes, the law of 
reversion or recapitulation was ‘discovered’ several times during the second half of 
the nineteenth century, but is most commonly attributed to Ernst Haeckel, professor of 
zoology and comparative anatomy at Jena, who set out its most detailed account in his 
Generelle Morphologie der Organismen of 1866 (though two American neo-
Lamarckian paleontologists, Edward Drinker Cope and Alpheus Hyatt, independently 
published a strikingly similar account in the same year, with the then recent work of 
Darwin and the natural philosopher Louis Agassiz providing the impetus). The theory 
of ancestral recapitulation, which had been popularised in the English-speaking 
medical world by Edwin Ray Lankester (1847 – 1929), “one of England’s staunchest 
supporters of the biogenetic law” of recapitulation, served as a prominent and popular 
way of uniting psychiatric claims with a growing awareness of, and belief in, the 
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theory of evolution amongst the educated classes.279 Within psychiatry, a variant of 
this notion of reversion was promulgated in John Hughlings Jackson’s theory of 
‘dissolution’, according to which the last evolved and therefore ‘highest’ powers of 
any organism were susceptible to disruption. As one of his followers, James Sully, put 
it, Hughlings Jackson had emphasised that “psycho-physical degeneration is the 
reverse process to that of nervous evolution. The highest and latest-evolved nervous 
arrangements, being the most unstable, are the first to be thrown hors de combat by 
the inroads of general cerebral disease; the successive changes of dissolution retrace 
the path followed by evolution.”280  
 
Indeed Clouston’s own Assistant Physician at Morningside, George Wilson, 
had also written on the subject of recapitulation in relation to alcohol in his 1883 
study Drunkenness.281 In his discussion of ‘Alcoholic Dissolution’ Wilson noted that 
drunkenness was frequently associated with “a retrogressive pathological process” 
standing as “the reverse of evolution”, a process that could divide the insanities of 
alcohol into two distinct pathological branches: the “effects produced by the direct 
action of alcohol on nerve-tissue” in the individual, and the racial “degeneration 
initiated by the habitual abeyance of the organic basis of altruism.” This ‘altruism’ 
was Wilson’s own attempt to sermonise based on an entirely familiar argument; since 
the moral faculties are the highest, they must necessarily have been the last to evolve, 
rendering them most fragile aspect of the organism. Anyone who drank to excess 
betrayed a lack of moral sense, which in turn suggested that: 
 
their altruism was abnormally defective from the first . . . Whether the particular outcome of the 
morbid stain shall be vice, or madness, or crime, will depend much on the circumstances of life; but 
there is no doubt in my mind that one way in which insanity is generated de novo is through the 
deterioration of nature, which is shown in the absence of moral sense. It was the last acquisition in the 
process of humanisation, and its decay is the first sign of human degeneration. And as an absence of 
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Science with a study of drunkenness regarded as a nervous disease” (vii). 
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moral sense in one generation may be followed by insanity in the next, so I have observed that, 
conversely, insanity in one generation sometimes leaves the evil legacy of a defective sense to the next. 
Any course of life, then, which persistently ignores the altruistic relations of an individual as a social 
unit, which is in truth a systematic negation of the moral law of human progress, deteriorates his higher 
nature, and so initiates a degeneracy which may issue in mental derangement in his posterity.282 
 
More broadly still, psychiatry had been working with a notion of insanity as a 
failure to develop since the 1820s, when it began to describe the mentally subnormal 
or idiotic child with the work of Esquirol (1772 – 1840) and Belhomme (1800 – 
1880), in which idiocy was dislodged from the summit of madness to become its 
starting point or most fundamental form. For example, Belhomme’s doctoral 
dissertation, Essai sur l’idiote of 1824 (which, following the French convention at this 
time, was published and would have been accessible to an audience beyond his 
immediate circle) “followed Esquirol’s definition of idiocy” as a starting point of 
undeveloped insanity, emphasising the importance of the notion for a new generation 
of psychiatrists who took up the theme with greater force in Morel’s generation.283 
Hence, with the work of Esquirol, Belhomme and others a notion of idiocy was 
adopted that did not appeal to the language of disease at all, but to the principle of 
development. In placing idiocy on a developmental line, French psychiatrists had 
sought to emphasise the importance they had come to attach to diseases of stagnation, 
heredity, and development. The process of development, common to all organisms,  
could therefore serve as a type of norm, allowing the idiot, whose development was 
halted from an early age, to be distinguished from the ‘retarded child’, whose 
development was merely slowed down, marking the emergence of an approach to 
psychiatry in which the patient was not only ill, but abnormally ill.284 
 
 We can see in Clouston’s continued interest in dipsomania a coming together 
of the two themes of reversion and development (which was to become the central 
tenet of his theory of insanity in later years). This interest in the abnormalities of 
children can be attributed, at least in part, to this process, particularly as the first class 
of dipsomaniac – the regressive or developmental failure – was simply a sub-species 
                                                 
282 Ibid., pp. 25-28. 
283 Sofie Lachapelle, ‘Educating Idiots: Utopian Ideals and Practical Organization Regarding Idiocy 
inside Nineteenth-Century French Asylums’, Science in Context, 20 (4), 2007: 627-648 (632) 
284 Foucault, Psychiatric Power, pp. 208-210. 
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of idiot who had failed to acquire the ‘normal’ powers of self-restraint. The patient’s 
childhood would therefore present clues indicating the presence of dipsomania (rather 
than one of the many conditions capable of producing similar symptoms), revealing 
that they were “usually of a neurotic parentage or from a drunken family, and are in 
fact one variety of the class of ‘moral idiots’ or imbeciles.” The portents of this 
condition were descent from “a drunken family”, a childhood in which the patient was 
“slightly peculiar, impulsive, and often difficult to manage from a baby”, someone 
who, though they had been “taught the ordinary branches at school . . . was backwards 
somewhat”, incapable of concentration and “a good deal of an automaton mentally”. 
These signs, as in the case of homicidal mania, would allow for a retrospective 
separation of the abnormal, ill and irresponsible subject from those merely inclined 
toward vice.285 
 
 Once again, the psychiatrist’s ability to uncover these germinal traces of 
madness and abnormality in the past provided them with a place in the present as 
experts in “preventative mental medicine”, reading “the signs of nervous and mental 
constitution along with the heredity” in order to determine the responsibility of the 
subject.286 In this way the pastoral role of psychiatry was placed directly between the 
individual and social bodies, and Clouston argued that the laws of the State were 
merely social representations of the laws of natural desire, with their mutual function 
being to promote the strength and vitality of the organism. Aspiring to establish a 
medical cosmology as the dominant ideology of modern states, Clouston prophesised 
that it would become “the highest duty of the physician of the future to interpret 
cravings and repulsions, and to satisfy them safely by his treatment”, a duty that 
would, by extension, “apply to the politician and priest.”287 As The Hospital reported 
in reference to one of Clouston’s Annual Reports, his work sought to demonstrate that 
a greater knowledge of heredity was needed “on the part of statesmen, lawyers, and 
common people . . . the civilisation of the future must be scientific, or if it be not there 
will be no future at all for the races that now lead.”288  
 
                                                 
285 Clouston, ‘Diseased Cravings and Paralysed Control’, Part II, pp. 698-99.  
286 Ibid., p.705. 
287 Clouston, ‘Diseased Cravings and Paralysed Control’, Part I, p.512.  
288 The Hospital: An Institutional Journal of the Medical Sciences and Hospital Administration, Mar 
10, 1894, in LHB 7/12:5. 
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5.4 The Neuroses of Development 
 
The evolutionary dimensions of psychiatry in relation to alcohol and degeneration 
were outlined once again in Clouston’s Morison Lectures on the Neuroses of 
Development, delivered at the Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh in 1890.289 
Here Clouston began by noting that while the surgeons and pathological anatomists in 
his audience would no doubt be aware of “pathological-tissue degenerations” such as 
“the fatty, the cirrhotic changes that take place in the vascular, the renal, the hepatic, 
the glandular, the fibrous, and the nervous tissue”, representing the degenerations of 
“the individual tissues and single organ damages”, they may not be aware that these 
same degenerations also existed on a more general level of pathology, mirroring 
localised and specific incidents in the race at large. There had apparently been much 
discussion of “degeneracy and degenerations of tissues and organs” in the years 
preceding Clouston’s Morison lecture, though these terms were used only to describe 
“the retrogressive changes that are met with in tissues and other organs once normal, 
but that through alcoholic, malarial, or other poisons, disease, or other cause, have 
undergone nutritional changes away from the normal.” 
 
Clouston therefore wished to contrast the clinical specificity of the term 
‘degeneration’ then popular in medical circles with the more general usage that had 
entered into psychiatry, laying “the foundation of our modern knowledge of certain 
human physical degenerations and their causes.”  Clouston was quite explicit that his 
own model of mental disease, a model in which illness appeared as a developmental 
disorder, was able to bridge the gap between the specific (anatomo-pathological) and 
the general (psychiatric) understanding of degeneration, supplementing and 
completing the theories of French psychiatry. In short, he believed he had discovered 
that the various degenerations could “be put down to trophic neuroses of a hereditary 
                                                 
289 The Scotsman reported on these lectures positively, noting that “The question of mental and bodily 
‘degeneracy’ is one of enormous importance to society. Diseases, incapacity, poverty, and crime result 
from it beyond a doubt.” The Medical Press hailed the lectures as a remarkable success, and the Boston 
Medical and Surgical Journal also gave them a favourable review when they appeared in print.  The 
Lancet, in contrast, felt that while the lectures were “well attended” and “full of interest”, the “views 
expressed [were] hardly likely to be accepted by [medical] practitioners in general.” (The Scotsman, 8th 
Nov. 1890 & 15th Nov, 1890, in LHB 7/12:5 (pp.108-09); ‘Abstract of the Morison Lectures on the 
Neuroses of Development’, The Lancet, Nov. 29, 1890, in LHB 7/12:5, p.113; The Medical Press, Dec 
24, 1890 in LHB 7/12:5, p.116; Boston Medical and Surgical Journal [Nov 26, 1891] in ibid., p.195). 
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character; and they first appear during early growth and development, a point which 
Morel and Moreau de Tours both missed.”290 
 
The interplay of specificity and generality at work in the history of the term 
degeneration can be traced from Lucretius, through Medieval notions of Mundus 
senescit, to the eighteenth century, where figures like Sylvanus Urban (writing in 
1746) argued that the “Degeneracy of the People of England” was attributable to 
“lamented money”, “an inferior God”, and “the propensity to extravagance among the 
most ordinary mechanics, [whose] savings are expended in debauch, hence the tears 
of the widows and the cry of the orphans.”291 Indeed, when the British Quarterly 
Review discussed Morel’s Tratié des dégénérescences it noted that “the phrase 
‘Degenerations in Man’ must not be understood as synonymous with that of the 
‘Degeneracy of Man’”, since the latter question was an aspect of the old querelle des 
Anciens et des Modernes that had divided the courtly politics of late seventeenth-
century France, concerning itself with a fall from or rise to some “typical high estate 
of moral and physical excellence” rewritten to consider whether man was “a fallen 
angel, or a polished and refined ape.”292 Even within medicine the concept of 
degeneration, when it was introduced into pathological anatomy in the early 
nineteenth century, was already an old one and, as Foucault notes, “Buffon [had] 
applied it to individuals or series of individuals that diverged from a specific type; 
doctors also used it to designate that weakening of natural robust humanity that life in 
society, civilization, laws, and language condemn little by little to a life of artificiality 
and disease.” Figures such as Cruveilhier were quick in “criticizing too wide a use of 
the term ‘degeneration’ [and] wished to reserve it for that disordered activity of the 
organism that creates tissues that have no parallel in the state of health; such tissues, 
                                                 
290 T. S. Clouston, The Neuroses of Development, Being the Morison Lectures for 1890, Edinburgh: 
Oliver & Boyd, 1891 (p.40). 
291 Sylvanus Urban, cited in De Clare Woodcock H. ‘Physical Degeneration: Past and Present’, British 
Medical Journal, Aug. 13, 1904, p.354. C.f. Veyne P. Did the Greeks Believe in their Myths? An Essay 
on the Constitutive Imagination, University of Chicago Pres, 1988, p137 n.40 [“whatever one says, the 
most widespread conceptions of time view it as neither cyclical or linear but as decline.”]; Jacques Le 
Goff, Time, Work, & Culture in the Middle Ages, University of Chicago Press, 1980, p.226 [“It is true 
that for a long while the reigning idea would be not progress but, rather, decline. Mundus senescit. The 
world grows old. Mankind has yet entered the sixth and final epoch of its existence: old age.”]; Andrea 
A J. ‘The Myth of the Middle Ages’ Historian, 55 (1), 1992, p.184 [Protestant polemicists in the 
German-speaking world “wrote ecclesiastical histories that widened and popularized as never before 
the idea of a post-Classical age of degeneration.”] 
292 Anon, ‘Traité des Dégénérescences by Dr. Morel’, British Quarterly Review, 78, 1864: 425-459. 
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which usually present ‘a fatty greyish texture’, are to be found in tumours” and other 
irregular tissue masses.293  From this increasingly specific application the term was 
again re-expanded with the work of Morel, though by the time Clouston came to give 
these lectures the tendency in general medicine was once more to refer to the 
degeneration of tissues or organs without implying any overall theory of decline. 
 
 Hence, Clouston began this series of lectures by drawing attention to the 
broadest aspects of the question of degeneracy and their relation, through heredity, to 
the degeneration of tissues and organs. In particular he wished to highlight how 
Continental theories of criminology that had been in vogue since the inaugural 
Congress of Criminal Anthropology in Rome (1885) and its successor event in Paris 
(1889) – events which, though they had attracted discussion in the national press, had 
failed to attract a single British delegate – were related to the study of pathological 
anatomy practised by his audience of surgeons and physicians. For example, the work 
of Benedikt of Vienna – “by far the most notable of the Continental criminal 
anthropologists” to have discussed the “psycho-neurosis of criminality” – was said to 
have demonstrated the existence of stigmata unique to certain forms of criminality 
and insanity, stigmata which “must arise during early growth and development”, and 
hence were related both to the medical study of pathological anatomy and to 
Clouston’s own research into developmental abnormality.294  While Clouston 
accepted that the conclusions of this school were “not yet fully accepted as facts” in 
Britain, he submitted that the “question of mental degeneracy, quite apart from idiocy 
or technical imbecility or insanity, [was] one of enormous social importance” and that 
the propositions advanced by Continental authorities must be taken seriously by 
British doctors. Indeed, the question of degeneration was of far greater national 
importance that the study of mere idiocy or technical (that is, legally recognised) 
insanity psychiatrists had formerly occupied themselves with. As Clouston told his 
audience in a lengthy characterisation of the degenerate that is worth quoting in full: 
                                                 
293 Foucault, Birth of the Clinic, pp. 192-193. 
294 Clouston, Neuroses of Development, pp. 37-38. Clouston’s interest in the work of Benedikt was 
longstanding; he noted in his Clinical Lectures that he had attended the Austrian doctor’s panel at the 
1881 International Medical Congress in London. There he had witnessed a display of “a number of 
brains of habitual criminals which [Benedikt] affirmed had their convolutions arranged in a certain 
simple form peculiar to the criminal classes, so that on seeing such a brain he could tell the ethical 
tendencies of the person to whom it belonged . . . There is no doubt that an organic lawlessness is 
transmitted hereditarily [as Benedikt claims].” Clouston, Clinical Lectures pp. 232-233. 
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For every idiot or insane person we no doubt have ten human beings in society, and weighing it down, 
who are so much below or away from even a minimum standard of humanity that they must be 
reckoned among the degenerate. Such persons are the despair of teachers and parents. They afterwards 
sink in the social scale through incapacity; they are left stranded in nooks and corners and eddies in the 
struggle for existence; they live at a lower level than average humanity; they are not an interesting 
class; they need help always and cannot help themselves; they are easily drifted over the border line 
that separates the criminal from the non-criminal; they fill poor houses and are a heavy burden on the 
charitably disposed, for they cannot be taught to help themselves; they are only kept at work by their 
empty stomachs; they are fortunately and fittingly situated when they settle into the grooves of hewing 
some of the world’s wood and drawing its water; they are the grown up children of society who can 
never attain self government; they always do best under the rule of the strong and kindly; they are 
responsible to the law and have the liberty of men with the self-control of children, yet liberty in a 
complete sense is contraindicated for them by the tyranny of their organisation. 295 
 
Note how many concerns are brought to bear in this description of the degenerate: 1) 
though they are not suffering from the forms of ‘technical’ imbecility of insanity 
society protects itself against, their condition is just as destructive, hence a new 
approach is needed; 2) they vastly outnumber these recognised members of the 
insane, therefore the detection and prevention of degeneracy is of far greater social 
concern than the ‘sensibility’ accorded to the insane; 3) they cannot be educated or 
improved and in fact show an inexorable tendency to deteriorate still further, 
rendering any of the established methods of philanthropy useless; 4) they may become 
a direct danger to the public through criminality, but in any case they are always a 
burden on the State; 5) they are suited to a socially atavistic existence in the forests 
but wilt at the complexities of modern life, the degenerate is, in this sense, the savage 
within modern society; 6) as with the savage Other, they are not suited to “self 
government” and must be colonised and managed by more advanced races;296 7) 
finally, they cannot be dealt with under the existing system of laws, which, like the 
degenerate, had failed to keep pace with the new conditions of society. 
 
                                                 
295 Clouston, Neuroses of Development, p.41. 
296 Clouston’s description of the degenerate as a being fit for hewing wood and drawing water was 
clearly intended to touch a colonial nerve; a decade later Boer rebel commander Paul Kruger feared 
that defeat at the hands of the British would see his people reduced to a similarly Gibeonite status as 
“exhausted remnants” forced to serve as “wood-cutters and water-carriers for a hated race.”  [Kruger 
cited in P. Brendon, The Decline and Fall of the British Empire, Jonathan Cape, 2007, p.217]. 
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Clearly questions of such social importance should not have been a concern 
only for Continental theorists. Indeed, Clouston noted, there was much evidence of 
the degenerate ‘criminal type’ amongst the Scottish prison population, and while he 
could not endorse Lombroso’s claim that “of all the persons found by him to have the 
typical criminal head only one has up to this time remained honest”, the presence of 
degenerate stigmata in habitual criminals was nonetheless a marked feature of his own 
experience of prisoners. In order to investigate this supposition further Clouston had 
applied for, and was granted, permission to examine all the inhabitants of Edinburgh 
Prison over the course of a week, these being chiefly short-sentence prisoners who 
had committed minor offences. Many of them were habitual criminals and “a large 
proportion of them [were] of the ‘degenerate’ class bodily and mentally” providing “a 
fair example of the lesser criminal and ‘degenerate’ class of our large cities.” A 
common feature in the biographies of these degenerate types was that that “their most 
marked deficiencies and peculiarities of body and mind were not very apparent till 
they got to the age of adolescence.” Yet when Clouston had examined the palates of 
the six babies born to imprisoned mothers – “all women of a degenerate class” – he 
had found that four had deformed skulls, an early “bodily defect [that] seemed to 
foreshadow an undue liability to crime, degeneracy, insanity, or idiocy.” Though the 
full extent of their abnormality would not explode until adolescence, these “four 
innocent occupants of the prison cells” were already marked with the “hard fate and 
the unyielding tyranny of their heredity, from which it seems as if it will be as 
impossible for them to escape as it was for their mothers to burst their prison bars.”297 
 
These examinations had alerted Clouston to a prominent feature of criminal 
degeneracy, namely, the role of deformities of the skull in confirming that crime and 
insanity were produced by the same process of abnormal development. The evidence 
for this connection was most strikingly presented in the presence of a warped palate, 
an abnormal physiological sign serving as an “index of brain and mental 
development” in which “the criminals and the lunatics stand alike.” While only 22% 
of the prisoners he had examined had had ‘typical palates’, 43% had ‘neurotic palates’ 
and 35 % had more extremely ‘deformed palates’ (see figure 1 below). This 
physiological evidence seemed to offer empirical confirmation of “some of the 
                                                 
297 Ibid., p.38 & pp. 48-49. 
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conclusions of the Continental criminal anthropologists, such as Despine, Lombroso, 
and Benedikt”, though it did not confirm “Lombroso’s idea that the habitual criminal 
is a ‘reversion’ to the savage type of man.” Savages, Clouston noted, “commonly 
have good palates”, a fact he had ascertained as a result of his own anthropological 
investigations at the collections of the Anatomical Museum of Edinburgh University, 
where he studied the skulls of Europeans, Hottentots, Australians, and extinct 
American groups. This research led him to the conclusion that ‘false stigmata’ such as 
dolichocephalism and brachycephalism (disproportionate length and width of the 
skull respectively) were racial qualities rather than the result of degeneration, and that 
these conditions did not in any case affect palatal shape and left brain function 
unimpaired. Furthermore, the comparative morphology of the human and the monkey 
suggested that there was no connection between the degree of evolution and the 
relations between palate and skull (see figure 2 below), facts which tended to further 





Figure 1: Casts taken from the Royal Edinburgh Asylum showing palates of adult patients: 1) Typical; 
2) Neurotic; 3) Deformed. 4), 5), and 6) show the various palatal deformities of adolescent patients; 7) 






Figure 2: The anterior margin of the brain runs perpendicular to line AB. Here Clouston intends to 
show that while in human physiology the position of the palate has a direct relationship to cranial 
capacity, for the primates and lower mammals palatal form is “merely a part of the alimentary system” 
and has no bearing on brain development, evidence discrediting Lombroso’s account of reversion.  
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We have seen that, in the year before these lectures were given, Clouston had 
insisted on the value of ‘savage reversion’ for understanding European degeneration, 
an insistence that renders somewhat puzzling his rejection of Lombroso’s own rather 
similar proposal. On closer inspection, however, it appears that Clouston was not 
really interested in rejecting reversion but was motivated by a desire to preserve the 
fundamental role of heredity as “one of the marks of a family that is tending towards 
mental death and extinction.” On this basis it was impossible for him to concede that 
the deformities common to prisoners and their progeny could by explained as the 
result of reversion to the savage because this concession would imply that skull shape 
preceded the development of mental function. The discussion of palatal deformity in 
Clouston’s lectures was neither an incidental detail nor the reporting of observation, 
but an attempt to reinvest credibility in his earlier theories of heredity degeneration. 
If, as Lombroso seemed to imply, palatal deformity caused cerebral abnormality, it 
could plausibly be claimed that accidental intrauterine trauma was responsible for 
cerebral abnormality (for instance, the use of forceps could be appealed to as the 
cause of rising idiocy). While Clouston accepted that there were “certain cases where 
traumatism must be put down as the exciting cause of the arrest of brain 
development”, these cases of traumatic arrest were “more partial” in their effects, 
leaving certain brain functions in tact along with a facial expression, dental structure, 
and general gait that was “more natural as compared with the common heredity types 
of idiocy and imbecility.” Clouston therefore mobilised the study of Hottentots’ skulls 
against his earlier theory of reversion to ‘prove’ that palatal shape could not logically 
precede brain abnormalities (since it was known that “savages who make their 
children’s heads square by pressure don’t alter the mental or motor functions of the 
brain thereby”),298 a proof that would allow heredity to stand as the undisputed cause 
of danger to the race.   
 
In this way Clouston’s discussion of ethnology and comparative morphology 
was used simply to demonstrate that a deformed skull was the result rather than the 
cause of brain abnormality, with deformity a sign that there had been a “bad initial 
neurotic heredity” causing the abnormal cranial convolutions and warped palate. The 
important element of this argument was that it allowed heredity to remain the primary 
                                                 
298 Ibid., p.54. 
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cause of degeneration, a fact upon which Clouston remained insistent. The 
intransigent commitment to an hereditarian paradigm is typically associated with 
French psychiatry in the late nineteenth century. Yet when the illustrious pupil of 
Charcot’s, Pierre Janet, reviewed Clouston’s Morison lectures for the journal Brain, 
lectures “devoted partly to the study of [the] most striking examples of 
dégénérescence”, he noted that while Clouston had expanded “the theories of Morel 
and Moreau de Tours” by “insisting upon the fact that hereditary influences modify 
chiefly the organs whose development is the slowest” – a modification aligned with 
the developments produced by “Magnan and his school” in endeavouring to 
determine the “external manifestations of dégénérescence” – the emphasis Clouston 
had placed on heredity was, even to French tastes, a little too acute. While Janet 
credited Clouston with the novel suggestion that the age at which the stigmata of 
degeneration manifested themselves was inversely proportional to the strength of the 
heredity taint he felt that the proof of this principle relied on an overly extensive list 
of heredity stigmata and he could not but feel uneasy “at the number and variety of 
complaints attributed to one and the same cause” of heredity, a restricted emphasis 
that was combined with the tendency to neglect “among the complex causes at work 
in the causation of disease, the external influences” such as environment and training. 
“A disease”, Janet wrote, “is always the result of two factors – of a certain innate 
predisposition and of an occasional cause”, and while “evidently, a hereditary 
predisposition is necessary for the development of obsessions or hysteria . . . the same 
patients placed under different circumstances would probably not have been affected 
in the particular manner that they have.”299   
 
There is of course an interesting reversal here, for it has been argued that the 
British approach to psychiatry in the late nineteenth century was distinguished on the 
basis of its reticence in the face of theory and, in particular, theory of the mono-causal 
variety. For instance, Neil Davie notes the tendency of early British discussions of 
criminology (i.e. circa 1880-1890) was to “condemn the deductive methods of 
criminal anthropology” on the Continent, especially since they saw in these theories 
the premature assumption that all criminal acts must originate from the same cause.300 
                                                 
299 P Janet, ‘Review of T. S. Clouston, The Neuroses of Development’, Brain, 1895, 18: 597-600.  
300 N. Davie, ‘Lombroso and British Criminology: Precursors and Influences, 1865-1918’, p.5. 
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Similarly Gayle Davis has noted in regard to the aetiology of GPI that 
“epistemologies of causation” in nineteenth-century British psychiatry relied heavily 
on a “broad multi-causal concept” of disease.301 Clouston, at least, does not appear to 
conform to this pattern, and we have seen that his rejection of Lombroso’s approach 
to criminal anthropology and degeneration theory was not based on empirical 
observations, still less on a desire for theoretical nuance, but rather followed from a 
determination to preserve the single cause of heredity in his account of mental illness. 
 
 Clouston did however concede that while heredity was “the real predisposing 
cause” of all neuroses it required “an exciting cause to develop the diseases”, a fact 
which opened up “a large field of preventative measures against the adolescent 
neuroses.”302 Yet these preventative measures were also targeted at the level of 
heredity, and from the Neuroses of Development onward there was a growing eugenic 
element to Clouston’s writings. At the Psychological Section of the BMA’s meeting 
in Edinburgh eight years later, Clouston delivered a follow-up paper on the ‘Neuroses 
and Psychoses of Decadence’, supplementing his earlier discussion by considering the 
nervous and mental conditions that came, not with the development of the organism in 
adolescence, but of its natural degeneration in old age. Here he clarified his earlier 
theory of the insanity of adolescence, or developmental neuroses, by noting that such 
defects “may be looked on as Nature’s effort to stop a bad stock before it reaches the 
time to reproduce itself”, and that hereditary degeneration was “Nature’s chief means 
of weeding out the organisms that do not make for the physical ideal she sets up in all 
species”, a weeding process in which psychiatrists ought to assist.303 These themes 
remained with Clouston up to his last major work, The Unsoundness of Mind, in 
which he reworked the classification presented in The Neuroses of Development, 
circumscribing mental disorder within a typology of “mankind as a whole” divided 
into “eleven orders of brain” falling into three classes: 1) the “independent, 
responsible, punishable persons, who constitute the self-sustaining world of men”; 2) 
“the tramp, the born pauper, the instinctive ‘born criminal’, the dipsomaniac, and the 
moral pervert” marked by the “stigmata of degeneration” – figures who “fall as a 
                                                 
301 G. Davis, Cruel Madness of Love, p.22, p.199, & p.244. 
302 Clouston, Neuroses of Development, p.135. 
303 Ibid., p.114; Unmarked newspaper clipping: ‘An Address Delivered at the Opening of the Section of 
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natural burden on the State” and are, scientifically speaking, “not fit for the exercise 
of political rights, and their liberty should be strictly conditioned by the requirements 
of the society in which they live”; and 3) the “dead weights of society” consisting of 
the “arrested and degenerate man all over” who would be extinguished if left to 
nature.  
 
The last two classes of “hereditarily connected” degenerates contained 
members who should not be permitted to reproduce, particularly as “Physical means 
of preventing reproduction, not dangerous to life or health, loom before us now as a 
possible solution to this problem”, a solution that waited only for legislation to save 
the race. Clouston regretted that the public were adverse to this legislation and that 
“Galton and his new science of ‘eugenics’” was “having a hard task to persuade 
mankind that this is feasible”. Even “psychiatrists of authority, notably Maudsley and 
Mercier” refused to accept it, “chiefly on the grounds that the laws of heredity are as 
yet uncertain and that genius has frequently cropped up in children of such 
marriages.” Clouston’s own take on the matter was that it would come down to the 
slightly loaded question as to “whether the world is fully compensated for a hundred 
thousand degenerates, with all the harm they do, by a genius in a generation.”304 
 
5.5 The Small Thumbed Patient and the Potential Killer 
 
At the British Association’s Annual Meeting for 1892 (Edinburgh) the “best attended 
session”, according to The Times, was convened in a crowded hall to discuss criminal 
anthropology, a subject “introduced by Dr T. S. Clouston . . . whose complaint was 
that the criminal had not of late years been studied on scientific lines in Great Britain 
as he had on the Continent.”305 It was thanks to Clouston’s activities, The Medical 
Press reported, that the subject of the criminal had “taken the stage of scientific 
                                                 
304 Clouston, The Unsoundness of Mind (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co 1911, pp. 19-30, p.53, & pp.72-
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discovery” in the national press, though the journal saw his speculations as mere 
Hardean determinism, offering “yet another illustration of the current fatalism that 
man, when we find him in the criminal mesh, often proves to have been a mere 
counter in the game of life.” If “the lobeless ear is a degenerate ear and related to 
earlier types of human evolution”, it continued, then its owner was to be excused from 
the “normal share of responsibility.”306 It was this same aspect of Clouston’s theories 
that The National Observer picked up on, writing that while it “may reasonably be 
argued that crime is a disease” on a purely theoretical level, society must uphold that 
“science and conduct” remain entirely separate domains, with the “hulks and the 
gallows” serving as “better remedies than mild doses of bromide or the kindly 
exertions of the masseur.” Clouston’s ideas, even if they were accepted on principle, 
could “only benefit mankind if they [led] to the accurate discovery of the criminal 
type. And even then their value would depend upon the determination of the State to 
lock up a pronounced criminal at sight.” However, it was the existence of this 
‘criminal type’ that criminal anthropologists themselves could not agree on; Clouston, 
along with Benedikt of Vienna, disputed its existence, while even those who accepted 
it argued over its distinguishing features. In this regard, the article continued, 
Clouston’s “attempt to bind the State by the conclusions of anthropology” was “the 
maddest folly of all”, since he maintained that: 
 
if enquiry established physical, hereditary, and psychological bases of criminality, the State would have 
to treat the criminal from a point of view entirely different from the ‘primitive method’ . . . The outrage 
upon society is the same, whether the ruffian who perpetuates it be a cynic or an epileptic. But if we 
followed the criminal anthropologist to his logical conclusion, we should be forced to confess that no 
wilful crime has been committed since the world began. The murderer is happily abnormal; therefore 
he is not responsible for his actions.307 
 
More explicit condemnation came from The Standard, when it reported on Clouston’s 
lecture by addressing the question; “How does one become a Scientific Criminal 
Anthropologist?”: 
 
 If we may judge from a paper read at the British Association on Saturday, the main thing is to collect a 
set of long Latin words, and arrange them, as far as possible, according to the rules of English 
                                                 
306 Medical Press and circular, Aug 31, 1892: ‘Criminal Anthropology, in LHB 7/12:5 (pp. 239-240). 
307 ‘The Plaything of Science’, The National Observer, Aug 13, 1892, p.313, in LHB 7/12:5 (p.241). 
 136 
grammar. The ideas do not matter very much. Expressed in recondite vocabulary, the platitude 
resembles a discovery, and nonsense passes for a paradox. We are informed [by Clouston] that the 
student of Scientific Criminal Anthropology has three great factors to deal with; the heredity of the 
criminal, the reactive and resistive qualities of his brain, and his environment . . . Do we require any 
learned Congress to tell us this? And what connection has it with the suggested inference that 
malefactors are to be placed on the same ethical level as idiots and maniacs? From the purely 
theoretical point of view, we have no objection to the proposed classification. It is the practical 
application that cannot be tolerated . . . we will talk no more of crimes and penalties . . . we will 
prescribe the approved regimen known as penal servitude. It tends to strengthen the ‘inhibitory 
qualities’ of his mind, and to counteract his ‘anti-social’ instincts. If we do this in the true penological 
spirit we shall, no doubt, assist him ‘to accommodate himself to the conditions of a highly organised 
and extremely artificial modern society.’”308   
 
We can see then that Clouston’s brand of criminal anthropology was 
recognised instantly by the press as a means of pursuing social reform, removing 
‘crimes and penalties’ and replacing them with degrees of abnormality capable of 
‘binding the State’ to a new theory of conduct. It is also clear that, from 1890 
onwards, Clouston stepped up his interest in criminology and degeneration to become, 
along with Havelock Ellis, Britain’s most vociferous defender of the theory.  That is 
not to say that these ideas had a limited appeal in Britain, indeed, in this same year 
(1892) the scientific status of criminal anthropology was considered by another 
Scottish psychiatrist, William Ireland, who published a paper on the subject in The 
Cape Law Review (suggesting once again that intellectual and political boundaries 
were not synonymous in an Empire Nation).309 Like Clouston, Ireland rejected 
Lombroso’s theory of reversion, doubting that “the thieves in the slums of our great 
cities are the analogues of the free savages who roam in the forests or prairies of 
America or Africa”, though he was prepared to accept that criminal anthropology 
could be used to group diverse conditions in terms of their underlying pathology, with 
the “extended study of these physical peculiarities [rendering] it clearer and clearer 
that they are common to all the degenerated, to the insane, the imbecile, the neurotic 
as well as to the criminal.” As with so many of the discussions encountered in this 
thesis, “the great family of the degenerated” were said to be of importance to 
psychiatry insofar as it lacked both the “classical symptoms of insanity, such as 
                                                 
308 ‘Criminal Anthropology’, The Standard, Aug 8, 1892, in LHB 7/12:5, p.238 (p.234). 
309 W. Ireland, ‘Is Criminal Anthropology a Science?’, Cape Law Review, 1892, 9: pp. 86-102. 
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hallucinations, delusions, involuntary movements and excessive passions” and 
constituted a greater problem for society than these ‘classical’ forms of insanity, for 
“with delinquents bearing the stigmata of degeneration, there [was] not only a danger 
of their begetting their like, but of their bringing into the world a larger proportion of 
idiots, epileptics and lunatics.”310 
 
The early 1890s therefore represents a period of increased interest in 
criminology amongst British commentators, interest that would culminate in the first 
appearance of the nation’s doctors at the 1896 International Congress of Criminal 
Anthropology in Geneva (an event attended by the Scotsmen Thomas Clouston, 
William Bevan-Lewis, and David Nicolson, along with their English colleague Henry 
Maudsley). However, just one year before this event the president elect of the 
Medico-Psychological Association, David Nicolson (Superintendent of the State 
Criminal Lunatic Asylum at Broadmoor), had used his Presidential Address to 
disparage the practice of criminology, which was, he noted, thankfully more prevalent 
abroad than in Britain.311 Confessing that, as a child, he had wished for his own death 
merely to disturb his mother, a sadistic impulse he believed to be innate to all, 
Nicolson argued that this ‘science’ failed to take into account the innate wickedness 
of the human condition. Hoping that British psychiatrists would never live to see the 
day when, in their “official examination into the mental condition of suspected 
persons, or persons lying in prison upon a criminal charge” they would “be expected 
to produce craniometers for the head measurements”, he argued that the Evangelical 
“hopes for the betterment of the class by education and for the reformation of the 
individual by punitory measures [and] prison discipline” would be crushed if British 
psychiatry were to follow the coarser Continental methods.312 
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311 Nicolson , ‘Presidential Address’, JMS,  1895, 41 (175), pp. 567-591. 
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Following Nicolson’s address there was a mixed reaction from those 
assembled. Sir Edmund Du Cane, Head of the British Prison Service, was in 
agreement with the president, arguing that “too much is made of the idea that 
criminality is a special quality of the mind.” The Irish psychiatrist Dr Conolly 
Norman spoke of the “puerilities of criminal anthropology” which their president was 
right to discredit, going on to note that his address was conducted in the “calm and 
robust way that I hope will be always characteristic of the mode in which Englishmen 
will engage on these questions.” Dissent came from Nicolson’s predecessor at 
Boradmoor, Dr William Orange, who argued that many of the members of the MPA 
did not follow their president’s assessment but were convinced that “a proportion of 
those persons who are the despair of prison authorities” were suffering from “a certain 
amount of impairment or defect of mind which hampers them from their birth.” Given 
this assumption, he argued, the degenerationists were right to demand that when a 
juvenile delinquent was apprehended, doctors should obtain a school report in order to 
ascertain whether the offender really was “below the average of capacity.” Clouston 
however was capable of no such restraint in his response to the address and, 
expressing a sarcastic satisfaction with the optimism pervading Nicolson’s remarks, 
commended him for having removed: 
 
the great black shadow that seems to be thrown over science by the work of Lombrosso and other 
criminologists . . . You have told us there is nothing in it; there is no such thing as criminology, no such 
thing as any special connection between the depraved organization of a defective brain and crime. I am 
certain that most of us will scarcely agree with you in your optimistic view of criminology and its 
psychological relation. 
 
 Indeed, he continued, Nicolson’s dark suspicions concerning his wicked impulses as 
a child offered support for, rather than an objection to the criminologists’ claims: 
children were likely to commit crimes simply because their powers of inhibition were 
underdeveloped, and if they lacked adequate moral training then they could similarly 
have received no instruction compelling them to vice and must be “virtually at that 
age criminals by compulsion.” Nicolson’s rejoinder, displaying the characteristic 
ambiguity of British commentators when faced with the question of degeneration, was 
to protest that he had “never said that there is no truth in what these criminologists, or 
criminal anthropologists, or criminalists, say. There is truth in it.” Yet this truth was 
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restricted to those “otherwise law abiding persons [of] feeble mind [who lacked] the 
power of restraint to avoid committing a criminal act”, a position that was not too far 
removed from Clouston’s own.313 
 
 Following these debates, Clouston developed the ideas he had set out at the 
British Association in 1892 for publication in two revealing forums – The Journal of 
the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland and the Juridical Review 
(which was by this time Edinburgh’s most important legal journal) – suggesting that 
he had been spurred into defending the work of Continental writers in scientific and 
legal forums.314 In the first of these articles Clouston made it explicit that his own 
work on developmental abnormality had always been a part of the anthropological 
project, and that he had “often directed the attention of [his] own students and 
assistants to the great interest and importance” of degenerationist ideas, anticipating 
the time when a knowledge of the theory would be “required of all medical men, and 
especially of all lawyers and the higher officials of our prison” as tests of 
responsibility: “Lombroso, Benedikt, and the whole school” had affirmed that just 
such a test existed, though “British laws virtually deny this, and of course take no 
measures to meet it”315  
 
No doubt as a means of obviating the most common objection posed against 
criminal anthropology – that its essential foreignness was unsuited to the “men of 
cooler judgement” who pervaded the North – he insisted once again on the inherently 
British nature of the science, drawing attention to the three Scotsmen who had laid its 
foundations: James Bruce Thomson, William Wilson and, somewhat perversely, 
David Nicolson. These early enquiries had set the lines for a scientific enquiry into the 
links that had for a long time been established between idlers, vagrants, drunkards, 
and criminals, coming to fruition in the discovery of heredity as the “pathological 
nexus” between these species of deviance. Habitual drunkards in particular offered 
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evidence of “a pathological degeneration in the brain cortex” that could be detected 
by the trained investigator taught how to recognise the signs of arrested development 
in the degenerate’s biography (though the ultimate causal proof could “only be 
demonstrated by the microscope.”)316  
 
Returning to a theme from his lecture series on the Neuroses of Development, 
Clouston argued that the broader study of “degeneracy in a race or family” that had 
been explored by many popular writers could also be applied to describe “a non-
development in the individual”, a process linking the criminal’s brain to that of the 
inebriate, the epileptic, the habitual liar and so on. There were then “two great sources 
of criminality”: “the not fully evolved man” suffering from imbecility and regressive 
disorders, and “the non-developed man” whose moral faculties had been 
“pathologically arrested towards the end of the period of adolescence” before they had 
gained a sufficient degree of control over his conduct.317 It will come as no surprise 
by now that the discussion of these abnormally developed offenders was directed 
toward their legal implications and the theory of “scientific justice”, with Clouston 
concluding that “if criminal anthropology established physical, hereditary, and 
psychological bases of much criminality, the State would have to treat many criminals 
from an entirely different point of view than the punitive methods hitherto applied.”318  
 
The forensic implications of this argument were expanded in Clouston’s 
companion piece appearing in the Juridical Review in which he warned the journal’s 
readers that the process of brain development could not “be left out of [the] account of 
the jurist; for, on the process of the normal and regular development of the nervous 
tissues of which the brain is composed, depends the accountability to law, and the 
amenability to punishment.” Since the civil law protected the mentally enfeebled from 
contractual litigation, he argued, the criminal law should similarly consider “the 
amount of brain arrest and mental impairment” to determine “whether this constitutes 
[the equivalent of] civil incapacity or irresponsibility for crime.”319 While psychiatry 
                                                 
316 Ibid., p.219.  
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could not satisfy the law’s demand for gradated measures of the degree of 
responsibility (and hence of the degree of punishment that should be accorded) – there 
was, after all, “no possible test for legal capacity or incapacity applicable, like a 
chemical reagent, with certainty in every case” – the psychiatrist’s skills did allow for 
the “careful psychological analysis and comparison of different cases”, enabling 
doctors to “perform the very important duty of giving advice or evidence in any given 
case.”  
 
These arguments were part of a far larger remodelling of society, and Clouston 
sought to emphasise in his discussion that the successful maintenance of an ordered 
society required its members to believe that institutions were acting in their interests, 
while the courts, in refusing to adhere to the scientific understanding of responsibility, 
were in danger of losing their grip on social order by standing as a preserve of archaic 
values.320 Clouston had raised a similar point in the same journal two years earlier, 
arguing that if the court’s antiquated understanding of the laws of the body were not 
updated, and if legal punishment did not “develop and meet new conditions of 
society”, the law would cease to be regarded as a guarantor of order and become an 
arbitrary and despotic system of rules, damaging the State’s moral influence on 
conduct.321 It seemed to Clouston that an acceptance of criminal anthropology would 
not represent a significant departure from the practical methods of protection 
humanity had evolved in response to the danger of degeneracy, since it had “for 
thousands of years been prejudiced against the moral qualities of dwarfs, hunchbacks, 
and very ugly men and women.” He did however note an intriguing case where 
“nature [had] lied and cheated” by presenting him with an infatuating patient, a “girl 
of seventeen, who, when she first came [to Morningside], was a charming-looking 
brunette with wavy locks, an intelligent expression of eye, a coquettish manner, and 
pretty feminine ways”. There was, however, a tell tale sign of degeneracy: her 
deformed palate. This young girl, “deceptively cloaked in beauty and left at liberty to 
marry” would, he feared, one day become “the mothers of a race of fools, idiots, 
lunatics, and cripples.”322  
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While this trail of degenerates presented a warning to jurists that they could no 
longer ignore psychiatric evidence, the appeal to eugenics was undoubtedly 
recognised as premature and forlorn, and Clouston redoubled the force of his 
campaign for legal change by emphasising the imminent danger degeneracy presented 
in the continuum between minor and serious criminal. As many historians of 
nineteenth-century law have argued, the defence of insanity as an absolute aberration 
or a fundamental departure from the norm was philosophically more acceptable to 
Victorian judges than the idea of a metaphysically dangerous and penologically 
unenforceable emphasis on degrees of normality.323 However, this latter was precisely 
what Clouston wished to highlight by drawing attention to the fact that the “bodily 
arrestments and abnormalities of movement, of head, face, or eyes, go along with and 
are a necessary accompaniment of congenital mental and moral weaknesses and 
perversions.” On this account the “small-thumbed patient” and the “potential 
murderer” simply stood as “different examples of the same pathological process”, and 
the minor abnormalities that the law overlooked in determining sentencing did not 
represent an ‘inhumane’ failure to respond to the sentimental appeals of doctors so 
much as an irresponsible refusal to recognise the potential danger concealed in every 
minor abnormality. Once again, it was the pathological continuum offered by the 
theory of degeneration that provided the justification for psychiatric expertise.   
 
 
5.6 From Psychiatry without Symptoms to Psychiatry without Sentiment 
 
Around the time of Clouston’s turn to criminal anthropology there had been stirrings 
against the sentimental treatment of the criminal within the MPA. In 1894 Moritz 
Benedikt of Vienna (1835 – 1920) – the Continental source of Clouston’s 
criminological interest, though himself a self-professed “disciple of the British 
school” of psychiatry – had visited Britain to deliver a paper at the MPA on the 
relationship between moral insanity and the role of the State in punishing criminals.324 
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Here Benedikt produced a variant of the ‘wild beast’ theory of criminal law, arguing 
that while the psychiatric model of the dangerous offender showed the criminal to be 
a “voracious wolf” or a “rapacious animal” whom it would be wrong to regard as 
“metaphysically guilty”, this should not entail a ‘sentimental’ approach to crime in 
which the murderer would be “handed over to psychologists”. Alexander Reid 
Urquhart, Superintendent at the Murray Royal Asylum in Perth, responded to 
Benedikt’s speech by noting that the moral insanities pursued by certain of his 
colleagues were merely sentimental attempts to free the guilty, and that “immorality 
alone [could] never be held to be proof of insanity.” Indeed, he argued, it would be “a 
very sad day for our science and for humanity if ever it should happen that every 
person who exhibits vicious tendencies in an incorrigible degree is regarded as 
insane” (a proposition outlined at length in “a very large book” it had been his 
“painful duty” to read under professional obligation, in other words, Krafft-Ebing’s 
Psychopathia Sexualis). Hence, while psychiatrists were “neither teachers of morality, 
nor custodians of morals”, they ought to be cautious not to allow such Continental 
folly to direct their science into channels that could allow it to be “prostituted for the 
purposes of vice.”  
 
In that same year Clouston had attended the Psychological Section of the 
BMA’s Annual Meeting (Bristol) at which, The Times reported, Dr Lionel Weatherly 
had read a paper on insanity and criminal responsibility that provoked an “interesting 
controversy on the subject” between Henry Maudsley and Sir James Stephen.325 
According to The Medical Magazine this controversy had concerned a recent crack-
down on Anarchists in Paris – a dramatic strike against a subversive element 
permitted to fester through the mixture of “slushy sentimentalism, bad physiology and 
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worse metaphysics” that had been poured out by Europe’s psychiatrists. The main 
charge against this sentimentalism – “served up in the much-abused name of Science 
[which] imagines that, when it has accounted for the wickedness of a bad man, it has 
abolished the distinction between good and evil” – was that it would allow psychiatry 
to ‘screen’ murderers from punishment and that “any criminal may become an object 
of interest, or even of sympathy, if some notoriety-hunting doctor can be got to rig up 
a theory of mental disease.”326 Even the Professor of Forensic Medicine and Public 
Health at the University of Glasgow, John Glaister, an otherwise sympathetic reader 
of psychiatry (see chapter seven), argued at later a Meeting of the BMA that, if courts 
allowed psychiatrist’s to move beyond their narrowly defined legal competences, a 
great injustice would be done to the general public, who would be left at the mercy of 
the psychiatrists’ sentimental disposition to send any slightly peculiar criminal to 
Broadmoor “to smoke his pipe for the rest of his life”. Psychiatric witnesses, he 
argued, “ought to try to stem that tide of sentimentalism and leave the sentence of 
prisoners to the proper legal authority.”327 
 
While these hysterical accusations were wildly generous in the power of 
influence they were prepared to bestow upon psychiatrists, we can nonetheless see 
that there was a substantial counter-discourse to the psychiatrists’ claims that their 
knowledge was beneficial to society. We can now understand why Clouston wished to 
highlight the connections psychiatry had established between minor abnormalities and 
grave threats, of the small thumbs of a patient as the harbingers of the future killer. 
This explains why, in the Juridical Review, he referred his readers to a somewhat 
trivial case that had been tried in Edinburgh in 1884, the case of Alan Fergusson, a 
young male of neurotic heredity whose stunted mental development had been 
compounded by a fall sustained while playing sports at school, after which he became 
fixated on the idea of burning down the building, a fixation that led to his starting a 
fire one night the classroom below his dormitory. Along with Dr Littlejohn, the most 
eminent member of Edinburgh’s medico-legal community, Clouston had been called 
by the court to examine the boy, with both doctors attesting to his lack of capacity.328 
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The British Medical Journal had, in its report of Fergusson’s trial, noted the 
“remarkable course” pursued by the judge in allowing medical witnesses to give 
evidence on the prisoner’s history and to describe mental state in reference to facts 
“communicated to them out of court.” These witnesses had affirmed that the boy had 
a history of committing acts of a “motiveless character” and who had, after receiving 
his sporting injury, been placed “mentally in the condition of a child of 6 or 8.” While 
at this trial the “Scotch judges [had] shown themselves to be in advance of their 
English brethren in their appreciation of the bearings of mental disease upon 
responsibility”, the sentence they had awarded was, the journal felt, “more draconic in 
severity” than those handed out by English judges, for it inflicted punishment upon a 
child who was shown at trial to be insane.329 
 
 Clouston seems to have returned to this unremarkable and probably long 
forgotten case solely to make a point of his disagreement with the interpretation 
offered in the British Medical Journal. Making a great show of this contrast before his 
readership of lawyers, he highlighted what he believed to be the excessive leniency of 
the sentence the judge had awarded to the boy, a sentence that had imposed a 
punishment so light as to have no conceivable power of deterrence in a prisoner 
whose powers of self-control were so utterly enfeebled. The verdict of the judge was 
therefore not an unduly harsh affront to sentiment (the expected complaint of the 
psychiatrist), but, on the contrary, it was not harsh enough. Worse still, the methods of 
the court were “an inefficient mode of protecting society.” It seemed to Clouston “an 
illogical thing to cut down the sentence from five years to one in prison because the 
boy seemed weak mentally, thus letting him out before his full bodily and mental 
development is completed, to do, perhaps, the same acts again.” Surely in this case it 
was the unscientific judge who was acting out a ‘slushy sentimentalism’, for if he had 
followed Clouston’s theory of conduct he would have seen that this child was one of 
the delinquents that schoolmasters and psychiatrists were coming into increasingly 
frequent contact with, representing a species who “are a danger to society as they 
grow up, from their want of self-protective, moral, and inhibitory qualities”. These 
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“imperfect specimens of humanity” were impervious to punishment and moral 
training and would, if the law did not alter its course, only serve to “swell the ranks of 
the prostitutes, small criminals, vagrants, and paupers; many of them ending in 
technical insanity and the county asylum.”330  
 
We have seen how degeneration was used to re-structure psychiatry’s relations 
with the law, particularly from the 1860s onwards, a time when psychiatrists began to 
make explicit their break with the older logic of monomania. While psychiatrists liked 
to talk up the great antagonisms between medicine and the law in warlike language, 
perhaps the most striking element of these arguments is their listless lack of 
spontaneity, with the psychiatric polemic performed in the fashion of a Japanese tea 
ceremony. This can be seen clearly when we consider how similar Clouston’s position 
with regard to the law is to that of his former mentors, David Skae and Thomas 
Laycock.  
 
In an 1867 lecture delivered at the Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh 
Skae had outlined the legal relations of insanity in remarkably similar terms to those 
later employed by Clouston.331 Describing the explosive acts of violence produced by 
“loss of self-control or self-direction” – acts which conferred upon psychiatry a 
special power to intervene in the social danger represented by insanity – Skae used his 
lecture to address the contention that, in extending the diagnosis of insanity beyond 
either a legally defined group of delusional patients or those who were 
incontrovertibly mentally enfeebled, medicine was being used to “screen the guilty 
from punishment.” According to this charge, psychiatrists were ensuring that the thief 
would be protected as a kleptomaniac, the fire-raiser protected as a pyromaniac, and 
the murderer pardoned as an unfortunate suffering from “a low type of organization”. 
In response to this charge, Skae invoked the model of law to which psychiatrists were 
generally drawn, rooted in the principles of the Classical School of Penal 
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Jurisprudence. If the court was to wield a symbolic power over the public, it must not 
only pose a threat of punishment, but must pose it in systematic and rational terms 
(demonstrating once again that the psychiatric concern with law was not at heart a 
desire to expand the boundaries of the profession, but to strengthen the underlying 
social rationale for the mechanism in which doctors wished to see their science 
operate). The well-worn hypothetical examples of cases falling outside of the legal 
tests were introduced in support of this claim, covering impulsive acts which did not 
seem to accord with any motive, for example when:  
 
 A mother, in violation of the common instincts of nature, hates her new-born child and murders it; a 
wife tells her husband that she fears she will kill him during the night, as she wakes with a horrible 
impulse to do it, and implores him not to sleep with her; a husband and a father voluntarily seeks 
protection in an asylum, which he refuses to leave lest he should murder his wife or some of his 
children, to which he is impelled by an impulse over which he has no control; a gentleman, who has 
been for a lifetime a model of temperance, and prudence, a piety, suddenly becomes drunken and lavish 
to folly, and impious and obscene in his language and habits, and may even lose all self-control over 
his actions and conduct, tear his clothes and bedding to ribbons, and dance around his room naked, 




However, it was not only the absence of legally recognised motive that rendered such 
people irresponsible; that, after all, would not make them subjects for psychiatry. The 
important point was that these acts of impulsive crime were generally accompanied by 
distinctive physical characteristics, a brutishness inscribed onto the patient’s form that 
would betray his dormant impulses, allowing doctors to detect and apprehend the 
instinctive criminal. This is not of course to imply that Skae had any intention of 
locking up anyone with a cleft palate or sloping brow, but one can see that, in making 
the rhetorical association between defective form, impulsive or explosive conduct, 
and legal process, he was essentially following the logic of degeneration as it was 
applied to the law. Indeed, drawing on the typical arguments of French doctors, these 
distinctive physiological signs were said to be portentous of future danger, since “a 
man of weak mind, an imbecile, a man of a low type of organization, may commit a 
murder from motives of revenge of a trivial kind.” 
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While these arguments were generic to European psychiatry, Skae’s own take 
on the theory was directed toward the recent and unprecedented verdict of culpable 
homicide applied to a murder tried in the Scottish High Court (see chapter six), 
arguing that such verdicts ought to be extended to “any case of murder where the 
existence of mental disease, even in a partial degree, was distinctly proved”. This 
seemed to be a particular social expedient in light of the reports of the surgeons and 
inspectors of Scotland’s prisons (particularly those of James Bruce Thomson at Perth 
General Prison) which increasingly showed that “a very considerable portion of 
[Britain’s] permanent criminal population labours under mental infirmity and 
disease.”333 Such degenerates, “a curse in any well-regulated asylum”, were therefore 
“proper objects of protection, and segregation”, and while “pseudo-philanthropists” 
believed that psychiatrists were either too sentimental – wishing to assist in granting 
every convict their reprieve – or too concerned with attracting the government subsidy 
that would come with each patient, these same philanthropists would, if they 
considered the economics of abnormality, “congratulate themselves that such persons 
were permanently placed under proper care than allowed, after repeated sentences . . . 
. to live at large, perpetuating a diseased and degenerated race, which might otherwise 
gradually die out.” 
 
The other great proximate influence on Clouston’s work, Thomas Laycock, 
was disseminating an almost identical set of arguments in the 1860s. For instance, in 
one of his Lectures on Mental Diseases at the University of Edinburgh (1864), 
Laycock discussed the trial of a prisoner, George Bryce, who had brutally murdered a 
servant girl. Laycock’s evidence at this trial led the Courant to anticipate: 
 
a time when the general repugnance of capital punishment, acting in conjunction with a deeper sense of 
the mystery of the connection between mind and matter, will make the treatment of criminals a very 
difficult affair. ‘Organisation’ may come, at last, to be placed against all responsibility whatever; but in 
such a case, the moral law will be in a bad way; and society will have to cast about for new foundations 
on which to build, and live, and act.”334 
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To the Courant, this confirmed that trial by jury had, under the weight of specialist 
medical information, ceased to serve as “an engine for the truth”, a problem that 
would only become more pronounced with the “increasing complexities of 
civilisation.”335 Laycock’s courtroom deposition that the prisoner was suffering from 
“physical organisation of a low type [and was] labouring under a fit of maniacal 
excitement” at the time of his acts was ultimately unsuccessful (Bryce, it turned out, 
was the last person to be publicly hanged in Edinburgh). However, in the lecture 
covering the case he drew attention not to these clinical features of the prisoner’s 
condition, but to the philosophically unsound theories of responsibility and 
punishment held by the legal system.336 
 
The law, Laycock contended, had misunderstood the proper function of 
psychiatry, which was not a means of treating delusional patients or those who could 
not distinguish between right and wrong, but a means of protecting society from “the 
free homicidal lunatic” against whom the law’s desire to “satisfy public vengeance” 
would always come too late. Indeed, he made it quite explicit that the increase in 
insane homicides was not due to a general increase in insanity, but “to the fact that 
there is a greater number of dangerous lunatics at large, and these are so at large 
because of the legal doctrine as to insanity and the responsibility of the insane.” It is 
quite clear then that Skae, Laycock, and Clouston sought to give a defence of 
psychiatry that challenged the ‘rise of sentiment’ hypothesis head-on. It was not that 
psychiatry sought to claim new objects (the alcoholic, the criminally insane), or that it 
wished to temper the severity of punishment, but rather it sought to supplement the 
law by taking into account the potential danger inherent to certain criminals. As 
Laycock continued, this change was particularly necessary as: 
 
the worst and most dangerous kind of criminal lunatic offers in the early stages none of the symptoms 
of popular or legal lunacy, he is of necessity left uncertified, and wanders abroad in society, free to 
commit the vices and crimes to which his insane nature impels him, until, with increase of his malady, 
he finds his way to an asylum, or a workhouse, or a jail, or the hulks, or the gallows, according to the 
character of his insanity.337 
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It is in this attempt to de-sentimentalise psychiatry that we should ground our 
understanding of the uptake of degeneration theory by psychiatrists (and particularly 
by Clouston). If on the clinical level degenerationists wished to emphasise their break 
with the symptomatological methods of alienistic medicine, on the forensic level they 
sought to emphasise their break with the accompanying humanistic sentiment with 
which these methods were tinged. Clearly these ideas were not confined to Clouston 
(or indeed to Scotland) and we could cite any number of sources arguing much the 
same thing. Maurice Craig, one of Britain’s most eminent psychiatrists in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was even more explicit in condemning the 
belief that the “morally insane and other degenerates should be judged more leniently 
for their offences”; indulging the sick was infecting the healthy and it was “incumbent 
upon society to protect itself from the consequences of their ills.”338  
 
This new ambition for psychiatry amounted to nothing less than the complete 
erasure of the portrait of the mad-doctor it had built up over the first decades of the 
century, a portrait that had been absorbed by the popular understanding of the subject: 
as the Edinburgh Evening Courant noted in 1870, “If there is one point on which 
more than another the ‘nineteenth century’ is given to congratulate itself it is the 
humane treatment it extends to lunatics.”339 The symbolic role of the lunatic asylum 
as a showcase for the century’s virtue had been part of a broader rise in sentiment 
amongst the British public. In addition to the removal of chains and whirling chairs 
from the asylum alienists of the early nineteenth-century had witnessed the abolition 
of slavery, the shaping of private lives through sermonising and legal intervention, 
and an ever decreasing use of the capital sentence, restricted to the crime of murder in 
1837. As one Scottish newspaper told its readers, “the mode in which criminals are 
now executed is one of the most striking symptoms of a change in public sentiment”, 
a change which would perhaps lead to the adoption of entirely private executions. 
“Hanging”, they noted, “may perhaps have been a necessary and a useful institution, 
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but we all feel that it does not fit into modern civilisation.”340 Where this sentiment 
had come from was a mystery to everyone, though it remained a source of confusion 
well into the twentieth century. One theory was that, “under the influence of 
civilisation the individual nature [had] become more nervously sensitive”; after all, 
we are told by one of Edinburgh’s lawyers, “a Chinaman suffers far less than a 
European under physical chastisement or torture.” While the cause of this change was 
a matter of speculation, there could be “no doubt” that there was “a great and growing 
sensitiveness as regards the infliction of suffering even upon the guilty, and that this 
[was] exercising a powerful influence upon . . . criminal administration.”341 In an age 
that was critically self-conscious of its sentimentality toward the convicted criminal 
and proud of the humane treatment it had extended to its insane, the suspicion that 
psychiatrists were guilty of blurring the distinction between the two groups was 
widespread: “There is a feeling growing up in the public mind”, we read in the 
Edinburgh Evening Courant, “that ‘mad-doctors’ have been seeking to extend their 
domains beyond just limits.” Before this “special branch of the medical profession” 
had worked its way into public service, they reported, the average citizen had no 
difficulty in distinguishing sanity from insanity. However, the casuistry of the 
psychologists, coupled with “the humanitarian tendencies of recent years”, had led the 
public astray by causing them “to accept the plea of insanity set up on behalf of 
criminals . . . on the most imperfect medical evidence, simply because it relieves us of 
the disagreeable duty of hanging the culprit.”342 
 
 The journalistic commentaries discussed above were preserved within the 
‘Morningside Scrapbook’, a monument to professional struggle begun by Skae and 
continued by Clouston. Occasionally this book reveals the frustrations Clouston 
experienced with a popular press slow to update its understanding of his science (as 
when the journalistic use of ‘mad-doctor’ is scored through in red ink). Elsewhere, 
however, we see that the strategy of renouncing sentiment had gradually seeped into 
the public consciousness and gained influence in the press. Nearly thirty years after 
this scrapbook was opened, the Scottish Leader, discussing Clouston’s expert 
testimony at a then recent medico-legal case, noted that for the courts, as well as for 
                                                 
340 Newspaper/date unknown, ‘The Influence of Capital Punishment’, LHB7/12/1, p.166. 
341 Johnston C. N. ‘Sentiment and Crime’, Juridical Review, 1912,  23: pp.142-52 (p.143). 
342 Undated piece, circa 1864, LHB7/12/1, p.128. 
 152 
the general public, “insanity is a dark and repellent problem. How dark and repellent 
one would hardly have ventured to say without the testimony of an expert.” While the 
common image of the madman, the piece continued, was of an instantly recognisable 
caricature subject to delusions or wild eccentricities, this mistaken belief ignored the 
sizable ranks of madmen concealed in normal society who could not be detected until 
their illness erupted in murderous or destructive acts.  Thus, it argued, while “medical 
science” had helped people to: 
  
understand that a man may make a homicidal attack and yet be no criminal, may be sane as men go, 
and yet be of unsound intellect, something more is needed for the security and mental peace of the 
public. The very subtlety of this form of disease, with the possibility of the wild beast leaping suddenly 
forth, imposes on public guardians a duty that seems by no means too clearly recognised.
 343   
 
 The sentiment that had once pervaded the image of psychiatry had, by the end of the 
century, been replaced by concern that, “One cannot repress an uneasy feeling that in 
veering off from the dangers of unjust or unnecessary restraint, the method of the 
lunatic asylums has passed to undue laxity”, leaving the public exposed to the risk of 
dangerous criminals. At a time when the Whitechapel murders had stirred interest in 
the idea of psychopathic criminality, the psychiatric emphasis on the hidden dangers 
of degeneracy had a receptive audience. As The Daily Chronicle asked in 1891: “Who 
knows but that ‘Jack the Ripper’, save when under the influence of demonic impulse, 





I have used this chapter largely to examine how the work of a particular psychiatrist 
demonstrates the ways in which the science constituted itself in relation to the law, 
modelling its categories and distinctions in reference to legal notions of insanity. In 
this dialectic there remains unanswered the returned gaze of the law: how did legal 
writers discuss, interpret, and utilise psychiatric ideas? To what extent were they 
aware of the notions of responsibility and degeneration that theorists such as Clouston 
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developed in relation to their own study of conduct? In the following sections of this 
thesis I will turn my attention away from the writings of psychiatrists and consider the 
world of medical jurisprudence and of the legal system proper, examining in detail 





6 Psychiatry and the Scottish Courts: Alcohol, Partial Responsibility, and 




The 1867 case of Alexander Dingwall has been noted landmark of nineteenth-century 
Scottish law.345 At this trial the presiding judge, Lord Deas (1804-1887), introduced 
culpable homicide as a potential verdict in capital cases, laying down the maxim that 
a plea of diminished responsibility could be entered on behalf of offenders whose 
mental state did not amount to absolute insanity and that evidence of such mental 
states could be taken into consideration by the jury in reaching their verdict.346 By the 
close of the nineteenth century culpable homicide had supplanted murder as the 
principal category in both the doctrine and practice of homicide law in Scotland. 
When viewed in its broader legal context the move toward culpable homicide reveals 
a paradoxical element of social intervention in the late Victorian period, for while 
judges began to shield killers from the severity of legal punishment, they also began 
to increase the number of acts subject to legal sanction, in effect broadening the scope 
of social duty that was minimally applied to the older laissez-faire legal subject.347 
The move away from absolute insanity as a test of culpability also followed 
developments in psychiatry which had, from the 1850s onwards, been paying 
increasing attention to a diverse range of conditions that suggested abnormality 
without constituting legal insanity. Yet in spite of these wider contextual changes to 
medico-legal notions of responsibility the increased visibility of the culpable 
homicide verdict for serious crime in Scotland remained tied in the minds of 
contemporary observers to the agency of Lord Deas. As The Scotsman noted in 1882, 
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both the change “in the legal conception of the extent of the criminal responsibility of 
the insane” and “the theory that insanity may be sufficient in degree to found a verdict 
of culpable homicide is new to the law of Scotland, and due entirely to the aged and 
learned Judge Deas”.348 Scotland’s seemingly progressive stance on this matter was 
well-known in the late nineteenth century, and in 1889 The Medical Press noted that 
the country had been blessed with a sympathetic judiciary ever since Lord Deas made 
the valuable advance of abandoning the established legal tests of responsibility, after 
which time “the situation had ripened rapidly” and “the general principle [had been] 
affirmed that absolute insanity is not necessary to irresponsibility, neither is a 
knowledge of right and wrong . . . there are gradations of responsibility, and should be 
gradations of penalty.”349 
 
The established tests of legal responsibility Deas had ostensibly broken with 
were the infamous M’Naughten Rules of 1843, stating that:  
 
 To establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of 
committing the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason from disease of the 
mind that he did not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, as not to 
know it was wrong.350 
 
 The Rules, a formula “quite colour-blind to any permutations between black and 
white” as Truman Capote complained a century after their formulation,351 were in use 
throughout the Commonwealth and in certain North American states throughout the 
nineteenth century, providing Anglophone psychiatrists the world over with a 
prominent symbol of the legal resistance to scientific advance. As Edward Cox Mann 
noted in his Treatise on the Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity (1893), to the 
“physician skilled in psychiatry, nothing appears more absurd, and nothing could 
possibly be more in conflict with the laws which govern mental disease” than the 
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M’Naughten Rules, which stubbornly ignored the “advances of scientific knowledge 
in the field of physiology and psychology, sociology and anthropology.”352  
 
The verdict of culpable homicide resulting from the diminished responsibility 
of the mentally peculiar offender therefore seemed to align Scotland’s judiciary with 
this progressive psycho-social school, and indeed there was an increased use of 
psychiatric language to frame legal verdicts along with openness to the notion that 
responsibility was not an exclusively philosophical notion. This was expressed on 
numerous occasions during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, and the 
general shift in consensus may be captured by the observation of a Scottish judge 
who, in 1907, offered the following advice to his jury: 
 
 what may be called scientific opinion on insanity has greatly altered in recent years, and Courts of law, 
which are bound to follow so far as they can the discoveries of science and the results of experience, 
have altered their definitions and rules along with the experts . . . It is well recognised, that although 
science has not yet taught us sufficient about the brain to know on what insanity depends, yet it is a 
perfectly possible thing to have a man who may for all purposes be as sane as anyone on nearly every 
matter, and yet on one point be hopelessly insane. 
 
These observations were hailed by Clouston who, in a letter to The Scotsman, took 
them to signify:  
 
a new era in the judicial treatment of insanity, and as marking an acceptance of that medical attitude 
towards mental disease, which maintains that such diseases may be of a kind which produces moral 
paralysis without impairment of functions; so that mental inhibition may be paralysed by brain disease 
of special nature, and although such mental conditions may not affect an ordinary man’s powers, they 
may affect him in his capacity as a law abiding citizen.353 
 
 In spite of this general change in attitudes toward psychiatric claims amongst lawyers 
and judges we find that, on examination of specific trials, there is no clear evidence 
that this change was the product of any development in medical knowledge; indeed 
judges could have dismissed (as occasionally they did) the evidence of mental 
incapacity they were presented with in 1900 using the same methodological and 
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philosophical arguments that had prevailed at the time of the M’Naughten 
Commission. In what follows I analyse the development of diminished responsibility 
in murder cases tried at the Scottish High Court (primarily) under Lord Deas’s 
jurisdiction, examining both the development of the legal notion itself and the place 
psychiatric evidence played in its formation. From this I turn to consider the recurring 
points of contention psychiatrists found with the law, suggesting how the notion of 
degeneration and the importance ascribed to heredity and inebriety as causes of 
insanity contributed to psychiatrists’ reluctance to embrace the legal discussion of 
insanity.  
 
6.2 Tonight: The Robbers! Murder and Expertise Prior to Culpable Homicide 
 
While the trial of Dingwall introduced diminished responsibility as mitigation in 
capital cases to Scottish law, I will begin by exploring the slightly earlier trial of 
Milne (1863).354 Milne’s trial was important to the development of medico-legal 
relations in Scotland for several reasons. Firstly, a substantial discussion of the 
medical testimony relating to the prisoner’s state of mind is contained within the 
Justiciary Reports. Though this ‘psychiatric’ defence was ultimately unsuccessful, the 
evidence presented at this trial is indicative of the kind of ‘expertise’ entering into 
Scottish courts at this time. Secondly, although Lord Justice-Clerk (Inglis) guided the 
jury, he was assisted on the bench by Deas, who later noted (at Granger, 1878) that he 
believed the sentence passed at Milne to be unjust, and that the trial had convinced 
him that greater latitude should be given to expert medical witnesses in Scottish 
courts.  Thirdly, the guidance that the Lord Justice-Clerk laid down at this trial 
appears to be a notable and perhaps final instance of the ‘pre-modern’ concept of 
responsibility, in which punishment was based on the prior penal consequences of 
certain classes of actions rather than on the intentions of actors.355 
 
As with most murder trials, the details of Milne’s case make for fascinating 
reading. Having suspected for several weeks that his acquaintance and sometime 
business partner James Patterson was conducting an affair with his wife, plotting to 
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take over his business, and conspiring to kill him with poison, Milne stabbed 
Patterson with an awl during an alcohol induced frenzy. No one who was called to 
testify doubted that erratic behaviour had come increasingly to dominate Milne’s 
character, marking him out as mentally peculiar. At a Christmas celebration two 
weeks prior to the murder he had said a long and rambling grace before dinner, carved 
the haggis in an ‘odd way’, and organised a strange procession around the table, 
which he led with a sword.356 However, the most significant aspect of Milne’s 
unusual behaviour was his extreme and apparently groundless paranoia, and even 
while he was placed in prison to await trial he maintained his suspicion that the whole 
event had been staged to effect his demise, repeating his stories of poisoning to an 
inmate, and going so far as to claim that Patterson was not dead at all, but had been 
hidden away by the police until he was condemned, at which time he would marry his 
wife and inherit his business.357 At his trial Milne spoke of instances in which 
Patterson had taken “some mercurial stuff” from his pocket and “filled the room with 
a dense gas” that made breathing difficult and recalled how he had seen Patterson 
“take up his little daughter and put paper in her nostrils” and then go to his wife with 
whom he lay on a sofa (Milne was apparently unable to prevent this due to the effects 
of quicksilver poisoning). The constable who interviewed Milne shortly after the 
stabbing took place also reported that he spoke of how Patterson had been putting 
poison in his drink for some days “in order to get his business and his wife” and that 
he had caught the interloper “on top of his wife” a few days prior to the stabbing, 
which fatal act had been intended “to teach him a lesson.”358 A later analysis given in 
1889 by the lawyer Charles Scott (who had been present at the trial) noted that Milne 
had claimed his victim appeared from a veil of clouds “smoking a magical cigar, from 
which thick and deleterious mists arose that filled and darkened the whole room”, 
periodically lifting to reveal glimpses of the liaison between his wife and his 
tormentor. Milne had also reported seeing a theatre bill posted on his wall upon which 
was printed: “To-night – The Robbers”, an advert of the crime against him that was 
now imminent, forcing him to take action against the ringmaster.359 
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It is a pity this case was tried a good half-century before psychoanalysis began 
to make inroads into the courts, for Milne would have undoubtedly had a ready made 
case for his defence – with such persistent fears over loss of power, vitality, property, 
and of his wife, one cannot help but speculate that Milne’s troubles went beyond an 
inability to carve haggis properly. As it was, his defence had to rely upon the court’s 
accepting a plea of insanity, which, following the passage of a recent Act, would 
either see him tried as sane, but found to have been insane at the time of his actions, 
or declared to be insane at the time of trial, thereby calling a halt to the proceedings 
and absolving him from criminal responsibility until his sanity was restored.360 Since 
Milne was capable of cogently responding to questions and comprehending the 
charges brought against him, the latter option did not seem to be open to the jury, 
while a plea alleging insanity at the time of the act while accepting sanity at the time 
of trial was phenomenally difficult to substantiate – trials were usually conducted 
within weeks of the acts libelled and concluded within days; in this case, only two 
months had passed since the fatal stabbing, rendering it highly unlikely that if insanity 
in the legal sense were present at the time of commission it had subsided by the date 
of the trial. However, establishing a defence on the grounds of delirium tremens, a 
transient mental condition recognised both legally and medically as amounting to 
insanity, was one way of negotiating this difficulty, and the Lord Justice-Clerk 
informed the jury that if they were satisfied that Milne really was “in a condition of 
mental disorder or disease” at the time of his act, and not merely suffering from “an 
anomalous state of mind” or “moral depravity” brought about by his indulgence, then 
he could be excused without further enquiry into the “exciting cause” of the 
insanity.361 
 
Two years prior to the murder Milne had been declared bankrupt, after which 
he took strongly to drink. His eyes, it was noted, had become sullen, piercing, rolling, 
and frantic, a testament to his troubled soul. Various witnesses spoke of his “piercing 
look”, his “rolling eyes and fierce-look”, a “wild roll in his eyes”, that his eyes were 
“different after bankruptcy”, that where “he had formerly a mild eye, now it was 
glaring” and that “there was something very strange in his eyes.”362 In addition to his 
                                                 
360 Milne (1863) p.331. The Act referred to is the 20th and 21st Vict. C. 81, sect. 87, 1862 
361 Milne (1863), p.344 
362 Milne (1863), pp.317-325 
 160 
heavy drinking and frantic appearance, lay witnesses testified that they believed Milne 
to be suffering from delirium tremens, a fact that was given considerable attention by 
the medical witnesses called at trial. While in prison Milne had been given a copy of 
the Anatomy of Drunkenness, a medical treatise on intemperance written by the 
Scottish alienist Robert McNish. The descriptions of alcohol-induced insanity 
contained within this work made Milne doubt the reality of his own delusions and 
suspect that alcohol had been the cause of his erratic behaviour.  
 
Thus, a special defence was lodged on the panel’s behalf stating that “at the 
time of the act charged [Milne] was insane and labouring under insane delusions.” 
Medical witnesses were asked to attend the trial in order to give an impartial 
assessment of the evidence pertaining to the prisoner’s state of mind, though as they 
were not cognisant of the facts upon which the defence was based, they were, at the 
Advocate’s request, permitted to remain in court throughout the trial. Dr Littlejohn, 
who examined Milne in the cells at the request of the local constable, noted his fast, 
weak pulse and suspected that he was in the incipient stages of delirium tremens, 
though he inferred from his present state that he could not have suffered an attack in 
the past 24 hours (i.e. when the murder had taken place). Indeed, on the day following 
Milne’s arrest, Littlejohn found his condition to be greatly improved and passed him 
fit to be examined. Thus, the symptoms he had observed were judged to be those “of 
recent hard drinking”, not those of a past fit of delirium tremens, making it unlikely 
that this condition could, at least on Littlejohn’s account, be used as an excuse for his 
conduct. Similarly, Professor Robert Christison and Dr James Simson were called to 
examine the prisoner in custody. Both affirmed that Milne was not suffering from 
delirium tremens, though they could not help noticing that his “eyes had a dreamy, 
heavy appearance”, and did not believe him to be feigning insanity in order to escape 
punishment.  
 
Simson was however suspicious of Milne’s attempt to excuse the stabbing as 
an accident, for a “monomaniac does not attribute to accident what he has done under 
delusion” (indeed he had “never heard of a case in which homicide committed under 
an insane delusion was first admitted and then denied by a lunatic”).363 Furthermore, 
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neither Simson nor Christison could see any connection between the fatal stabbing 
and the five main delusions they had been able to discern in Milne’s conduct (i.e. at 
no point, even if the delusions were founded in reality, would it have followed that he 
ought to commit murder, a fact which made his defence legally weak in reference to 
the M’Naughten Rules establishing the conditions of responsibility). An alternative 
medical testimony was offered by Dr John Smith, visiting physician at the Saughton 
Lunatic Asylum, who argued that Milne’s declaration that the stabbing was an 
accident was not necessarily inconsistent with the presence of delusions, for on the 
recovery of his senses he may have remembered the delusion and realised his error. 
Commenting on the divergence of his experience from that of Dr Simson, he noted 
that he had “known an act done by a monomaniac under the influence of his delusion, 
and then denied by him. A monomaniac may, immediately after an act committed 
under the delusion, feel contrition, and try to extenuate the act.” Smith also asked the 
jury to consider whether a monomaniac may know the “nature of the crime” but 
nonetheless “feel irresistibly impelled to commit the crime”, a question dismissed by 
the Lord Justice-Clerk as legally impermissible, and that “if all the physicians in 
Europe were to state that I would tell the jury that they must not believe it, or act on 
it.” However, he acknowledged that Milne’s Advocate was correct in stating that if 
the accused was suffering from insane delusions, then the jury did not need to enquire 
whether he knew that this would constitute murder, for the holism of mind entailed 
that the presence of insane delusion in one respect could be taken to indicate an 
incapacity to reason in another.364  
 
Citing Baron Hume, the Solicitor-General reminded the jury that, to serve as a 
defence in Scots law, mental disorder “must amount to an absolute alienation of 
reason” and not merely indicate that the accused was of peculiar temperament or 
habit. Thus, the jury was directed that, if they could neither established that Milne was 
insane at the time of the act, nor at the time of trial, he was to be punished with the 
full severity of the law. Escaping this final verdict did not seem likely: The evidence 
against Milne was, from a procedural point of view, fairly damning. The claim that 
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the stabbing was an accident had not been made until the day after his arrest, and he 
had been clear about his intentions when apprehended. Thus, the Solicitor-General 
expected the jury to agree with him that the Milne “was not at the time, nor was he 
now, either an idiot or a furious madman.”365 Furthermore, Milne’s history of 
drinking and erratic behaviour was not taken as an exculpation of his crime, but rather 
an exacerbation of it; the reports of his eccentric mental state were, after all, the 
product of his own indulgence, and if this indulgence placed him in such a position as 
to make reckless acts of violence likely, so much the worse for him. 
 
 There was a final question for the court to settle however, one that was of 
central importance to the arrangement of medico-legal claims; namely, if Milne was 
assumed to be sane, why did he commit his crime? If he was not a delusional madman 
acting upon fantasy then surely a plausible motive would have to be found to account 
for his conduct. In Milne’s case, the Lord Justice-Clerk accepted that if it was 
assumed that the delusions upon which Milne acted “were not really delusions 
affecting his mind” then the motive would admittedly become opaque, but opacity did 
not necessarily entail special legal significance, for while he admitted that it was 
“very true in one sense [that] murder can never be committed without motive”, it was 
equally true to say that almost no act could be committed without motive, and while 
many mysterious motives remained the secrets of murderers this did not absolve them 
of guilt.366 Thus, the Lord Justice-Clerk gave the doctrine of Scottish law on the issue 
of criminal responsibility, which, he felt, was an “exceedingly simple” one: “If a 
person knows what he is doing – that is to say, if he knows the act that he is 
committing, if he knows also the true nature and quality of the act, and apprehends 
and appreciates its consequences and effects – that man is responsible for what he 
does.” Following this guidance, Milne was sentenced to death, though, under a 
recommendation of mercy, his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. It was 
this habit amongst the jury of convicting a prisoner of murder and subsequently 
appealing for a suspension of the forthcoming sentence that caused nineteenth-century 
judges so much anguish. For instance, a year later, in discussion of the trial of George 
Bryce (1864), the Edinburgh Evening Courant paid particular attention to the jury’s 
                                                 
365 Milne (1863), p.337 
366 Milne (1863), p.345 
 163 
open refusal to follow the judge’s directive to find the prisoner either sane or insane: 
“They could not decide whether to vote unanimously for or against his sanity, so 
those who had doubts of Bryce’s sanity agreed to vote him sane, and thus to convict 
him, providing the rest of the jury would accept a recommendation for mercy, which, 
being unanimous, would spare his life.”367 In this way Milne’s case served as 
something of a high water mark, representing both the final High Court case of the 
nineteenth century in which the older logic of insanity was defended by a judge in 
such explicit terms and the last instance in which the jury were not offered an 
alternative to the philosophically imprecise verdict of ‘guilty with mercy’. 
 
 
6.3 Diminished Responsibility and Expert Evidence: The Trial of Dingwall 
 
In 1867 the Lord Justice-Clerk John Inglis, whose intransigent direction at Milne was 
noted above, departed from his former position to become the Lord Justice-General of 
Scotland (the country’s highest legal office). In this same year his successor, Lord 
Deas, gave the ruling on diminished responsibility resulting from disordered mental 
states that was to become such a distinguishing characteristic of Scottish law. 
Dingwall, a retired soldier serving in the Indian army with a long history of inebriety, 
was arraigned for stabbing his wife on the morning of the first of January 1867 (a date 
which had special significance in Scotland at the time, constituting the major holiday 
of the year). His biography was littered with instances of drunken excess: in 1846, 
following concerns over his drinking, he went voluntarily to ‘Dr Poole’s Retreat’, a 
reformatory for drunken patients, though, as he was freely able to procure alcohol 
there, it did him no good. In 1851 the executors charged with overseeing his estate 
became worried that his profligate spending on alcohol would soon render him 
bankrupt and attempted to secure medical certification for his removal to an asylum, 
though his medical attendants did not concur and “continued all along to be averse to 
granting the necessary certificate.” In 1855, as a result of his being “habitually and 
irreclaimably addicted to drink”, the penurious Dingwall was forced to place his 
estate in the hands of a local Advocate, whom he empowered to fix his residence and 
limit his allowance which was to be disbursed through his wife. This allowance was 
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said to include five bottles of whisky per month, though through the sale of articles 
from his house or by enticing credit notes from local merchants Dingwall frequently 
managed to obtain extra funds, which he used with grim inevitability to procure more 
alcohol.  
 
  Between his discharge from the army and his fatal crime, Dingwall had spent 
some twenty years back in Scotland living with his wife in rented accommodation and 
drawing an allowance from the proceeds of their estates. On the morning of the 
stabbing, Dingwall had been given a small amount of whisky by the proprietress of 
the apartments in which he and his wife lived, and had subsequently left the house to 
make calls on neighbours. This was of course New Year’s Eve, a time when such 
drinking and social calls would not have been out of the ordinary. Dingwall returned 
to his lodgings a little before midnight, and was given a glass of whisky by his 
landlord who then left him and retired to bed. At around two in the morning, upon 
hearing a faint cry issuing from the Dingwalls’ room, the landlord went to investigate 
and found his tenant sitting fully clothed by the bed in which his wife lay bleeding 
from a wound in her chest. When he asked what had happened he was told by 
Dingwall that he had “murdered his wife” who, though mortally wounded, survived 
for two weeks and was able to give details of the case. She reported that, for obvious 
reasons, she had hidden a pint-bottle of whisky and some money from her husband, an 
action inciting him to a fit of rage. Dingwall was kind to her when sober, but drinking 
threw him into a melancholic state in which he frequently spoke of his desire to end 
both their lives. He was inclined to read morose stories which she blamed for putting 
such ideas in his head, though she believed that his crime must have been carried out 
“on the impulse of the moment.”368 His wife’s testimony aside, Dingwall’s crime 
appeared to display a degree of premeditation. The bell-pull had been thrown over the 
top of the bed-frame prior to the attack, for the victim reported that she had reached 
out for it on being stabbed, but had not found it in its usual place. Furthermore, upon 
being apprehended, the prisoner had shown no remorse, and indeed expressed regret 
that he had “missed his mark.”  Thus, after a long history of uncontrollable 
drunkenness, it appeared that a mixture of motive and impulse had caused Dingwall to 
stab his wife repeatedly about the chest.  
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Medical witnesses called to give evidence at the trial drew attention to the 
likely impact Dingwall’s drinking had had on his mental capacity, with Robert 
Jamieson of Aberdeen Lunatic Asylum making much of the prisoner’s habitual use of 
alcohol. Though Jamieson did not think the craving for alcohol Dingwall experienced 
was a form of insanity in itself, he suggested it might be “an impulse arising out of [a] 
disease of the mind”, and that this uncontrollable “diseased impulse to drink is of the 
same kind as the impulse to homicide or suicide, equally morbid.” This form of 
uncontrollable impulse was not therefore a disease but a symptom of some underlying 
degeneracy that was at the same time a cause of its exacerbation, with repeated 
exposure to alcohol having “a tendency to weaken the intellect, and in the end 
produce insanity.”369 A key element of this process was the prisoner’s hereditary 
predisposition, and while there was general disagreement amongst the medical 
witnesses concerning the exact nature of Dingwall’s mental aberration, they all agreed 
there was a marked tendency toward insanity in his family, and “several medical 
witnesses had been asked, without objection, whether insanity among relatives would 
increase the probability of an individual becoming insane, to which an affirmative 
answer had been given.” However, when “the Dean of Faculty proposed to ask [a 
witness] whether he knew that an uncle and granduncle and two aunts of the prisoner 
(all of whose names were specified,) had been inmates of a lunatic asylum”, the 
Advocate-Depute objected, citing precedents in Scottish law where this line of 
questioning had been declared impermissible.  
 
Thus, while psychiatrists regarded heredity tendency as perhaps the most 
important evidential marker of insanity, the law ruled out evidence of heredity on the 
grounds of presumption in favour of sanity, a fact confirmed in all the major mid-
nineteenth-century works of Scottish legal procedure. William Gillespie Dickson’s 
Treatise on the Law of Evidence in Scotland (1865), the authoritative manual of 
judicial guidance, simply noted that: “It has been held inadmissible to prove the 
existence of heredity insanity in the family of the person alleged to be insane.” 
Similarly, MacDonald’s Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law of Scotland (1877) 
stated that under Scottish law “proof is not to be extended generally to events which 
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happened before the crime libelled . . . Difficult questions arise as to facts not 
immediately connected with the case, but which may thrown light upon the direct 
evidence. The question whether insanity of the relations of the accused may be proved 
has been decided in the negative.”370 This position placed severe limitations on 
psychiatric evidence, though it must be noted that many lawyers were unhappy that an 
accepted cause of insanity could not be adduced to overturn the presumption of sanity, 
particularly as heredity became such a visible topic in periodicals from the 1880s 
onwards.  
 
However in 1867 discussions of heredity were only beginning to feature 
prominently in British intellectual life, and the idea that a science of heredity could 
assist in determining legal responsibility was still largely confined to the psychiatric 
profession. While the bench was “anxious to give as much latitude to the defence as 
possible”, they felt that to follow the line of enquiry they had opened up would be “to 
introduce a precedent hazardous to the ends of justice.” The matter was therefore 
turned over to Lord Neaves (Deas’s brother), who deemed that “by the law of 
Scotland, the proposed line of investigation was incompetent”, and that the claims of 
a medical speciality founded on the opinion “that insanity in the family increased the 
probability of one of its members becoming insane” was not sufficient to overturn 
legal precedent, according to which the appropriate question was only “whether the 
prisoner was de facto insane at a certain date.” Thus, it was maintained that if a 
person’s insanity could not be “proved directly or substantively” through medical 
examination, then it “could not be proved by evidence that any number of his relatives 
had been insane”.371 Furthermore, to obtain adequate evidence of insanity in these 
relatives would require a lengthy analysis of evidence and counter evidence that could 
extend the trial indefinitely. Indeed, Lord Deas made it clear that, even if Dingwall 
had himself been insane, such a fact would be immaterial “unless he was insane at the 
time in question, and had committed the act in consequence of that insanity.” In short, 
if ascertaining whether the prisoner was himself insane presented so many problems, 
analysis of the sanity of his remote ancestors would be all but impossible, particularly 
as it had been accepted by all the witnesses that even commission to a lunatic asylum 
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would not prove that a person was absolutely irresponsible with respect to the law. It 
is clear then that Dingwall raised some very serious practical problems surrounding 
the speculative or probabilistic evidence of mental states that psychiatry had come to 
rely upon, establishing a tension that was to be hugely important for the relationship 
between psychiatry and the law in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
 
In addition to deeming the psychiatric knowledge of heredity to be legally 
inadmissible, the reports of the Aberdeen Circuit Court at which Dingwall was tried 
suggest more generally that the epistemic authority of medical expertise was minimal. 
For instance, while eight medical witnesses were called at the trial (including 
physicians, asylum superintendents, and a prison surgeon), it was made clear to the 
jury that their expertise was not rooted in a familiarity with theoretical knowledge. 
Thus, the Dean of Faculty reminded the jury that while the opinions of medical 
experts could assist them in reaching their verdict, the witnesses’ ‘expertise’ consisted 
largely in having a direct acquaintance with the prisoner over a number of years, and 
that the jurors’ own opinions concerning the prisoner’s mental state could be given 
equal or greater weight if they had a similar degree of familiarity with his condition, 
irrespective of their knowledge of medicine or insanity. In situations where the expert 
witness had no former acquaintance with the prisoner – for instance in cases where 
the examining witness was called from an asylum or had been instructed to examine 
the prisoner in the cells – the statements given were not regarded as necessarily 
pertinent insights, but as mere observations for the jury to interpret. For instance, at 
the 1864 trial of Bryce (noted above), the presiding judge Lord Colonsay had stated 
that while “medical gentlemen have opportunities of observation which make their 
testimony very important in reference to such matters . . . the question [of 
responsibility] is not a medical question.”372 Similarly, The Times had reported in 
1862 on a parliamentary debate concerning the Lunacy Regulation Bill. Here the Lord 
Chancellor had sought to limit the evidence of medical witnesses who frequently drew 
the types of evaluative conclusions that fell within the province of the jury, arguing 
that while a medical witness might be “a more accurate and acute observer” than the 
members of the jury, he should be prevented from offering statements asserting that a 
                                                 
372 H. M. Adv v. Bryce, 4 Irvine (1864), p.508 
 168 
person was mad, particularly if they were based on a series of medical facts which the 
jury were not qualified to judge.373 
 
Around this time psychiatric expertise was generally understood according to 
this division, both in legal manuals and in works of medical jurisprudence. 
MacDonald’s Criminal Law of Scotland used the case of Dingwall to highlight the 
admissibility of certain types of evidence under Scottish law, with “scientific” 
authority said to apply equally to those “persons who know an individual [and may 
therefore] be asked as to their opinion about his sanity, even though not possessed of 
medical skill.”374 Similarly James Fitzjames Stephen had removed technical 
competence from legal authority by noting in his Digest of the Law of Evidence 
(1871) that while it was “the duty of the judge to decide . . . whether the skill of any 
person in the matter on which the evidence of his opinion is offered is sufficient to 
entitle him to be considered as an expert”, it remained an unassailable principle of law 
that the “opinion of the expert as to the existence of the facts on which his opinion is 
to be given is irrelevant, unless he perceived them himself.”375 This appears to 
confirm what David Skae had noted in 1867 (presumably in response to Dingwall’s 
trial), when he complained that the legal understanding of experts fell into two 
classes, “those who know something of the prisoner, and nothing of insanity, and 
those who know something about insanity, and nothing of the prisoner.”376  
 
In his advice to the jury, Lord Deas noted that while the medical evidence had 
generally established that Dingwall was weak-minded and eccentric, only one 
witness, Dr Howden of Montrose Lunatic Asylum, had declared him to be insane. Yet 
Howden was previously unacquainted with the prisoner and had examined him only 
once, indicating that his conclusions were to be regarded as personal opinions based 
                                                 
373 The Times, March 25, 1862, in LHB7/12/1 
374 MacDonald, Criminal Law of Scotland, p.487 & pp. 479 -80 
375 J F Stephenson, Digest of the Law of Evidence, Little, Brown, & Co: Boston, 1877 (3rd edition), 
p.105 
376 Skae, ‘The Legal Relations of Insanity’, p.20. By the early twentieth century, the legal definition of 
expert evidence had been expanded to include both an acquaintance with the prisoner’s diagnostic 
history and the nature of a particular type of insanity (“if scientific or expert evidence be given, such, 
evidence will be limited to definite particulars. Either it will consist of facts regarding previous bodily 
and mental manifestations, and the mental phenomena exhibited by the prisoner at the time; or it will 
consist of replies to questions regarding the principles or details of some particular form of insanity that 
may be set up as a defence”: W. Ramsay Smith, Medical Jurisprudence from the Judicial Standpoint, 
Unpublished M.D. Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1913,  p.258) 
 169 
largely on second-hand reports. Since Howden was not a member of the jury it would 
be irresponsible (and perhaps illegal) for the judge to advise that this witness’s 
interpretation of facts was inherently more accurate than the interpretation of the 
jurors. Furthermore, Dingwall’s own Advocate, who had regularly consulted with his 
client on matters pertaining to the management of his estate over a twenty year period, 
had never believed him to lack sufficient mental capacity to be involved in these 
decisions. Having ruled out the probabilistic inferences which characterised medical 
tests of insanity, evaluation of the prisoner’s guilt seemed to come down to the 
traditional M’Naughten tests of insanity. However, even these presented problems, for 
there “was no allegation here either of idiocy, or what the law calls furiosity. This was 
not said to be a case of total deprivation of reason. Neither was it alleged to be a case 
of insane delusions.”  
 
Faced with such a situation, Deas proposed an alternative test, advising his 
jury that if they “believed that the prisoner, when he committed the act, had sufficient 
mental capacity to know, and did know, that the act was contrary to the law, and 
punishable by the law, it would be their duty to convict him.”377 While Deas thereby 
ruled out a defence of simple insanity, he did note that the sunstroke Dingwall was 
known to have received while on military service in India, coupled with his frequent 
attacks from delirium tremens, had a bearing on the case, and that “he could not say 
that it was beyond the province of the jury to find a verdict of culpable homicide if 
they thought that was the nature of the offence.” Dingwall was found unanimously 
guilty of culpable homicide and received ten years’ penal servitude. This trial came 
fairly quickly to be recognised as the first Scottish case in which medical evidence 
concerning the mental state of the accused could used to modify sentencing (a fact 
that can be seen in subsequent cases referring back to Dingwall). 
 
6.4 Monomania, Degeneration, and Culpable Homicide 
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The next significant trial at which partial responsibility was raised came in 1872 with 
the case of Agnes Laing or Paterson. Paterson had cut her daughter’s throat in a fit of 
drunken rage, an act which she excused when her neighbours intervened by saying 
“you drink yourselves” (i.e., you know what comes of it). As with Dingwall the case 
involved a murder committed after heavy drinking over the New Year. This state of 
acute intoxication, it was alleged by Paterson’s defence, accentuated the prisoner’s 
traumatic grief concerning the loss of her other two children to measles a few months 
prior to cutting her daughter’s throat (this sense of loss presumably becoming more 
acute at a time of year when it was customary for families to gather). Summarising the 
defence, Paterson’s Advocate claimed that she could not be held responsible for her 
actions for the simple reason that while it was possible to imagine a person 
committing such deeds from “hatred, cupidity, or revenge”, a rational being “could 
not conceive how anyone could commit the crime of murder without having any 
motive whatever, or how this woman, being sane, could have taken the life, in such a 
barbarous manner, of the child of whom she was passionately fond.” Thus, “while 
there was not the slightest motive to which murder could be attributed”, the Advocate 
suggested that “there was, however, a way in which the crime in this case could be 
accounted for”, submitting to the jury that they had, in the absence of such motive, 
“sufficient proof that the prisoner was not on the 3rd of January in a sane state of 
mind.”  Paterson’s defence had intended to “prove that the mother of the prisoner was 
insane at the time of her birth”, and had been confined for a long time to an asylum 
where she died by her own hand in “a paroxysm of insanity.” The defence had 
proceeded to list a series of English cases in which evidence of heredity appeared to 
have been accepted, an argument that was met with some sympathy by the chief 
prosecutor, Lord Cowan, who admitted the strength of the case, though noted that it 
was difficult to enter into contested legal terrain in the Circuit Courts (as opposed to 
the High Court), adding that the English cases cited could have no bearing as they had 
not been authorised by an Act of Parliament. The presiding judge, Lord Neaves, also 
refused to admit the evidence, referring to an “established point of law” raised at 
Dingwall that confined the jury to consider only the sanity of the accused (and only in 
reference to the acts libelled) while ignoring “the question of sanity or insanity of half 
a dozen persons besides herself – an enquiry which might practically be endless and 
quite away from the matter before us.”  Thus, evidence of heredity predisposition to 
insanity was once again rejected on the grounds of precedent and “the great danger 
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and difficulty which might ensue, should a different decision be come to.”378 
However, the jury found unanimously that the deeds were committed while the 
prisoner was in an unsound state of mind and found her not guilty.  
 
As we might expect given the nature of this ruling, Paterson’s case was also of 
interest to the psychiatric profession, and at a Quarterly Meeting of the MPA in 1872 
John Batty Tuke, Medical Superintendent of the Fife and Kinross Asylum, read a 
paper containing his observations on the trial.379 Coming to his own analysis of the 
“medical character of the case”, Batty Tuke, who had been present in the court room 
and had examined the prisoner himself, drew attention to the “miserable story of 
family insanity” and the “fact that for three weeks at least before the crime was 
committed the prisoner had been drinking hard, and that she had for long been of 
dissipated habits.”  Further evidence of insanity was suggested by the fact that, during 
the trial, the prisoner had “protested against statements which rendered her sanity 
doubtful”, a point that confirmed for Batty Tuke the well-worn forensic maxim that 
the truly insane believed they were sane while feigners wishing to escape justice 
attempted to convince courts of their insanity.380  
 
 In many ways then, Paterson was almost the perfect forensic-psychiatric 
subject: a woman who did not display clear and distinct insanity but whose suggestive 
symptoms were so numerous and otherwise inexplicable as to render psychiatric 
explanation practically essential. However, Batty Tuke’s response to the case was 
interesting, for he insisted on drawing attention to the preponderance of evidence 
negating the assumption of insanity. Thus, he noted, no “definite symptoms of 
insanity” were detected by the examiners. Indeed, in spite of the prisoner’s heavy 
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drinking, no symptoms of delirium tremens were noted around the time of the act. 
Furthermore, while Paterson had denied her insanity, she had also denied her guilt by 
attempting to blame her husband for the crime (though he was not present at the time), 
and though the motives for her crime were small, they were not entirely absent – on 
the morning of the attack Paterson had started drinking early and, having quickly 
drained her cellar, ordered her daughter to go fetch more whisky. When the young girl 
refused, her mother cut her throat in a “fit of frenzy” apparently unaware of what she 
was doing at the time, though her recollection of the event afterwards was clear. 
Finally, Batty Tuke noted, there was “nothing in the history of this woman which 
would have justified a medical man in certifying her insane had she not cut her child’s 
throat when dazed with drink.” During her time in prison Paterson was “under the 
eyes of medical gentlemen . . . well acquainted with the subject of insanity, and who 
were fully alive to the necessity of examining her, from the knowledge that insanity 
would most likely be the defence set up”, yet with the exception of sleeplessness and 
suicidal tendencies observed by a fellow prisoner (behaviour that could easily be 
accounted for by her guilt, imprisonment, and impending trial) no insane symptoms 
were detected by any of the medical examiners.  
 
 We can see then that when a case like this was discussed as a psychiatric 
object the emphasis was placed not on the opaque character of the motive, but on the 
fact that want of motive alone could not confer scientific legitimacy on the insanity 
diagnosis. Indeed, for Batty Tuke, the case presented an interesting model for 
psychiatric diagnosis, since the prisoner had seemed to offer the medical witnesses the 
opportunity of conducting a “differential diagnosis between insane homicidal impulse 
and alcoholic mania”, a diagnosis that would not only have been conducted according 
to the logic of general medicine (the psychiatrist’s dream) but would have held “great 
importance to public justice.” The case, he continued, had been misdiagnosed at trial, 
for Paterson was not a patient suffering from a form of simple insanity that could be 
inferred from a lack of motive (i.e. monomania), but was suffering from “alcoholism 
acting on a congenitally weakened brain, which did not possess sufficient inhibitory 
power over violent passion.” Thus, he argued, from “a purely psychological point of 
view, Mrs. Paterson was insane at the time of her offence. She had all the necessary 
primary factors for the production of insanity, to which she added the toxic influence 
of alcohol. But it is very open to question whether she ought to have been excused in 
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the eye of the law.”381 This argument formed part of a general reversal taking place 
around the late 1860s and early 1870s (the precise time when degeneration was 
becoming increasingly popular amongst British psychiatrists, with Batty Tuke serving 
as one of its chief advocates), a reversal in which psychiatrists began to distance 
themselves form monomania and the inherent diagnostic value of the symptom itself 
to insist on the necessity of an underlying condition (degeneration or heredity 
predisposition) that would allow psychiatry to function as a science. Indeed it is 
notable that two years before this case Batty Tuke had delivered a paper to the MPA 
at Glasgow in which he argued that British psychiatrists should abandon their focus 
on  “leading mental symptoms” to follow the research programme established during 
the 1850s and 60s by “Morel, [Schroeder] Van der Kolk, and Skae”, all of whom 
recognised the need to break with the “psychological nosologists”.382 Thus, in 
addition to the rejection of heredity evidence noted above, a second tension between 
psychiatry and the law was clearly generated by the judges’ continued adherence to 
the logic of monomania, which seemed too close to the symptomatological methods 
degenerationists sought to break with. 
 
In spite of this psychiatric insistence on the break with monomania, there was 
undeniably a growing acceptance of criminal insanity amongst Scotland’s judges from 
the late 1860s onwards. We see this clearly in the case of Miller (1874), another 
habitual inebriate who murdered his wife by stabbing her in the throat and beating her 
with a clothes-beetle as she tried to escape the house. Initially the defence alleged that 
Miller was insane at the time of trial, though as he was found to be coherent and sane 
by the medical witnesses who examined him, could understand the questions put to 
him, and was able respond in a clear and coherent way in court, this defence was 
substituted for the claim that he was insane at the time of his acts. Though Miller was 
found to be guilty of murder and subsequently hanged, his case is of significance for 
the guidance offered by the presiding judge, who appeared to promote a 
psychiatrically informed picture of the mind as a complex of forces in which insanity 
could consist in a perverse desire to subvert the law (rather than a violation of the law 
merely from ignorance of its form or consequences). The Lord Justice-Clerk 
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(Moncrieff) advised his jury that the question as to whether the defence of insanity 
had been proved was entirely open to them, and that while Miller’s case did not 
appear to conform to the established legal definition of insanity, improvements in 
mental science had shown these former legal tests to be inaccurate and that a person 
“may be entirely insane, and yet may know well enough that an act which he does is 
forbidden by law.” Thus, the Lord Justice-Clerk noted, the test a jury should have 
before their mind must not centre on an abstract definition of a prisoner’s knowledge, 
but on his general “soundness of mind.” In this way, he continued, the “right and 
wrong test” offered by M’Naughten was psychologically inaccurate, for most medical 
witnesses were of the opinion that a person of unsound mind suffering from morbid 
impulses may be stimulated to crime by the very knowledge of prohibition, or be 
incapable of acting on the knowledge of injunction.383  
 
 It would be wrong however to infer from this that psychiatric evidence was the 
cause of any judicial shift, for two years later this guidance was clarified at the trial of 
Macklin (1876). Macklin was an inebriate who had been subject to paranoid delusions 
for many years. In particular he believed that his mother was conducting an affair 
with a local doctor with whom she had murdered his father and was in the process of 
concocting a scheme to deprive him of his penis. Acting on these delusions he shot 
her dead with a pistol and fled to a farmhouse where he was subsequently discovered 
mutilating himself (though the transcript is naturally delicate on this point, it seems 
that he was in the process of removing his penis with a knife.) It seems (though again 
the transcript is somewhat opaque) that Macklin had previously suffered from syphilis 
and that his delusions arose chiefly from the medical attention he had received in 
consequence, subjecting him “to a very extreme and unnecessary torture under the 
guise of treatment; that the object of that torture was to change his religion and 
compel him to become a Roman Catholic.”384  
 
The symptoms present in Macklin’s case were well-known to forensic 
psychiatry, and as one Edinburgh medical student summarised in the early twentieth 
century: “The combination of a delusion of mutilation of the sexual organs with the 
                                                 
383 H.M. Advocate v Miller, 3 Couper 1874-77 [1874], pp.16-19 (p.18) 
384 Macklin, 3 Couper 1874-77 [1876], pp.258-61 
 175 
delusion that the patient’s food is poisoned, and that his wife is unfaithful to him, may 
be considered to neatly demonstrate the existence of alcoholic insanity as any other 
group of symptoms in mental pathology.”385 Repeating the guidance he had offered at 
Miller, the Lord Justice-Clerk stated that while he would “lay down no general test 
from which unsoundness of mind may be inferred”, the jury had been selected on the 
assumption that it represented a random cross-section of public opinion, meaning their 
judgement was to be considered “not merely or mainly as a question of law or 
science, but on the ordinary rules which apply in daily life.”386 Thus, while there was 
within Scottish law a move away from rigid cognitive tests of responsibility and 
toward a notion of mental unsoundness that appeared to follow psychiatric evidence, 
this was explicitly not an attempt to define insanity according to medical notions. 
However, the implication in both Miller and Macklin was that a jury should be 
permitted to follow popular notions of insanity, and if these happened to be informed 
by medical discussion, whether in the press or at trial, they were permitted to act on 
this knowledge. 
 
Why was this notion being pushed so consistently by Scottish judges? As I 
suggested above, judges wanted to avoid the sort of ambiguity that led to split juries 
openly negotiating a punishment amongst themselves by agreeing to find a prisoner 
guilty with a recommendation to mercy – a process that seemed to make the law 
arbitrary in its disposal of criminals (the law was, it must be remembered, theorised as 
a self-stabilising social mechanism by many prominent legal scholars of the period). 
However, even as judges implied heavily that diminished responsibility was 
preferable to a divided sentence, juries continued to ignore them, as was demonstrated 
in the following year at the case of Middleby or Tierney (1875), concerning a miner 
accused of killing one of his colleagues with a pick.387 From the exculpatory evidence 
it emerged that Tierney had been of sound mind until 1860, at which time the death of 
one of his children had greatly affected his mood. A fellow miner testified to the 
effects this had had upon the prisoner’s mind and conduct, noting that his work 
became gradually less steady as his conduct became more erratic. On one occasion 
Tierney’s wife had approached the witness telling him that her husband had cut a cat 
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into four pieces, and upon arriving at the house he found blood on the floor and was 
told by the prisoner that he “had been disposing of a witch.”  Tierney’s actions 
became so unpredictable that his wife began to fear for her safety and, on consultation 
with a local doctor, had her husband removed to Ireland as a pauper lunatic. On his 
eventual return to Scotland he quickly resumed his old habits, burning all the clothes 
he could lay his hands on and displaying such a contempt for those around him that 
his wife was obliged to live separately, returning only ten days prior to the occurrence 
of the crime for which he was libelled. This act of separation would of course have 
been imbued with a far greater moral and social significance in the 1870s, and a 
Roman Catholic Clergyman acquainted with the family testified at the trial that he had 
intervened to protect the reputation of Mrs. Tierney from the local community, telling 
them that, as her husband was insane, it was right for her to live separately from him. 
Furthermore, had refused to give Tierney the sacraments on the grounds of his weak 
intellect, arguing that “[t]o receive the privileges of religion a man requires to be sane, 
and I refused him those privileges on that account.”  
 
While there was a good deal of evidence that Tierney was of unsound mind, 
the prosecution denied that he was insane. Firstly, the doctor who had initially 
certified Tierney insane sixteen years prior to his final crime had re-examined him 
shortly after the murder had taken place and did not deem him to be insane (indeed, 
though he did not doubt that he had granted the certificate, he had no recollection of 
having previously examined Tierney). Dr Yellowlees, Physician Superintendent at 
Gartnavel Asylum, had also examined Tierney while he was detained at Hamilton 
Prison, and on two separate occasions had conversed with him for nearly an hour. 
While he believed that the prisoner seemed suspicious and a “dour, sulky, repellent 
sort of man”, he did not believe him to be insane. Under cross-examination 
Yellowlees was pressed on the point of Tierney’s former insanity and noted that, 
while interviewing the prisoner, he found it impossible to forget that he had been at 
one time insane, and that the erratic nature of his behaviour could indeed have 
resulted from his former attack of insanity, though he maintained that there was 
nothing to show that Tierney was, at the time of examination, insane.  
 
While Yellowlees saw nothing that would allow him to certify the prisoner 
insane, he believed that the mental peculiarity described in his case history “may have 
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lessened his power of self-control and self-regulation” (though he was quick to add 
that this would not be sufficient to “make him the mere helpless instrument of his own 
impulses”). It is striking that Yellowlees was not only permitted, but was actually 
encouraged to address the jury in this way, with his statement delicately rephrased by 
the bar for the benefit of the jury to read: “[if there] was no actual access of mania, the 
mental deficiency of [the panel] might have removed his power of self-control, so that 
an amount of irritation which would not have enraged another man might have 
enraged him greatly.” This suggestion of uncontrollable impulse – a novel notion in 
courts of law at this time that was never fully accepted in either Scotland or England – 
was questioned by the prosecution, who seized upon the presence of motive, 
particularly the fact that Tierney had, on the morning of the murder, misreported the 
number of crates he had managed to fill at the coal mine. Under cross-examination 
Yellowlees accepted that the desire to take credit for another’s work could perhaps be 
a “sufficient motive” for such an attack, particularly if the mind was already 
weakened, conceding that if “immediately after [the murder] he incorrectly stated the 
number of hutches he had filled, conversed quietly, and asked to be taken to the top of 
the pit, that would afford the presumption that he was then sane.”388 Following this 
revelation, the Advocate-Depute proceeded to his summation of the evidence, stating 
that the jury had clearly before them “an adequate motive” for murder, “it might be an 
insufficient motive; but murder has been held to be committed in many cases where 
the motive was much slighter.” However, he also allowed for their taking an 
“intermediate view” of the prisoner’s mental responsibility, one which fell between 
sanity and insanity to declare that “the panel had to some extent lost the power of 
regulating his actions.” In this instance the guidance was not followed, and the jury 
returned the type of ambiguous verdict culpable homicide was supposed to remove 
from the legal records by unanimously declaring the prisoner to be guilty but 
recommending him to mercy “on account of the excitement which might result from 
previous insanity.”389  
 
6.5 The Development of Diminished Responsibility  
                                                 
388 A footnote in the Justiciary Report pursued this motive even more relentlessly, noting that as 
Tierney had not correctly called the number of hutches he had himself filled, he wished to get credit for 
the deceased’s work “therefore, he killed Campbell.” Tierney (1875), p.165 
389 Tierney (1875), pp.160-66 
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The diminished responsibility of the mentally peculiar offender was not confined to 
cases of homicide, and evidence pertaining to the mental state of the accused was 
admitted into trials for lesser offences. As we have seen, following the case of 
Dingwall the notion of diminished responsibility was raised in several cases carrying 
the capital sentence at which Lord Deas was absent. The next trial of this nature Deas 
presided over was at the trial of McLean (1876), a case of housebreaking and theft 
involving a prisoner who had recently escaped from the Royal Lunatic Asylum at 
Aberdeen. While this was of course a less serious crime than those discussed above, it 
must be remembered that housebreaking was still a capital offence at this time, though 
judges were reluctant to punish it as such and would have gone to great lengths to 
excuse such a prisoner.390 Thus, while it was unusual for the court to hear expert 
medical testimony concerning mental states in a case of theft, or for such a crime to 
be tried in the High Court of the Justiciary, McLean’s case was used to demonstrate 
the progress of Scottish law on this matter. Indeed the Lord Justice-Clerk, James 
Moncrieff, noted that he sought to take precautions beyond the ordinary course 
pursued in such a case, while Lord Deas, who was appointed as judge, made it clear to 
his jury that the medical report would be central to their verdict, and advised them to 
take the prisoner’s mental state into account. Returning to his verdict at Dingwall, 
Deas advised his jury that they may take this into account mental peculiarity when 
arriving at the level of responsibility (and hence punishability) to be imputed, stating 
that a prisoner, “without being insane in the legal sense” may nonetheless “labour 
under a degree of weakness of intellect or mental infirmity which may make it both 
right and legal to take that state of mind into account” and that “the state of the 
panel’s mind” would be “allowed to modify both the nature or (sic) legal category of 
the crime and the punishment.” In walking this line, he advised, the court should 
avoid the error of inflicting punishments either “in excess of their object” or liable “to 
degenerate into irregular and mistaken leniency, calculated to mislead the individual 
and betray the interests of society, which last alone can justify human punishment at 
all.”391 After considering both of these concerns, and the medical evidence pertaining 
to the accused’s mind, a sentence of six months’ imprisonment was read. 
                                                 
390 McLean, 3 Couper, 1874-77 [1876], pp.334-40. On this case see also Gordon, The Criminal Law of 
Scotland, p.461 
391 McLean (1874), pp.337-39. 
 179 
 
 The next case at which diminished responsibility resulting from the mental 
state of the accused was to be considered was of an altogether more serious nature. 
This was the case of Granger (1878), a successful railway contractor who was 
“respectably connected” to the extent that his trial for homicide “excited considerable 
interest” amongst the public.392 Up to the date of his offence Granger’s sanity “did not 
appear to have been at any time doubted” by those he was connected with, though he 
had been drinking heavily for a number of days prior to his crime, and this prolonged 
drinking bout had transformed his character beyond recognition. One morning at 
around six Granger left home and travelled to Inverness station, whence on toward 
Grantown (a small village in the North of Scotland), drinking all the while and 
behaving in a “noisy, extravagant, and excited manner.” This journey, in effect a 
small dissociative fugue, eventually saw Granger being assisted from the train and 
escorted by the stationmaster to a local hotel where he was to wait for a doctor. When 
the doctor arrived Granger became fearful that he would be put into a sleep from 
which he might never awake, and began to behave once more in an agitated and 
destructive manner. He was therefore sent to a room at the hotel to gather himself, 
where he attacked two men with a knife, one of whom subsequently died (the other 
being a police officer called to the scene).393 
 
Granger’s Advocate lodged the special defence that his client was not guilty 
by reason of insanity at the time of the act charged, and that in particular he was 
suffering from delirium tremens. Here the defence counsel referred to the case of 
Murray (1858), in which the Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis had laid down that a person 
suffering from delirium tremens was to be treated as insane as far as criminal 
responsibility was concerned. This was not taken to be an authoritative statement at 
Granger (precedent law, by its very nature, required subsequent confirmation).394 The 
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condition was unequivocally recognised by psychiatrists as an insane one, with a 
well-marked cluster of symptoms in which the patient would suffer from “visual 
hallucinations . . . usually of a horrible character. Over the bedclothes are seen 
crawling rats, mice, snakes, lobsters, etc., and the same objects are affirmed to be 
wandering about the room. The patient . . . imagines his attendants to be an attacking 
army, and does his best to overwhelm them in combat.” Such symptoms were pretty 
generally accepted as constituting delusions that could be readily incorporated within 
existing legal definitions of insanity to supply “logical motives for the most appalling 
and brutal crimes.”395 However, Lord Deas appeared to be less indulgent towards the 
defence than on previous occasions, and while he accepted as reliable the testimonies 
of a prison doctor and a druggist who declared Granger to be suffering from delirium 
tremens, he refused to accept that this ought to translate automatically into legal 
irresponsibility, arguing that delirium tremens was not, nor had it ever been, 
equivalent to insanity under Scots law (a position that seemed doubtful, if not patently 
false).396 Given that the presence of delirium tremens was not doubted, Granger’s case 
is particularly interesting historically, for as the Justiciary Report notes, the question 
of guilt would focus entirely on the conclusions that could legitimately be inferred 
from psychiatric claims concerning “the state of the panel’s mind, and the question of 
responsibility applicable to that state of mind.”397  
 
In his opening counsel to the jury, Deas stated that, aside from the presence of 
delirium tremens, the details of the case pointed toward the prisoner’s sanity. Granger 
had shown a good deal of reason and forward thinking throughout the day, even if he 
was severely inebriated: he had deposited his money safely at the station, and had 
been able to recall the exact amount deposited after his crime, he had disposed of the 
murder weapon by dropping it out of the hotel window, and had deliberately inflicted 
a wound upon his leg, smearing the walls with blood in an apparently calculated effort 
to convince the police that he had attempted to commit suicide after the stabbing. 
These were, it seemed, the acts of a man who wished to make the most of his altered 
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mental state, and “although his nervous system was greatly shaken, [he] still knew the 
quality of the act he was committing, and the responsibility it inferred.” However, the 
determination of sanity was once again left to the jury, who were told that no binary 
definition dividing sanity from insanity could supplant the particulars of the case as 
diagnostic aids, and that the M’Naughten Rules were in particular “only calculated to 
mislead.” There is a clear sense in these trials that the agency of Lord Deas (and to a 
lesser extent the Lord Justice-Clerk Moncrieff) was instrumental in maintaining the 
acceptability of diminished or partial responsibility in response to medical evidence. 
In Granger’s trial this involved a sleight of hand through which, having ruled out 
delirium tremens as a proof of insanity, Deas went on to advise his jury that “it did not 
follow that they must convict him of the capital offence”, and a direct circumvention 
of the capital sentence would be legally sounder than a recommendation to mercy if 
they wished to consider the prisoner’s “weak or diseased state of mind, not amounting 
to insanity whether arising from delirium tremens, or from some other disease or 
infirmity” (a guidance that was subsequently followed).398  
 
In a series of final cases tried by Deas we see the notion of diminished 
responsibility come to stand clearly and unambiguously as the law of Scotland, almost 
without exception in cases where psychiatric evidence was heard (though again this 
was not a causal relationship; trials likely to be considered for this verdict were also 
likely to hear such evidence). Nonetheless, we see in these final cases of Deas’s reign 
as High Court Judge a development of both the legal understanding of insanity and 
the types of claims psychiatrists advanced in reference to this notion. The trial of 
Ferguson (1881) concerned a drunken butcher who stabbed his wife after she refused 
to give him drink and subsequently attempted to kill himself. Ferguson was said to be 
a quiet though generally unpleasant man when not under the influence of liquor, 
though when intoxicated (and he often was) he became violent. A special plea was 
lodged stating that Ferguson was insane at the time of the stabbing, though the 
circumstances of the case did not look favourable to such a conclusion. The only 
evidence suggestive of insanity was a suspicion concerning his wife’s infidelity, and, 
more substantially, a report from his sister claiming that on the day prior to the 
stabbing he had spoken of seeing a dead relative. However, immediately after the 
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attack he had told onlookers that he meant to do it and that his trade as a butcher had 
taught him well how to carve flesh. Thus, while Ferguson’s case had certain features 
in common with Dingwall (both had stabbed their wives while drunk for withholding 
alcohol): his drunken conduct was not exceptional to his character, making the legal 
supposition of monomania less likely.399 Indeed, Deas noted that this appeared to be 
quite a different type of crime, in which there was very little evidence of mental 
disorder (the testimony of Ferguson’s sister did not suggest the existence of any 
recognised form of insanity), though he laid down “in more explicit terms” than at 
Dingwall that he considered “the effect of weakness of mind might reduce a charge of 
murder to culpable homicide”, a doctrine “which had since been approved of in the 
High Court, and repeatedly acted upon in Circuit Courts” of Scotland.400 The jury did 
not take Deas up on his offer however, and found Ferguson guilty of murder (with a 
recommendation to mercy), a fact that would undoubtedly have rankled the judge, but 
also caused The Scotsman to question the propriety of their decision in an article 
noting that while there was no exceptionality to his conduct (the logic of monomania), 
the prisoner displayed marked symptoms of “a physical degeneracy which is, in the 
opinion of some eminent authorities, the invariable concomitant of mental 
weakness.”401 
 
Two final cases tried in the following year conclude Deas’s involvement with 
culpable homicide. The case of Thomson (1882) concerned a woman who placed her 
illegitimate son, aged two, upside down in a butter-kit which she filled with water. 
Thomson had been “depressed, inattentive to her work, and dirty and negligent in her 
dress and habits” for some months prior to the homicide, apparently the result of a 
visit she had paid to her mother in a lunatic asylum. Both the manager of the linen 
works where Thomson was employed and the doctor who examined her in the cells 
reported that she was a woman of weak intellect, though neither believed her to be 
insane. Deas did not think the jury needed any special direction in this case and he 
made it clear that diminished responsibility in cases of mental peculiarity was now 
sufficiently established under Scots law for the case to be left to their discretion – a 
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verdict of culpable homicide due to weak intellect was returned.402 Finally, there was 
the case of Gove (1882), an “aggravated egoist” who attacked and killed his father 
with a spade. A special defence was lodged stating that at the time of his acts Gove 
was “insane, or labouring under mental delusions or maniacal paroxysms, which 
inspired and uncontrollable impulse, and deprived him of his senses.” Two medical 
witnesses were called, one of whom had examined the prisoner on six separate 
occasions, and both stated that they would grant a certificate of lunacy. However, 
Deas reminded his jury that “the evidence of medical men in questions of this kind 
[is] no more valuable than the common sense judgement of friends and associates of 
the panel.” By now the ruling at Dingwall was declared as “the recognised law of the 
land”, one which admitted that there “might be men of habits of mind who should not 
be punished with the capital sentence of death, as they would have been if they were 
in full possession of all faculties.”403  
 
 Deas retired from the High Court in the following year, though his name 
remained connected with the discussion of diminished responsibility. In concluding 
this section I will consider the details of the cases tried in his immediate aftermath, 
showing how the same themes of heredity, monomania, alcoholism, and degeneration 
continued to structure medico-legal relations in Scotland. Following Deas’s 
withdrawal from the bench his successor, Lord McLaren, continued to guide the jury 
in the same fashion, as we observe at the case of Margaret Robertson or Browne 
(1886), who had placed her two grandchildren in the fire on New Year’s morning 
while their parents were away making social calls.404 Her son testified that around half 
past three in the morning his mother had come to his window crying and muttering 
about his deceased brother who had drowned himself the previous New Year (making 
the case to some extent similar to Paterson, 1872). Browne implored her son to take 
the opportunity the New Year offered to visit friends and neighbours with his wife, 
offering to mind their children while they were absent. Around an hour later she 
located the couple at a neighbour’s house and announced that “the children are all 
burned.” Their mother testified that when she arrived at the house the eldest girl was 
burned and her dress was wet (it was presumed that Browne had poured water over 
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her in an attempt to put out the flames). When she asked what had happened, she was 
told that their grandmother had put them on the fire, a statement she doubted, 
suspecting that her daughter was not fully conscious at the time. However, the 
children survived for a little over a week before dying of their injuries, and the eldest 
spent her last days calling out “Grandmother . . . Don’t put me on the fire” at regular 
intervals, a fact which confirmed to investigators that Browne had been the author of 
the crime. 
 
 Since her son’s suicide the previous year Browne had become an “inebriate of 
rough manners”, and while she was drunk on the night of her crime, her state was 
apparently no worse than had become custom (the whisky that was left in her son’s 
house, it was noted, had remained untouched). The prisoner herself reported that she 
had been subject to strange delusions at the time, and that a gang of “circus folk” or 
“show-people” who were in the habit of visiting their town during the holiday period 
had entered the house and attacked her and the children. While the children’s parents 
had been away at the police station, Brown had visited a neighbour and discussed the 
incident with her saying “this is an awful scrape I’ve got into”, and that “a big woman 
had come into the house” bringing with her a strange beast that Browne had struggled 
with. The chief prosecutor reported that the prisoner had told him she fell asleep at the 
house where her grandchildren slept and awoke to find herself shrouded in darkness, 
held down by a gang of circus folk who proceeded to burn the children before her 
eyes. The Justiciary Reports note that again at trial Browne had testified that: 
 
some one had taken advantage of her; that she struggled with him; that it was not something earthly; 
that it appeared to belong to the show folks; that it was not the Devil; that she afterwards found she had 
a burn on one of her arms; that she did not know where the burn came from; that she did not drink all 
the rum and whisky she bought; that she was drinking for some days before; that she got past the 
unearthly person and left the house; that she could not say what made her say the children were burned. 
 
This was clearly a case in which the reality of Browne’s delusions was central to the 
degree of responsibility to be imputed, though the presentation of medical evidence 
caused the presiding judge (Lord McLaren) to remind his jury that under Scottish law 
expertise must be founded on a concrete acquaintance with the facts of the case itself, 
a maxim that forbade witnesses from trying to infer a prisoner’s state of mind at any 
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time falling outside of their direct examination. Thus, the medical witnesses were not 
permitted to extrapolate Browne’s likely state of mind during the New Year from the 
details of her trial, though they were given license to explain how the medical theory 
of insanity could account for such conduct in the abstract, with one witness 
speculating that: 
 
[An] access of homicidal mania might be sudden, and might take effect in the way of causing those 
who were attacked to injure those who were near and dear to them. The absence of a son, at a time 
when there ought to have been a reunion, might have acted on the prisoner’s brain. In cases of 
homicidal mania the maniacs may have delusions, imagining they see things which do not exist, and 
the sights that are seen may be imprinted on the memory. That kind of insanity may disappear as soon 
as it appeared.405 
 
In his summation Lord McLaren acknowledged that Browne’s case was a particularly 
difficult one for the jury to settle: The “nature of the act and the circumstances in 
which it was committed” suggested no transparently malicious motive: “there was no 
evidence of ill-will” and “as there was no motive disclosed, the deed must be 
presumed to have been committed under a momentary fit of insanity.” On the other 
hand, there did not seem to be any substantial evidence in support of the special 
defence of somnambulism and, until the fatal burning, no one had suspected Brown of 
being insane. Her case therefore seemed to balance a lack of discernible motive 
against a lack of insanity. In an attempt to negotiate this deadlock the judge suggested 
that, though the crime might appear as a simple murder, the presence of intoxication 
might be relevant to the distinction between murder and culpable homicide in such an 
exceptional act, since it had the power to take away intent. Thus, if the jury could not 
satisfy itself of insanity, it could conclude that under some “momentary hallucination 
induced by drunkenness” it was possible to commit such deed without forming the 
malicious intent necessary for murder (the jury followed this guidance and found 
Browne guilty of culpable homicide).406 
 
 As with the case of Paterson, a medical witness who had been present at the 
trial felt compelled to question the way in which the law had inferred insanity from 
lack of motive when he presented the case to the MPA. This was Andrew Turnbull, 
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Medical Superintendent at the Fife and Kinross District Asylum, who had personally 
examined the prisoner prior to her trial, though had been prevented from speculating 
on the likely cause of her crime in court. Freed from these restrictions he noted that it 
was almost certain the “prisoner fell asleep when with the children, and either during 
this drunken sleep, or more probably at the time of awaking from it, the hallucinations 
were developed.” This would have been consistent with medical knowledge of 
delusion in states of acute intoxication, particularly if the sleep had been “short and 
unrefreshing, and was perhaps suddenly interrupted, [leaving] her in a state in which 
her brain was temporarily more susceptible than before to the action of alcohol.” The 
medical witnesses present in court were privately of the opinion that her mental state 
fell between somnambulism and insanity, without strictly being a case of either and 
that, as a result of drunkenness, the prisoner was “not fully or properly aware of what 
she was doing.” This then was the main point of divergence between psychiatry – 
which insisted that it was illogical to regard drunkenness as sanity – and the law – 
which maintained that the two states must be kept apart at all costs. Furthermore, as 
with the case of Paterson, the medical witnesses were suspicious of the monomania 
pushed by the bench, and once again we see a gap opening up between the psychiatric 
and the legal understanding of insanity, which, even while acknowledging partial 
responsibility and entertaining medical evidence, was still largely based on the 
principle of exceptionality. As Turnbull put it, while “paroxysmal attacks of insanity 
[lasting] for a short duration” were not unknown to psychiatry, the suggestion that 
such an attack may have been present in this case seemed rather convenient, 
particularly when, as in Browne’s case “the attack coincides with a time when the 
patient is away from any observation by others, covers the committal of a very serious 
crime, and passes off before the patient comes again under observation – all, too, 
within the space of one hour.” Thus, he continued, “one cannot but feel very 
suspicious of the alleged insanity”, for the judge accepted that she had not been 
“insane at any time other than just during the hour when the criminal act was 
committed”, and the plea of insanity, though ultimately unsubstantiated, was allowed 
by the judge only on the basis of “the extraordinary nature of the crime, not from any 
direct evidence of insanity.”407  
                                                 




A similar tension can be observed in the next murder trial at which diminished 
responsibility was alleged (ultimately unsuccessfully), the trial of McDonald (1890), 
concerning an habitual inebriate accused of beating his wife and their lodger to death 
with an iron bar. McDonald’s Advocate entered a more ambitious plea that the 
drunken assault had been brought on by “a sudden access of insanity, not 
distinguishable by pathology or law, except in point of degree, from delirium 
tremens” and that his client was therefore not guilty by reason of “temporary insanity 
caused by drink.”  In support of this claim he cited “the most recent textbooks” in the 
field of psychiatry, which showed that the brain consisted of “a series of ganglia or 
fibres, any one of which might be hurt or deteriorated by a variety of causes to the 
effect of deranging reason.” Alcohol abuse and heredity predisposition were, he 
continued, known to be the most prominent causes of degeneration precipitating 
insane acts, both of which were operational in McDonald’s case, where a “congenital 
disease” bordering on insanity had been “developed by the surrounding habits of the 
subject . . . alcoholism for fifty years had injured the brain, making the prisoner the 
victim of frenzies, which the medical evidence and the medical authorities” regarded 
as insanity. Quite apart from this medical evidence, the Advocate believed that, 
legally speaking, “the presence of such elements [as extreme intoxication] had, in 
recent years, always been held to lower the character of the offence [as was shown at] 
Brown, Gove, Browne, and Dingwall.”408  
 
This was, according to the Lord Justice-Clerk, the most wildly and mistakenly 
ambitious defence ever attempted in a Scottish court. The mere suggestion that 
medical and psychiatric textbooks could have any evidential status in a court of law, 
let alone serve as the foundation for a defence to murder, was, he argued, sufficiently 
incompetent to discredit the proposed defence.  However, he did believe there to be a 
“show of plausibility” in the claim that the “prisoner was of unsound mind when the 
acts charged against him were done”, though such a defence could not be sustained in 
reference to abstract discussions in medical works, but must “be supported by proof 
that the prisoner was actually of unsound mind at the time.” Similarly the judge 
acknowledged that the notion of temporary insanity was an appealing one in a case 
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like this, where “a motiveless crime” showed itself in a “sudden paroxysm that 
produces results not accounted for except by a sudden access of insanity”. Hence, the 
judge argued, while “it is not the duty of the prosecutor to prove motive”, a manifest 
absence of motive was strongly suggestive of insanity. In a case like McDonald’s, 
where death had been caused by a person “smashing about in a fit of rage” and there 
“was really no motive”, a presumption of insanity could be held irrespective of the 
relative lack of evidence suggesting that this was the case.409 While this presumption 
of monomania was permitted, the suggestion that alcohol had acted on the brain to 
produce a fleeting state of insanity was rejected as being too close to a description of 
normal drunkenness, for while the law held that alcoholism could cause insanity, the 
judge was cautious to maintain the distinction between this claim and the psychiatric 
notion that drunkenness was a type of insanity.  Thus, he continued, if drunkenness 
had produced “a disease of the brain, and if its effect is real insanity, then, to use the 
simple but expressive language of our law, he does not know the ‘quality of what he 
is doing’ . . . This is, however, quite a different thing from saying that all drunkenness 




In examining the details of these High Court trials four principal legal obstacles were 
shown to have plagued psychiatrists in Scotland throughout the nineteenth century. 
Firstly, we have seen that the very notion there might be a form of theoretical 
expertise connected with the mind was largely rejected by judges. Psychiatric 
witnesses were not permitted to draw inferences beyond their direct experience, 
though the law of Scotland did allow the jury to draw inferences based on psychiatric 
evidence. In the cases considered here this point was stated clearly and repeatedly 
from Dingwall (1867) to McDonald (1890). Secondly, we have seen that 
                                                 
409 This point was confirmed at Kane (1892), a further case of drunken murder. While no medical 
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“aimless violence” leading to death (a crime not amounting to “absolute murder”) and malicious, 
premeditated acts. Kane, 3 White, 1892, pp.386-90 
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inadmissibility of heredity evidence gave psychiatrists all the more reason to publicise 
its effects outside of the courtroom. We saw in the previous chapter how the 
psychiatrists Clouston, Laycock, and Skae became disenchanted with the legal 
process and turned their attention to promoting psychiatric knowledge through the 
popular press, seeking to mould public opinion away from the official channels while 
simultaneously creating an image of danger and threat that eluded the grasp of a 
liberal legal system. The opposition between ‘psychiatry’ and ‘the law’ is not quite 
accurate here, for the wider legal profession (that is, lawyers and legal writers outside 
the High Courts) were, in the final quarter of the century, increasingly vocal in their 
support for such evidence. An article in the Journal of Jurisprudence noted in 1875 
that the “occult and difficult enquiry” into insanity pursued by the law ought to 
welcome “anything tending to shed light upon” the prisoner’s state of mind. Thus, the 
article continued: 
 
looking to the undoubted fact that mental disease is often hereditary, one of the most extraordinary 
things in our law of evidence is that evidence as to the insanity of near relatives should be excluded . . . 
Can it be doubted that if a prisoner was allowed to prove that his father and mother both died in a mad-
house the grave doubts as to sanity would be changed in the jury’s mind to a certainty of insanity?”411 
 
In 1887 the same journal complained that while “medical psychologists regard the 
heredity transmission of insanity as an established scientific fact”, the law of Scotland 
“excludes all evidence tending to prove its existence in any particular case.”412 By 
1902 Scotland’s other main legal publication, the Juridical Review, was of the opinion 
that heredity was so central to medico-psychiatric thought that “before long in all 
probability such evidence will be universally admitted as strictly relevant. Even at 
present it would be hard to find anyone who doubts either its relevancy or 
materiality.”413 
 
 Thirdly, the question of alcohol’s role in causing temporary insanity was 
raised at almost every one of the major trials in which diminished responsibility was 
permitted as a possible verdict. The cases discussed above suggest that Scottish 
                                                 
411 W. C. S. ‘The Plea of Insanity in Murder Trials’, Journal of Jurisprudence, 19:227, 1875, pp.561-73 
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412 ‘Evidence of Heredity in Insanity’, The Journal of Jurisprudence, 31, 1887, pp.586-592 (586-89) 
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judges were prepared to allow for drunkenness to constitute mental aberration capable 
of reducing guilt from murder to culpable homicide on the grounds that intoxication 
could negative malicious intent. As one Edinburgh law student wrote in 1921, 
Scottish law seemed to uphold that “the absence of ‘mens rea’ demonstrated, in 
certain cases of insanity and drunkenness.”414 However, the application of the law in 
Scotland was both ambiguous and inconsistent on this point, and even eminent 
medico-legal writers seemed to be at a loss to capture the position of Scottish judges 
in regard to drunkenness with any precision. Writing in the early years of the 
twentieth century John Glaister (Professor of Forensic Medicine and Public Health at 
the University of Glasgow) was of the opinion that a doctrine had developed during 
the second half of the nineteenth century holding that drunkenness may bring a 
person’s acts “under certain circumstances within the category of insanity and 
irresponsibility”, though this was “not intended to illustrate the fact that alcoholism is 
one of the more indirect causes of the insane condition, but to signify that insanity – 
perhaps of a temporary kind – may be induced by the direct effects of alcohol.” 
However, according to Glaister’s interpretation, this mitigation of guilt relied on 
supplementary psychiatric evidence that alcohol had not just caused a lack of control, 
but had acted “abnormally on an individual whose brain and nervous system are 
easily rendered unstable, or upon persons who have been victims of profound brain 
and nerve disturbance.”415 This seemed illogical to psychiatrists who were convinced 
that the tendency to drink displayed in the violent criminals brought to court was itself 
the product of a hereditary degeneration. 
 
 Fourthly, the growing strength of the degenerationist paradigm caused 
psychiatrists to reject the legal grounds upon which insanity verdicts were based. 
Degeneration had been used to dissolve and proliferate of the formerly serious 
monomanias since at least the 1860s, with kleptomania and dipsomania standing as 
the two great trivial manias of the age of degeneration. For instance, a medical student 
working under the guidance of Thomas Laycock had produced a thesis in 1866 
arguing that kleptomania and dipsomania offered evidence of trivial moral insanities 
that corrupted the “affective faculties alone without, necessarily, any aberration 
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whatever of the intellectual faculties” (a position that could be traced back to 
Prichard).416 Here kleptomania was described as a condition well known in the animal 
kingdom “seen in animals such as rats who are fond of stealing shillings.”417  An 
example of this kleptomania was forwarded to the author by David Skae, who had 
provided him with “the notes of another case of a lad of 15, H.P., who when young 
stole things of no value to him, as his sister’s gloves and the like, which he never sold, 
but hid under his bed.” While the absence of financial gain conformed to the older 
legal understanding of crime without motive, it was the potential danger of the 
seemingly trivial condition that interested the author, who argued that its medico-legal 
significance lay in the fact that, in his later years, the same boy had “tried to set up a 
ridiculous plot against the life of an uncle of his for which he was sent to 
Morningside. He was to a certain extent clever but could never see any difference 
between a selfish and weak and a high minded man.”418 This thesis therefore provides 
an interesting example of the paradoxical turn to degeneration in which psychiatry 
insisted on the normality of the monomaniac (who could simply be a young thief) 
while at the same time arguing that inside every young thief lay a potentially serious 
criminal.  
 
Thus, as the species of mania psychiatry described became ever more widely 
accepted, the inference of insanity as simple lack of motive – an inference placing the 
emphasis on the act’s legal rather than its medical character – was increasingly 
rejected by psychiatrists. In this way we see a somewhat puzzling trend from the 
1860s onwards, in which doctors came to renounce categories of mental defect that 
were just beginning to gain a hold on that entirely mythical construct to which they 
tirelessly referred: ‘the public mind’. Indeed even The Times accepted the special 
mania of theft amongst the social elite by the 1870s, writing that: “Everyone who is 
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acquainted with London society could at once furnish a dozen names of ladies who 
have been notorious for abstracting articles of trifling value from the shops were they 
habitually dealt.”419 There was here a considerable overlap between the ‘popular’ 
discourse on trivial mania reported in newspapers and the ‘scientific’ presentation 
offered in works like Clevenger’s Forensic Psychiatry, where it was recorded that the  
widespread acceptance of an “irresistible impulse [such as] kleptomania in persons 
who are recognised as sane is a matter of considerable medico-legal importance”, but 
that if this species of insanity were “to occur in a poor or friendless person its 
discovery would most likely be punished as theft, pure and simple; but as the 
obsessed generally belong, as the Italian and French writers observe, to the educated 
and cultivated classes, it may be that kleptomania in the sane is confined to the so-
called upper classes.”  
 
Clevenger’s account continued to discuss a case submitted by the Marquise de 
Fontenoy concerning a social notoriety that had occurred in 1895, when speculation 
was rife in London as to “the identity of the English duchess who, according to the 
annual police reports of the French government just published, has been arrested 
during the last twelve months in one of the great Parisian emporiums for shoplifting.” 
This woman was suffering from “a form of insanity far commoner among the high-
born and delicately natured classes than people realize, and as much as Paris is the 
headquarters of everything in the shape of feminine elegance and goods calculated to 
tempt the purse and wishes of the fair one, it is only natural that those afflicted with 
this moral ailment of kleptomania should find it most impossible to suppress on the 
banks of the Seine.”420 Indeed the duchess was not the only lady of rank recently 
arrested in Paris for purloining small articles: professor Lacassagne of Lyon (a 
member of the Medico-Legal Society and editor of the Journal of Criminal 
Anthropology) had also written on this condition, noting that “the great stores, with 
their rich display of goods so temptingly arranged, [with] heaped-up counters 
whetting the feminine appetite for greed . . . are in a measure responsible for the acts 
of these women.” While Lacassagne believed that these commercial “aperitifs of 
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crime” would test even the strongest feminine will, he was certain that their allure 
could exert a force sufficient to “overmaster the feebler and degenerate minds.”421 
 
We can see here a certain tension between the social acceptance of these new 
species of disease, which appear to have been reported in widely sympathetic terms 
by the press and accepted in court by judges, and the psychiatric account of them, 
which relied on this popular appeal while seeking to distance itself from the overt 
equation of symptom with disease. Thus, for instance, when Thomas Clouston 
discussed this kleptomania in a short article appearing in The Scotsman in 1896, he 
disabused this popularly held notion, writing: “In the public mind, kleptomania is a 
mental disease, the victims of which are, as a rule, rich”, an assumption founded upon 
a mistaken premise that overlooked the “causating organic disturbance” distributed 
evenly across the social spectrum.422 Interestingly, the psychiatric presentation of 
these new manias also gained wide acceptance from legal reporters, who were happy 
to discover an independent body of evidence underwriting the legal annulment of 
responsibility that followed from motiveless crime. Thus, the Journal of 
Jurisprudence adopted the same position as Clouston, Clevenger, Lacassagne et al  
when, in an 1889 editorial discussing a case of intermittent kleptomania, the editor 
wrote that he and his colleagues in Edinburgh’s legal community were: 
 
strongly of [the] opinion that amongst the class of habit and repute thieves this form of insanity is very 
rife indeed; and the fact that the defence of kleptomania is almost never advanced in such a case, can 
be due only to the extreme difficulty of substantiating the plea on behalf of a person so miserably 
circumstanced, and in whom a strong motive for theft can so readily be imagined. . . . Only where the 
worldly position of the accused is of a kind to remove all supposition of the motive for theft, is the 
presence of kleptomania ever [accepted].”  
 
This, the article continued, was an inconsistent practice, since “the other forms of 
monomanie sans délire, such as homicidal mania, pyromania, and erotomania, are 
recognised without discrimination of class in the sufferer.”423 However, as we will see 
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in the following chapter, the psychiatric access to insanity continued to rely on these 
same methods ,with degenerationists forced to concede there were significant 
parallels between their methods of diagnosis and the past age of monomania. 
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At a Meeting of the 1890 Social Science Congress held in Edinburgh the Lord 
Advocate Baron Robertson introduced the weekend’s discussion by raising the issue 
of legal codification, a subject that had occupied medico-legal writers ever since Sir 
James Fitzjames Stephen’s attempt to codify the British laws in the 1870s. Here the 
Lord Advocate noted that:  
 
The criminal jurisprudence of Scotland is, like the common law of the sister country, founded on 
custom and the decision of judges. No authoritative statement of its principles has ever been 
promulgated in writing. Its definitions are to be found in the commentaries of judges and advocates, its 
sanction is supposed to be the conscience of the community; its classification of offences is purely 
arbitrary. 
 
“Arbitrary punishment,” he continued, “in fact as well as in name, dominates the 
whole category of criminal law in Scotland”, with the disposal of criminals, the 
admission of expert evidence, and the measure of responsibility all based on the 
caprice of judges. Against this arbitrary law, Baron Robertson noted, legal theorists 
had “proposed the great and universal panacea, a code; rather, indeed, we should not 
say it is proposed, but its advantages are pointed out, and its actual existence, as 
sketched out by Sir James Stephen, predicted for no distant day.” Reporting on the 
Lord Advocate’s speech, the Edinburgh Journal of Jurisprudence added the voice of 
Scotland’s wider legal profession to these remarks, declaring that “a code is the 
ultimate form of every good system of laws” with the power to sweep away “all 
confusion and complexity [of] the past.” 424 
 
 Ever since Stephen had revitalised Bentham’s dream of a codification, 
Scotland’s legal journal had published evidence of the divide between those who 
wished to see a united British Penal Code and those who remained committed to a 
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distinctly Scottish legal tradition.425 While the legal divide between modernity and 
tradition ran along a more general political fault line, it was the place that psychiatric 
evidence would play in the national laws that brought this divide into particularly 
sharp focus. In the 1880s Scotland’s legal journals were habitually claiming that while 
psychiatry had “made vast forward strides” since the middle of the nineteenth century, 
the law continued to employ eighteenth-century categories of mind that were 
meaningless to expert witnesses.426 That this was felt to be a problem in particular for 
the British legal tradition was highlighted by Stanley Atkinson, an English barrister of 
the Inner Temple, who argued in the early twentieth century that “the highly complex 
psychological variations” of certain impulsive criminals had “not been fully 
appreciated during the evolution of our Common Law.”427 
 
 It was precisely these deficiencies of the Common Law tradition that legal 
modernisers claimed a united British criminal code would correct, establishing a new 
and explicit social contract based on stated facts rather than an implicit series of 
guidelines (Stephen’s own favourite parallel here was the railways, likening the 
Common Law Judge to a passenger who must discover his route by “examining and 
comparing all the orders given by directors of railways from their origin, and 
interpreting them in accordance with a set of unwritten customs, putting special 
meanings on the various terms employed.”)428 Writing in support of the Code in 1876, 
the Edinburgh Journal of Jurisprudence noted that those Continental systems of 
jurisprudence that framed their definitions of insanity in medical terms had moved far 
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in advance of the British practice of allowing a judge to determine whether medical 
evidence was consistent with the legal definition of insanity. The newly formed 
Germany was seen as the leading nation in this process, and the definition of insanity 
had been modified in dialogue with both lawyers and physicians to remove terms such 
as Wahnsinn [lunacy] and Blödsinn [imbecility] that no longer accorded with 
psychiatric understandings of mental disorder. This, the journal continued, provided 
the new German Criminal Code with the admirably modern clause reading: “An act is 
not criminal when the actor at the time of its commission was in a state of 
unconsciousness, or morbid disturbance of the mental functions, through which the 
free determination of his will was excluded.”429 By the end of the century the journal 
was still pushing this matter, writing in 1899 that if the psychiatric understanding of 
insanity was ever to gain ground in Scotland “it must be through legislative 
enactment, as in Germany and France.”430 
 
 As usual, there is something a little too convenient, perhaps even suspicious in 
this British characterisation of the Continental utopia, and when we examine the 
medico-legal situation abroad, we see quite a different picture emerge. As the Harvard 
Law Professor Roscoe Pound noted in 1911, there had, since the late nineteenth 
century, been a vocal reaction on the Continent “against administration of justice 
solely by abstract formula”, with the Germans agitating toward a deconstruction of 
the rigid formula of the Classical School and the establishment of a freie 
Rechtsfindung [free adjudication] resembling the British model, while the French 
were seeking to move away from rigid definitions to adopt a “freer method of 
interpreting the codes.”431 Thus, while in Great Britain it seemed that the French, 
German, Austrian, and North American penal codes signified a rational and 
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enlightened break with the traditionalism of the past, theorists working within these 
nations saw the code as a Procrustean monolith that restricted progress.  
 
In France the case against the code was most famously made by Raymond 
Saleilles, Professor of Comparative Law in the University of Paris, whose monograph 
on the subject, Individualization of Punishment (1898), argued that in fixing 
punishment as a proportional response to certain categories of crime rather than 
certain types of offender, the French Penal Code had retained the ancient assumption 
of Free Will as the foundation of responsibility, a fact that rendered it scarcely 
different from the presuppositions that had prevailed prior to the Assembly. While the 
Code had been modified in 1810 in an attempt to confer on magistrates “some 
discretion in setting punishments”, these modifications had failed to remove the 
inherent flaw of the codified laws, since the greater degree of judicial liberty still did 
“not imply that the subjective circumstances in terms of responsibility were deemed 
adequate to modify the punishment for any given crime.” For Saleilles, these 
subjective circumstances corresponded to the need for ‘Special Types of 
Individualization’ in the administration of law, a flexibility of punishment that would 
be capable of addressing the varieties of crime produced by “the neurotic, the 
degenerate, and other such classes as are affected with partial responsibility.”432  
 
Similar complaints could be found in a number of French commentators, who, 
contrary to British assumptions, had become convinced that the codified law did not 
represent a scientific understanding of the criminal, but rather ignored the criminal 
altogether by fixing its attention only on crime. For instance, Bellanger’s Les théories 
nouvelles de la criminalité contained within it the complaint that: 
 
The School which has presided at the execution of our codes, the Classical School, [was concerned] 
above all, to fix punishments, [neglecting] almost completely the criminal himself . . . Moreover, 
according to this School, every man is free, equally free, absolutely free. Placed by destiny, as Hercules 
of old, at the crossways of vice and virtue, it depends on himself alone whether to advance to the right 
or to swerve to the left.433 
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In Britain this point had been advanced in Havelock Ellis’s 1890 work The Criminal 
(the only monograph by an Anglophone writer dedicated to Criminal Anthropology 
available at the time), a work the Journal of Jurisprudence suggested “every lawyer 
ought to read”, particularly as it showed the legal community the desirability of 
supporting the “abolition of the definite and predetermined sentence” and promoting 
the extension of indefinite sentences that could be measured according to the 
criminal’s nature.434  
 
7.2 Vengeance amongst Rabid Dogs: Anti-Codification and Vituperation in 
Scottish Legal History 
 
It is clear then that the Continental model of law shaped by the Classical School did 
not differ significantly from the metaphysical understanding of crime penal reformers 
in Britain saw in their own national tradition. Thus, while psychiatrically informed 
critics working in these differing contexts may have charged their national system of 
laws with perpetuating social ills, it was, at heart, the legal assumption of an unlimited 
power of freedom, an assumption overlooking both the nature of the criminal and the 
post-degenerationist theories of conduct that united their campaigns. In fact, both 
sides of this tension were well represented within the Scottish legal tradition which 
had, for reasons peculiar to its own institutional history, divided neatly along these 
lines. 
 
The Scottish legal establishment generally favoured an un-codified law, based 
on the philosophical principles elaborated in the great legal commentaries, though 
ultimately left to the discretion of judges and jurors. The Common Law system of 
Scotland that emerged after the 1707 Act of Union was solidified during the 
nineteenth century by what Lindsay Farmer describes as a “stubborn resistance to the 
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idea of codifying the substantive law” on the part of Scottish judges.435 On the face of 
it the resistance to codification seems a strange anachronism: the national code of 
laws was one of the distinctive products of the Age of Enlightenment, standing, as 
Farmer puts it, “in both a historical and theoretical sense at the juncture of law and 
modernity.”436 Furthermore, although Scotland’s High Court remained formally 
distinct from English authority, and was empowered to create categories of offence 
during the process of trial, criminalising citizens without prior warning, this power 
was put into practice only once following the Act of Union (in the case of Greenhuff, 
1838).437 This suggests that resistance to a standardised British code was not 
motivated by a desire to maintain a divergent legal practice. Indeed in 1844 the 
highest legal authority in Scotland, the Lord Justice Clerk-Hope, stated explicitly that 
the laws of Scotland concerning criminal responsibility were substantially those of 
England.438  
 
The resistance to codification within the Scottish High Court was not therefore 
driven by a desire to keep legal practice autonomous, but by the peculiar nature of 
Scotland’s legal profession, which, from the union of the crowns up to the around the 
1830s (a period of parliamentary reform), concentrated political power within the 
hands of a “small oligarchic elite of lawyers” who were entrusted with political 
authority by Westminster for well over a century.439 Following a similar chronology, 
the legal historian John Cairns places the origins of “modern Scots law” in the early 
decades of the nineteenth century, a time when “reforms in legal procedure and court 
structure” induced “a general fear for the survival of Scots law in the great reforming 
movements of the nineteenth century” (which of course would break their power to 
dictate matters of state.)440 Beyond foreign intrusions into a protected trade, it was 
more generally the possible emergence of a reforming Whig government that seemed 
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troubling to large sections of educated Scottish society (it must be remembered that 
Scotland in the early nineteenth century was a nation in which a fraction of the 
populace possessed the vote and in which political and economic power was 
concentrated within tiny spheres of influence). In resisting the personal devastation 
any move to unify the two nations’ laws might cause, this narrow managerial cartel 
propped up their power by appealing to the political conservatism that had marked the 
Scottish Enlightenment, mobilising a widespread distaste for the French Revolution to 
encourage the notion that codified laws were a means of smuggling Continental 
insurrection into the country. Thus, the institutional writings of Scottish legal 
commentators such as Baron Hume uniformly denounced the modernising project of 
Bentham and his followers, and expressed caution over “the fallacious conjectures of 
human wisdom before the event” enshrined in codified law, appealing instead to the 
‘good sense’ of the citizens who formed the jury.441  
 
 It was this notion of ‘good sense’ or conventional wisdom that, by the second 
half of the nineteenth century, had come to define the ideological opposition between 
the dominant legal theorists of England and Scotland. While English theorists tended 
to follow James Fitzjames Stephen in arguing that the creation of a national code 
would produce a synthesis of formal and tacit morality, explicating in clear terms the 
values of the people, Scottish authorities approached the same question in reverse, 
arguing that successful legislature was not produced by maximising public assent, but 
by minimising public dissent. Thus, in Scotland, the intellectual interests of judges 
and ‘conservative’ legal theorists was always inclined toward an account of the law 
that found its sources, justification, and legitimacy in historical developments 
supposedly rooted in the character of the people. Shaped by the work of Edmund 
Burke and, in particular, Edward Gibbon’s History of the Decline and Fall of the 
Roman Empire, the ‘mythical’ understanding of national tradition popular amongst 
the Scottish legal establishment was furthered in the 1820s when the Edinburgh 
Advocates’ Library began to acquire works from the German Historical School of law 
under the influence of head librarian David Irving, formalising the historical approach 
through scholarship and establishing regular contact between Continental and Scottish 
legal theorists. The increasing popularity of the German Historical School amongst 
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Scottish legal theorists during the 1820s and 30s was no coincidence, for this was a 
time when English incursions into Scottish legal practice were increasing, and, 
following debates on the possibility of legal codification in Westminster and at the 
Temple Bar, many Scots jurists feared that English codification would entail British 
codification. Thus, beyond the genuine intellectual interest Scottish legal theorists 
took in Continental debates, they had good practical reasons to ally themselves with 
the German Historical School, with works such as Carl von Savigny’s The History of 
the Roman Law in the Middle Ages offering theoretical resources to defend against 
codification through the creation of a sometimes strained affiliation between Scottish 
and Roman law in a move that allowed Scots jurists to distance themselves from 
English traditions.442 
 
While the Historical School represented the dominant movement within 
Scottish legal thinking, there also ran a concurrent Benthamist streak that can be 
traced back most notably to the founding of the famous Whig journal, the Edinburgh 
Review, in 1802. Three of the journal’s four founders were lawyers with an interest in 
Bentham’s penal theories and one, Henry Brougham, later Baron Brougham and Lord 
Chancellor of Britain, was a prolific and visible disseminator of Benthamite 
philosophy.443 In its early years the journal published Bentham’s writings on civil and 
penal legislation along with a host of essays and commentaries dealing with the 
theories of the ‘Classical School’. Brougham, whose story intertwined further with the 
fortunes of psychiatry in 1843 when he introduced the Parliamentary question that 
ultimately led to the M’Naughten Commission, was therefore a notable dissenter who 
challenged the assumptions and theories of the Historical School, doubting in 
particular that Scottish law did in fact have a recognisably Roman heritage.444 
 
This brief overview of Scottish legal history explains the intellectual 
phenomenon that was perhaps most visible in the nation’s legal press during the 
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second half of the nineteenth century, namely the battle that was fought between the 
two major schools of British jurisprudence: the Historical School and the Analytical 
School. While both schools of jurisprudence operated under the assumption that 
modern law was central to national progress and the maintenance of social order their 
members differed as to the best means of securing this. The Analytical School, though 
ultimately derived from the philosophy of Jeremy Bentham, owed its existence to the 
writings of John Austin (1790 – 1859), who developed the theoretical analysis of what 
he termed ‘universal’ legal concepts.  In his well-known review of Austin’s Lectures 
on Jurisprudence (1863), John Stuart Mill defined positive law as the study of “legal 
institutions which exist, or have existed, among mankind, considered as actual facts.” 
This project therefore sought to minimise national differences by emphasising that 
each particular system of laws contained “similar substantive provisions (designed as 
these are for the same world, and for the same human nature)” along with a “common 
groundwork of general conceptions or notions, which can be traced through every 
body of law, and are the same in all.”445 This commonality was not of course manifest 
– Austin and his followers did not claim that the English, Scottish, or Persian laws 
were prima facie similar – but that theorists could reduce the manifest differences to a 
common set of concrete features through a process of abstraction and analysis. In this 
way the Analytical School argued that legal terms (responsibility, duty, property etc) 
were ‘fictitious entities’ whose meaning was ultimately derivative of the natural 
entities or states of affairs they signified (bodies, desires, or concrete facts issuing 
from the actual commands of a ‘sovereign’).446  
 
In contrast, the Historical School saw legal notions as descriptive entities 
rooted in community or tradition, denying the presupposition pursued by Austin that 
values were essentially fictitious signifiers of facts. Values, they contended, were 
facts precisely because law and morality developed out of common social and 
historical experiences that could not be reduced to two distinct notions (‘facts’ and 
‘values’). On this account ways of thinking about right and wrong (mores) and their 
expression (laws) were not abstractions from concrete entities, but concrete entities in 
themselves, rooted in the historical development of a particular community and 
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constitutive of an essentially divided ethico-political order. Thus, in contrast to 
Austin’s minimisation of social difference a fiction, the Historical School liked to 
emphasise the distinctive nature of each culture’s particular system of laws and 
customs, ultimately allying themselves with quasi-progressive social movements that 
reified the notion of national difference into a concrete quality. Around the 1880s the 
Scottish Historical School began to sell itself on the principle of ‘Political Ethnology’, 
a term borrowed from Herbert Spencer and designating an approach to the study of 
society that appealed to the natural character of a people as a cause of national 
difference. This model of explanation was explicitly tied to the Non-Interventionist 
movement in international relations, arguing, as the Edinburgh Journal of 
Jurisprudence put it in 1883, that the “nations of the world will, if left to the operation 
of natural laws, gradually work out their own political salvation and attain the same 
desired and desirable goal” without the need for military of bureaucratic intervention. 
The bearing of these ideas on Scotland’s own political situation is of course clear, and 
the ethnological peculiarities of each nation’s ideals not only suggested their right to 
self-determination, but conferred a duty upon “the politician, the legislator, and the 
jurist to give effect to these ideals in shaping laws and political institutions.” It was, 
the journal continued, “on these principles that we argue for the full maintenance of 
our Scottish system of jurisprudence and the administration of justice; that we 
maintain the peculiar laws of Scotland ought to be in full accord with Scottish ideas 
and untampered with by English judges.”447 
 
A second significant Germanic influence to shape the intellectual approaches 
of the Historical School in Scotland came via the development of ‘British Idealism’, a 
philosophical movement popularised in the 1870s by the Oxford professors Edward 
Caird, F. H. Bradley and T. H. Green who, along with other notable philosophers like 
Bernard Bosanquet and John. McTaggart developed Hegel’s notion of ‘Absolute 
Ideality’ to produce a social philosophy that “converged around such principles as the 
primacy of community, the moral qualities of the state, and various notions of self-
development.” Accused by its critics of being a “parrot-like imitation of German 
cloud-cuckoo-land”, this school nonetheless rose to become the dominant philosophy 
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within British academia during the 1880s and 1890s. As Sandra Den Otter notes in 
her study of this movement, the “preoccupations with community and spirited 
controversy about the study of society” British Idealists engaged in reflected “the 
distinctive climate of fin de siècle Britain”, in which a “number of issues provided a 
focus for anxiety about the fragility of the social tissue.” In this way, she continues, 
“Hegelianism dovetailed with contemporary Victorian interest in historical change 
and, more precisely, in the ideas and practice of development. Interest in German 
historical scholarship had escalated throughout the 1840s, 1850s, and 1860s when 
Savigny’s critique of natural law traditions was taken up by British theorists.”448  
 
The extent to which these ideas infiltrated British intellectual life was 
remarkable; even a judge like Sir James Stephen, whose “philosophical position was 
substantially that of Bentham, Mill, and the empiricists”, had been a regular presence 
at the members-only Metaphysical Society.449 This debating club, attended by the 
nation’s cultural and political elite, remains largely mysterious (meetings were 
“strictly private” with minute keeping and reports considered “a breach of 
confidence”), though we know that its members would present metaphysical papers 
and attend dinners at which they apparently discussed the relevance of Idealism to a 
variety of political, legal, and scientific concerns. In this forum notable “scientific 
agnostics” such as Huxley, Tyndall, and William Kingdon Clifford met with members 
of the political ruling class including Gladstone and Lord Selborne, accompanied of 
course by eminent British Idealists like James Hutchinson Stirling, Henry Sidgwick, 
and T. H. Green (though it was suspected by Stephen’s brother and biographer that 
only “a small minority” of those assembled “had ever really looked into Kant”, while 
“Hegel was a name standing for an unknown region wrapped in hopeless mist.”)450 
Whether these men had or had not read the works of German Idealism (though 
presumably the professors of philosophy had), the fact that they regularly convened to 
discuss metaphysics explains the general interest British intellectuals took in these 
                                                 
448 Sandra Den Otter, British Idealism and Social Explanation: A Study in Late Victorian Thought, 
Oxford University Monographs, 2004,pp.5-7. The criticism of British Idealism was made by Frederic 
Harrison (cited p.2). For a detailed discussion of the theories of this School see William Sweet (ed.) 
Bernard Bosanquet and the Legacy of British Idealism, University of Toronto Press, 2007. 
449 L. Stephen, The Life of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, Smith & Elder: London, p.124. Though he 
shared Mill’s philosophy, Stephen had published a book-length attack on the Liberty principle (Liberty, 
Equality, Fraternity of 1874). 
450 L. Stephen, James Stephen, pp.358-362. 
 206 
ideas, even if they remained formally opposed to them. This was, for reasons that will 
become apparent, a significant context for the discussions of psychiatry in Scotland’s 
legal press.  
 
While in the 1850s the leading factions at the University of Edinburgh 
(particularly the Evangelical Party) had offered staunch resistance to the “dangerous 
German doctrines” they feared were bewitching Scottish students, it was a battle they 
eventually lost, and away from its intellectual heart in the colleges of Oxford, British 
Idealism thrived in particular in the Scottish universities. It was the confluence of the 
Historical School’s dominance in the Advocates’ Library and the Idealists’ dominance 
in the philosophy faculty that formed the intellectual context for one half of 
Edinburgh’s distinctively divided legal community in the late nineteenth century. 
Against this somewhat reactionary ideological community were the sizable margins of 
the city’s legal profession, where copy clerks, junior lawyers, and legal journalists 
generally more receptive to ideas of the reforming Benthamites were gathered. Thus, 
while both the Analytical School and the Historical School were represented in the 
Scottish Universities, there was often a deep political symbolism attached to one’s 
allegiance to these respective philosophical positions, which tended to divide the 
conservative elite from the disenfranchised wider legal profession. Indeed, when the 
Liberal M.P. and lawyer Richard Haldane recalled his philosophical education in 
Edinburgh during the 1870s, he noted that it offered students more or less a direct 
choice between Mill and Hegel.451  
 
This opposition between Mill and Hegel, which roughly mapped on to the 
opposition between reformers and conservatives in Edinburgh, was captured nicely in 
an article on ‘The Scottish School of Jurisprudence’ that appeared in Scotland’s 
leading legal journal in 1883. Here, the position of Scottish legal theory was tied to a 
model of retributive justice supposedly derived from Kant and Hegel and according to 
which the “authority of law springs from the fact that it enjoins the realization of our 
permanent and essential self.” The journal argued that obeisance to these principles 
defined the Scottish approach to legal theory, going on to note welcomingly Hegel’s 
dictum that “by the conscious commission of crime the higher nature of man consents 
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to punishment” distinguished their metaphysical and historical approach from the 
members of the English School, who had “divagated through the theories of Hobbes, 
Bentham, Mill, and Austin into a marshy ground of empiricism which affords no sure 
foothold.”452 This ‘Scottish School’ did not however represent the sole, or even the 
predominant approach to legal theory in Scotland, and there were just as many 
lawyers who disputed these ideas, even though they liked to present themselves as 
lone voices of sanity set against an irrational mob. Indeed, in 1872, the Edinburgh 
Advocate J. R. Blair had written in the same journal to complain that “the prevailing, 
if not universal, idea of criminal law is, that it is an institution for the purpose of 
punishing crimes”, a belief “not confined to the uneducated” but also prevalent among 
“lawyers and jurists.” One of the most formidable defenders of this theory, he 
continued, was “Hegel, the German philosopher, whose views on the subject have 
been so ably expounded to the legal profession in Scotland by Dr Stirling’s recent 
admirable lectures on the Philosophy of Law.” 
 
For Hegel, Blair continued, “punishment is the true remedy” to crime, and as 
the criminal “acts upon his own will, and against the will of the majority of the 
community”, the right to suppress crime through punishment was conferred upon the 
judge. Against this view, the ‘social defence’ school of which Blair was a member 
argued that the “great object of criminal law (and criminal law is the fundamental part 
of all human law), is the protection of men from their fellow men”, and that the 
“exigencies of human life, however much they may require pain, do not require the 
punishment of criminals.” Hence, the main difference between these two schools was 
that, for the ‘Scottish School’, or those who followed Kant and Hegel in constructing 
a metaphysical defence of punishment as the necessary consequence of guilt, justice 
was taken to be the end of law, while for those who accepted the “utilitarian views of 
law held by so many jurists, politicians, and philosophers, – among others the English 
jurists Bentham and Austin”, punishment was a means subordinated to the end  of 
“protecting men from their fellow men.”453  
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As we can see then, a well defined demarcation between the retributive and 
social defence schools of penal theory spread across the Continent, though it played a 
particular role in the social and political divides of Edinburgh’s legal community. 
Furthermore, there was a considerable overlap between the interests of psychiatrists, 
lawyers, and social reformers who approached the question of punishment as a 
problem in the tactical arrangement of social defence rather than a celebration of 
human dignity. However, it must be noted that the individual interests of these groups 
differed greatly, and in particular lawyers like Blair had no intention of changing the 
practical administration of criminals, but called only for a “different style of language 
when speaking of the nature and function of law.” Thus, while the psychiatric 
theorists were persuading themselves of the need to tear down the entire edifice of 
criminal responsibility and erect new scientific legal codes, appealing often to the 
sympathetic ear they found in the wider legal profession, lawyers were meanwhile 
protesting that they “must not be understood to insinuate that there is anything 
materially wrong with the way in which criminals are dealt with in [Scottish] courts of 
law” and that if they were to attain mastery of the courts “criminal law would, or at 
least ought to, remain unaltered.” After denouncing metaphysics in the name of social 
defence, they even claimed that there was “little actual difference between the ideas of 
Hegel and those of the utilitarians as to the necessity of law, and the practical shape 
which law ought to assume.” It is therefore perhaps best to remain at the level of the 
abstract when considering the confluence of psychiatry and the law in this regard, 
with one point at least satisfying the social defence school of both camps: that “the 
metaphysical subtlety termed free-will [should] be proved to have no existence.”454 
  
7.3 History’s Greatest Illusion: Free Will, Degeneration, and Legal Reform 
 
When in 1902 the Juridical Review attempted to “arrive at an approximation to the 
burden which Scotland bears” from degenerates who had fallen away from “the march 
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of evolution”, it claimed that such evidence was barred from the Scottish court by the 
lasting institution of free will. As ever, the journal looked longingly to that suitably 
vague place “the Continent”, where scientists and philosophers “with more or less 
determinist views” had shown that a great number of crimes were the product of 
“some abnormal development [or] degeneracy.” While these Continentals had shown 
that degeneration produced sub-normal citizens who were “to some extent, if not 
altogether, irresponsible” for their acts, this new approach was having difficulty 
taking “deep root in this country, where, by the great bulk of the people, free-will is 
still considered to be an essential fact.”455 A similar position was taken up by the 
French anarchist Augustin Hamon, who denounced the prevailing legal assumption of 
hypothetical freedom in his late nineteenth-century monograph The Universal Illusion 
of Free Will and Criminal Responsibility, a work considering the legal implications of 
that problematic class of “doubtful criminals [and] men on the frontier of insanity” 
who, though not technically insane, “approach insanity under certain forms of 
degeneration” to produce a condition of “semi-responsibility.”456 
 
Somewhat paradoxically, the increasing tendency of judges in the second half 
of the nineteenth century to accept partial or semi-responsibility without declaring a 
criminal to be legally insane came at a time when polemicists in Europe and North 
America were combining psychiatric, psychological, and criminological evidence to 
produce a sweeping denunciation of the legal system. In France, the idea of partial 
responsibility had been popularised by Joseph Grasset’s discussion of the demifous, 
which he set out in a sprawling work arguing for the existence of partial states of 
insanity in reference to literary, artistic, and psychiatric sources. Grasset’s study, a 
forensic analogue to Nordau’s Degeneration, drew its evidence indiscriminately from 
medical and artistic sources, combining the psychiatric theory of degeneration with 
the descriptions of degenerates found in Ibsen, Balzac, Flaubert, Zola, and 
Dostoevsky.457 In this way, Grasset’s demifous designated what the British 
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psychiatrist Heinrich Oppenheimer labelled “a category of people comprising 
degenerates, those descended from neuropathic stock, the backward, neurotics, such 
as epileptics, hysterical females, those in whom the chronic abuse of alcohol or a drug 
habit has enfeebled the brain”, with the notion of semi-responsibility encompassing 
“those whose mental condition excites suspicion, but whom it is, nevertheless, 
impossible to class among the insane.” Key to Grasset’s argument, Oppenheimer 
continued, was the insistence that the state of semi-responsibility was “not a mere 
expedient invented by legal medicine, [but] a real pathological entity” which, if 
adopted as a forensic term by doctors en masse, would become “a lasting institution, 
even in the countries of the Code pénal.”458  
 
 Naturally one thinks of Lombroso and the Italian School when situating these 
debates in a medico-legal context, though these same ideas were advanced by a 
variety of European and American commentators who claimed that the “terms free-
will and responsibility must be considered in the light of fresh knowledge. We are but 
machines of varying potential endurance and capability, and according to the quality 
of the mechanism so we should be judged.”459 This fresh knowledge was of course the 
psychiatric theory of degeneration, and the discourse on legal reform in reference to 
human degeneracy permeated a range of medical and legal debates during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As John Batty Tuke and Charles Howden 
(Sheriff-Substitute of Inverness) argued in a paper published in the Juridical Review 
in 1904, the “question of mitigated punishment [had become] one of practical 
importance in those cases of defect and degeneration, for the most part of a congenital 
or heredity nature, which lie on the boundary of insanity”, though such concerns were 
rejected by a legal system that placed “metaphysics and free will . . .  at the basis of 
all criminal jurisprudence.”460   
 
                                                                                                                                            
in Morel. As a “diathetic psychopath” rather than a “congenital moral fool”, he continued, 
Raskolnikoff’s crime was of a type that could be productively studied by forensic psychiatrists 
458 Heinrich Oppenheimer, The Criminal Responsibility of Lunatics: A Study in Comparative Law, 
London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1909, pp. 227-28. 
459 A. Wilson, Education, Personality, and Crime: A Practical Treatise Built up on Scientific Details 
Dealing with Difficult Social Problems, London: Greening & Co., 1908, p.236. See also Wilson, 
Unfinished Man: A Scientific Analysis of the Psychopath or Human Degenerate, London: Greening, 
1910, pp.70-100 (‘Responsibility’) & pp.100-113 (‘Sin and Crime’).  
460 Batty Tuke J. & Howden C. R. A. ‘The Relation of the Insanities to Criminal Responsibility and 
Civil Capacity: I.’, Juridical Review, 16, 1904, pp. 1-19 (p.3). 
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The psychiatric campaign against free will was set out in great detail by the 
neurologist and medical journalist Maurice de Fleury (1860 – 1931), whose well-
known study on The Criminal Mind (1899) opened by noting that: “The modern 
scientific ideas concerning the criminal brain are displeasing to the great majority of 
magistrates and jurists, and are most strenuously repudiated by those who have had no 
leisure to study them otherwise than superficially.” These legal personages had, he 
continued, “been brought up in a firmly-fixed belief in Free Will, and accustomed 
from their school time to regard that faith as fundamental and indispensable to the 
proper working of civilized society; nothing can be less surprising than their refusal to 
adopt new theories.” Seeking to replace these abstract theories of intention, guilt, and 
revenge with a more rational test of responsibility based around what he labelled “the 
prophylaxis of evil”, de Fleury offered a succinct presentation of the stakes involved 
in the contest between competing notions of responsibility. On his account 
magistrates were not only led astray by their lack of acquaintance with the new 
psychiatric theories, but were encouraged to refuse such evidence in defence of their 
interests, for it was impossible not to notice that support for the prophylactic model of 
law rooted in the psychiatric theory of degeneration would entail: 
 
A restriction of the role of the jurist and the magistrate respectively, and to diminish the importance of 
their office and rank, by regarding them no longer as judges discerning the intentions of men, and 
appointed to punish those who have voluntarily chosen the path of evil, but simply as defenders of 
public order and civic peace.461 
 
This magisterial protection, critics like de Fleury contended, would crumble in the 
absence of its irrational militia – the herd – whose bloodlust was fed by daily reports 
of monstrous crime sustaining an “unconscious primitive instinct, the savage need to 
imitate the act, to return blow for blow.” This of course shifted the psychiatric target 
from the law to the public mind, for even if legal institutions were shattered, if the 
bench were captured by psychiatrists, or if the Cours d’assises were ever to “exhibit a 
clemency and to send a criminal to the hospital as a patient, if they were to refuse to 
inflict a punishment, a social vengeance, upon him, the people would not understand; 
they would take justice into their own hands.”462 
                                                 
461 Maurice de Fleury, The Criminal Mind, Downey & Co: London, 1901, p.x. 
462 de Fleury, The Criminal Mind, p.11. 
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Thus, according to the social defence school, the institutions of justice spoke 
to two groups: the masses who appealed to revenge as “a sort of religion” sanctifying 
their most brutal and unthinking cravings, and the magistrates who clung to their 
birthright by denouncing “modern scientific ideas upon crime and the criminal [as the 
judicial equivalent of] anarchist, or at the least collectivist, ideas in the domain of 
politics.”463 There was of course an ironic reversal present in de Fleury’s presentation 
of the symbiotic relationship between the judicial belief in Free Will and the 
determinism of unconscious herd instinct. Indeed, it was the psychiatrists’ attempt to 
illuminate the unseen causes acting upon the degenerates drawn from the mob itself 
that inspired the masses to react with instinctive revulsion against: 
 
doctors, talking to us, without being asked, of determinism and fatality, of mind-sickness inherited or 
acquired! Why, this ‘savant,’ who would curb the vehemence of our natural feelings by argument, who 
thinks he can divert our just vengeance by a philosophic discussion, and wants to snatch its prey from 
our legitimate craving to punish, is a nuisance, an intruder, almost an accomplice.464 
 
While the first half of de Fleury’s book covered the major theories of the criminal that 
had been proposed by psychiatrists, the second half concerned itself with “a problem 
much more complicated and more delicate than all the others, the problem of 
responsibility.” Comparing the social defence model of criminal law that was 
generally preferred by psychiatrists with the Hegelian theory of punishment prevalent 
amongst judges, he noted that what was called ‘responsibility’ in the individual really 
came down to the question of “whether we ought to defend ourselves from [the 
criminal] as from a mad dog, or to punish him in the very name of his dignity as 
man.”465 The author’s own answer to this question followed the Benthamite notion of 
punishment to the letter in noting that the judge of the future should abandon all 
pretence of metaphysics and declare: 
 
There is nothing to permit me to judge, and I am not qualified to allot punishment . . . I am here to 
feign to punish, in order to make this example effective, and that future evil-doers when tempted may 
                                                 
463 de Fleury, The Criminal Mind, p.115. 
464 de Fleury, The Criminal Mind, p.xii & xvii. 
465 de Fleury, The Criminal Mind, pp. 83-84. 
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know that they expose themselves to the reprisals of society [so that] the image of a heavy punishment 
may be made to counterbalance the image of a guilty pleasure in his mind.466  
 
However, the unfortunate and intractable problem with turning away from the 
protectionism of judges and vicious instinct of the crowd was that, while their 
methods were “antiquated, irrational, and dishonouring to humanity”, there was at the 
same time no credible alternative measure of responsibility. On the psychiatric side 
the “methods laid down by Lombroso and Baron Garofalo . . . M. Paulhan, or even 
those of M. Tarde” were scarcely preferable in terms of their practical application, 
while on the legal side the dedicated work of philosophers had not “taught [reformers] 
to modify Criminal Procedure and the Penal Code with very appreciable advantage.” 
 
The most promising suggestion as to how the new system of social defence 
would operate had been outlined by “Magnan and his pupils”, who advocated the 
construction of institutions that were “half-hospital and half-prison, for criminals who, 
without being quite insane, are nevertheless suffering from a malady sufficiently 
formal, sufficiently classified, to enable the jury to admit what it is agreed to call 
‘extenuated responsibility.’”467 This reform would, de Fleury noted, “be a great step 
in advance towards a new era, precisely because the progress of neurology enables us 
a little better every day to demonstrate the existence of a malady of mind where 
hitherto only free choice of evil was recognised.” Thus, as a first step toward 
scientific jurisprudence, the social defence school advised that philosophically trained 
judges should be employed only in civil cases (where knowledge of legal principles 
was sufficient), with criminal cases presided over by psycho-social specialists trained 
in sociology, psychology, and criminal anthropology (the disciplinary elements of the 
Psy-function).  
 
                                                 
466 de Fleury, The Criminal Mind, p.118. As Slavoj Zizek notes, the ‘auto-iconic’ theory that “the thing 
is its own best sign” pursued by this philosophical school not only explains why they continued to 
believe that the best way to make punishment appear in the minds of others was through executing it in 
reality, but also why its founder Bentham wanted to have his whole body preserved as a memorial to 
his life; why bother with the mere appearance of the body through statues or portraits when the reality 
itself would serve the same function far better? See Zizek, The Fright of Real Tears, 2001, British Film 
Institute: London (p.29).  
467 de Fleury, The Criminal Mind, pp. 115-17. 
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While this school of thought was undoubtedly recognised by Scottish 
commentators as belonging to the Continent, it was nonetheless reported with great 
interest by the country’s medico-legal commentators. The Professor of Forensic 
Medicine and Public Health at the University of Glasgow, John Glaister senior (1856 
– 1932), considered these same themes in his Medical Jurisprudence (1902), an 
authoritative text-book on forensic medicine that was in common use for around half 
a century (albeit through his son’s extensive revisions to later editions). The third 
edition of Glaister’s Medical Jurisprudence (1915) discussed at length how the ideas 
of Continental psychiatrists had come to influence Scottish approaches to criminal 
capacity, particularly in reference to the “defects of volition” that produced conscious 
acts contrary to the will (a theme that, as we saw in chapter three, had special 
significance for psychiatry in the late nineteenth century). Here Glaister drew on 
Carrier’s monograph Contributions a l’Etude des Obsessions et des Impulses a 
l’Homicide et au Suicide (1899), which had demonstrated that “the true test of the 
existence of such mental states may be summed up in the word degeneracy, and that 
this degenerate condition is characterised by neurotic antecedents in the progenitors, 
and by the physical state and psychical condition of the individual.” 
 
 In such criminals, Glaister noted, the physical stigmata served as “an essential 
and permanent indication of the tendency to degeneration, and lack of equilibrium in 
the degenerate person – in the intellect, the emotions, and in the will – frequently 
bound up with persistent possessory ideas or obsessions.” These obsessions and 
impulses were therefore “two phenomena of the same nature”, since both indicated 
the kind of “inharmonious mental action” that could “only be met with in 
degenerates.” The existence of this species of mental degeneration called upon the 
medical examiner to testify that “the crime is purposeless or motiveless, that it is 
committed upon victims either the best beloved by the culprit, or upon those who are 
absolute strangers to him.” Indeed, Glaister continued, according to “the advanced 
psychological school, composed of such men as Lombroso, Ferri, and Garofalo in 
Italy, and Broca, Bordier, Lacasagne, and Manouvrier in France”, the criminal was a 
being caught between “two orders of influence”, the internal and the external, “from 
which flow two kinds of responsibility – viz. individual responsibility and social 
responsibility, neither of which, they declare, exists in the homicidal degenerate.” 
Though Glaister did not comment on the ideas of the ‘advanced psychological school’ 
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in his Medical Jurisprudence, it is clear from his discussions at the psychological 
sections of the annual BMA Meetings that he never wholly accepted its approach. 
None the less, the idea that degenerates could be compelled toward conscious and 
motiveless crime led him to conclude that the judge-led model of British law was 
inherently defective, and that “when the time comes for our criminal law to be 
codified, the question would require to be raised whether it should not be stated in 
express terms that insanity may destroy the power of self-control” without thereby 
implying delusion or absence of consciousness.468  
 
The British criminal law was of course never codified, though the formalised 
provision for irresistible impulse Glaister had recommended was considered in 1922 
following the trial and subsequent dismissal of Ronald True, an eccentric murderer 
whose case had prompted Lord Darling’s 1924 Bill to the House of Lords suggesting 
that judges ought to “make it quite clear that the Law does recognise irresponsibility 
on the ground of insanity where the act was committed under an impulse which the 
prisoner was, by mental disease, in substance deprived of any power to resist.” 
However, this proposal met with a lack of support by Members of the House who 
almost unanimously refused to recognise “the advisability of the admission of 
‘Uncontrollable or Irresistible Impulses’ as a defence”, which they felt would provide 
criminals with “additional means of escaping punishment [while offering] an 
additional incentive to the commission of crimes.” Dampened by this unexpected 
resistance, the Bill was instantly withdrawn and the M’Naughten Rules continued to 
serve as the sole recognised test of culpability in Great Britain and the 
Commonwealth.469  
 
In pursuit of these same themes, a student of law at the University of 
Edinburgh, Charles Bell Porter, submitted a thesis alleging that the unscientific 
“cornerstone of Criminal Responsibility [was] Free Will”, a masonry upon which 
judges had built a law that was “not at all in keeping with modern Psychological and 
                                                 
468 John Glaister, A Text-book of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, Edinburgh, 1915 (3rd edition) 
pp. 566-67. 
469 Appendix A, ‘Insanity and Crime’, in Charles Bell Porter, The Legal Conception of Criminal 
Responsibility in View of the Modern Theories of Criminology, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1924. 
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Psychiatric thought.”470 While on the Continent and within the United States 
“philosophers, doctors, jurists, and criminalists have given and are giving this most 
controversial question of Penal Responsibility their closest study”, Porter argued that 
English and Scottish writers had failed to grasp the significance of this body of 
literature, which showed that both the metaphysical approach to crime as a noxious 
deployment of free will and “the Classical Solution” based on the psychological 
model of Bentham were becoming “impossible in the light of modern scientific 
knowledge” of the criminal.  Indeed, he continued, the Classical School was little 
different in its approach from the metaphysical school insofar as it began from the 
assumption of rationality as a necessary postulate rather than an empirically 
demonstrated property of the criminal’s psyche.471  
 
For Porter, the question of responsibility was to be viewed from “a social and 
not a metaphysical basis”, with psychiatric theories of the criminal’s conduct essential 
to overcoming the deficiencies of both judge-led and codified systems of law, which 
began from a hypothetical state of desirable conduct. However, while he wished to 
see the law abandon these abstract tests, he was cautious to note that the ‘moral’ 
dimensions of crime could not be entirely overlooked, not least because it was 
inescapably “born in mind by many judges when dispensing Justice” throughout 
Europe and North America, a fact that could “readily be observed from the 
phraseology adopted by them when passing sentence.” More importantly the 
perspective of this critical school of forensic psychiatry was unashamedly 
internationalist in its outlook, refusing to situate itself “in reference to a definite 
system of law, be it English, French, or German.” As such, it approached 
responsibility in general or abstract terms (as an ‘ethical’ quality) rather than as a 
definition provided by a particular legal code or rule.472 Thus, Porter argued, while the 
leading ‘anti-metaphysical’ theories of responsibility were to be found in the 
psychological studies of Continental writers like Féré and (somewhat surprisingly) 
Otto Weininger, the contextual differences between British and Continental systems 
of jurisprudence had been overplayed, since it was clear that the assumption of free 
                                                 
470 Charles Bell Porter, The Legal Conception of Criminal Responsibility in View of the Modern 
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471 Porter, Criminal Responsibility, p.34. 
472 Porter, Criminal Responsibility, p.2 & p.18. 
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will was also written into “Continental systems of law, for even under the German 
Penal code. . . the criterion of Responsibility is based upon Freedom of Will”, 
minimising the difficulties of drawing direct comparisons between the discussions of 
volition by English jurisprudists and “the Will test as indicated by Von Krafft-
Ebing.”473  
 
A similar argument was presented in a 1913 thesis submitted to Henry Duncan 
Littlejohn, arguing that the discussions between the various legal schools concerning 
the law of responsibility had “given rise to all sorts of legal casuistry, psychological 
refinements, and medical sophistries” since 1843, though very little clarification had 
resulted. This, the author suggested, had led to a growing body of medico-legal 
writers who were keen to abandon the question of responsibility altogether and 
replace it with that of ‘punishability’, seeking to legitimise legal power in reference to 
the protection of the “social organism” rather than “the vindictive psalms” or the 
“reformation . . . of the criminal parasites which infest it.” What was needed, he 
continued, was a “new legal order” in which there would be “great changes in two 
directions, the study of insanity and the treatment of the criminal.”474 However, as we 
saw above, this project of social reform produced an uneasy relationship between the 
theory of ‘punishability’ represented by the Classical School of jurisprudence and the 
notion of conduct held by psychiatrists. As Richard Wetzell points out, there is 
something paradoxical in the fact that the criminologists and psychiatrists of the 
1870s and 1880s who took such a keen interest in the law relied on a Benthamist 
penological model that “depended on the assumption that most people were 
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autonomous and rational individuals who calculated the consequences of their actions 
in advance.”475  
 
 The increasingly untenable nature of older models of criminality had of course 
been discussed by Criminal Anthropologists on the Continent. For instance, when 
Lombroso’s writings first appeared in English translation, his daughter used her  
editorial introduction to clarify the relationship between the assumptions of the 
Positive School of Penal Jurisprudence to which her father belonged and the Classical 
School of Penal Jurisprudence established by Bentham and Beccaria, nothing that 
while the latter had “based its doctrines on the assumption that all criminals, except in 
a few extreme cases, are endowed with intelligence and feelings like normal 
individuals, and that they commit misdeeds consciously”, the new approach to the 
treatment of crime pioneered by her father and husband (Ferri) maintained that “the 
anti-social tendencies of the criminal are a result of their physical and psychic 
organisation, which differs essentially from that of normal individuals.”476  
 
 This much is well known, but it is nonetheless surprising to note the extent to 
which this same discourse of degeneration had begun to influence those who seemed 
the most inveterate of Benthamites within the British legal profession, as even 
moneyed liberals like Lord Bramwell became increasingly concerned about the ability 
of their legal philosophy to capture the essence of justice, and as the nineteenth 
century drew to a close there was a sense amongst these legal theorists that the project 
of reform they had been defending throughout the century, a project that relied on a 
somewhat reductive psychological model of the calculating citizen, was running 
aground. As Bramwell’s biographer noted in 1898, in order to contextualise the 
mature period of the baron’s views on the law, it must be understood that there was a 
revival in Britain “about the year 1880 of avowedly Socialistic theories, of which little 
had been heard, except in J. S. Mill’s ‘Autobiography’, after the collapse of the 
Revolutionary movement on the Continent and of Chartism here in 1848 – 49”. While 
in Mill’s time those who had “affiliated themselves to Socialist organizations were, as 
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a rule . . . weak, and physically unsound”, being for the large part “town-bred 
worker[s] who had lost most of [their] second teeth and [were] short-sighted and bald 
at twenty”, when the question of socialism was intensified in the 1880s the ravages of 
industrialism had convinced physically and mentally capable citizens that there might 
be something in it. Thus, a change could be observed in liberals like Bramwell, who 
were increasingly ashamed of the “physical wreckage of the competitive system” with 
its “great industrial machine” stamping out “feeble and degenerate human types, 
physically unfit to compete in the struggle.” In addition to this shame, those who had 
formerly defended Bentham’s vision of society realised that the innate servility of the 
“physically degenerate man [of] low and defective type” could not be accommodated 
within the psychological model of the Classical School, whose economic axioms were 
modelled on the assumption of a rationally calculating and physically capable citizen. 
Thus, for figures like Bramwell, individualism gradually gave way to the “biological 
standpoint” of collectivist political economy that was more suited to the “physically 
degenerate or artificially pauperized men” of the 1880s.477  
 
 These elements were discussed endlessly throughout the 1880s and 1890s, 
with periodicals commenting on the “strain of pessimism noticeable in the writings of 
the last few years. Sometimes it takes the form of despondency as to the future of 
humanity at large or of a particular people. Sometimes it rather seems to indicate 
perplexity over some great moral problem. Now and again it is a regret over some 
system or faith that has disappeared.”478 This pessimism, espoused by men of 
sufficient reputation to be taken seriously, had fed on the fear that there loomed a 
bureaucratic and entirely industrialised Britain with “houses designed by a State 
architect, and built more or less with monstrous uniformity”. Worse even than the 
State Socialists in fanning the flames of pessimism were the psychiatrists, whose “old 
battle against free-will in the individual” was experiencing a moment of “absolute 
success” as even the established Liberal tradition laid down its arms. In this climate, 
the Fortnightly Review continued, it was hardly necessary for “Galton and his 
compeers on the Continent to teach us the doctrine of heredity”, since the dark clouds 
of deterministic certainty had already coalesced into the dogma that “everything 
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which has once been in the race endures as a permanent influence modifying it, and 
that family types are apt to remain scarcely alterable for generations”; a fatalism that 
was felt to be more hopeless than was ever taught by Calvin.  
 
  The fact that this dogma had received the credible assent of scientific writers 
had fortified its effects and the pessimism was “beginning to beset society”, 
particularly in the administration of law, as public attitude towards notions of criminal 
responsibility were rapidly transformed. Where formerly a person was held to be 
“altogether accountable for his acts”, the fashion had come for regarding a person to 
be “almost entirely an irresponsible agent” (thought this tendency was still most 
visible in the French courts, where any “plausible theory to extenuate violence” was 
apparently accepted without critique).Extrapolating from this trend, the journal feared 
the time would soon come when “juries might refuse to inflict any but light sentences 
upon the perpetrators of rather serious offences”, and that “in days not very distant it 
is conceivable that the record of the whole family will be investigated as well as that 
of the individual”, placing the final nail into the coffin of British legal tradition.479 
 
 
7.4 Against Ancient Doctrines: The Search for Stable Stigmata 
 
The Medical Press noted in 1889 that the increasing judicial sympathy towards those 
with “a taint of insanity” had resulted from a combination of the public’s growing 
aversion to the death penalty and the increasingly sound foundations upon which 
modern psychiatry stood. To this end, they wrote, Charles Scott, “a Scotch Advocate 
of eminence”, had published an important piece on criminal insanity in Scotland for 
the Juridical Review that was destined to further integrate the medical and legal 
theories of insanity.480 Scott’s article was in fact nothing special, covering well 
trodden paths in punitive theory by attempting to synthesise the assumptions of 
Classical School with new theories of mind (several substantially similar pieces could 
be selected from the same journal in the surrounding years), though it was perhaps the 
extent to which he endorsed the legitimising power of psychiatry in service of social 
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defence that caught his medical audience’s attention. In his article, Scott reproduced 
the usual polemics against the magisterial theology that viewed the criminal as a 
“wilful rebel against the Almighty”, denouncing at the same time “the high-flown 
metaphysics of Kant and Fichte” that presented “the will as a kind of omnipotent and 
independent entity within the mind, which could act with absolute freedom, and 
independent of causes.” Indeed, Scott continued, any Hegelian belief in the moral 
propriety of punishment as the “restoration of justice” was to assume “free-will”, a 
problematically spiteful notion that was always “mixed with [the] question of 
revenge.” This prevailing philosophy of German Idealism had, Scott contended, lent 
support to the judicial notions of responsibility – notions that belonged “to the age of 
Kant’s Categorical Imperative; the mystic voice inside of man, issuing infallible 
moral commands.” 
 
 For Scott, the fact that questions of private immorality were largely ignored in 
courts of law demonstrated that “it is not revenge which the modern penal law is 
really seeking, but another and much more justifiable purpose – that of prevention.”481 
In this way reformist lawyers like Scott argued that punishment (and by extension the 
law itself) was not a moral system at all, but a consensus grounded in “the defence of 
society.” Five years later in the same journal Clouston followed Scott in arguing that 
“the law does not judge the rightness or wrongness of moral conduct. It merely makes 
penal certain kinds of conduct that are inconsistent with the well-being of social 
order.” To the extent that morals were metaphors for social regulation, he continued, 
the opposition between rights and wrongs was chimerical insofar as these were “brain 
qualities as well as moral qualities” existing on a continuum, and the law should 
therefore “take the pathological facts into consideration in awarding its punishments.” 
In this way, penal reformers like Scott and psychiatrists like Clouston argued that the 
regulation of conduct in the modern age required the citizenry to believe that the law 
was an enlightened master, and by eliminating psychiatry from their enquiries judges 
were perpetuating an “administration of the law [that did not] promote social 
order.”482 It was then to psychiatrists that lawyers would turn when they wanted to 
underwrite their theory of law by placing the act of punishment within the: 
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same category as the serpent which has been trod upon, or the savage who has been assaulted, and 
assumes at once the safety of society and self-defence as the sole object of this infliction of 
punishment. [We] punish the man for the same reason as the dog, [because] general safety imperatively 
requires it, without concerning ourselves the least in this world with the existence or non-existence of 
free-will.483 
 
This use of the ‘rabid dog’ as a metaphor for the criminal was almost certainly a 
swipe at James Hutchinson Stirling, the notorious Scottish Hegelian whose 1865 work 
The Secret of Hegel was so opaque that it provoked a popular witticism holding that 
“if Mr Hutchinson Stirling knew the secret of Hegel he had managed to keep it to 
himself.”484 In a paper on Hegel’s Philosophy of Right delivered at the Juridical 
Society of Edinburgh in 1871 Hutchinson Stirling had denounced the members of the 
Classical School present in the audience for supporting the ideas Bentham and 
Beccaria, ideas that would, “as Hegel points out . . . resemble the lifting of a stick to a 
dog while [refusing to] respect man as a free being [and] treating him as a dangerous 
animal that must be kept under.”485 Such presumptions, Scott observed, had begun “to 
crumble beneath everyday observations and scientific inductions” shown by “the great 
Italian jurist [Lombroso] in the clearest light” and revealing that habitual crime not 
only bypassed the will, but was “often indicated by the very features and form of the 
criminal”, with “crime and lunacy often [arising from] the same causes” and 
perpetuating themselves in a procession of degeneration “till the race becomes 
eliminated.”486  
 
As ever, it was drunkenness that showed up as a particular area of concern, 
demonstrating that the law of Scotland continued to rely on the same language of will 
rather than the language of social defence. Rather than considering the criminal as an 
individual capable of self-reflection, Scott argued, jurists ought to consider the 
degenerate family as a “continuous individual, of which the several members are 
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merely organs; and the state of mind which is under investigation is simply one stage 
in the progress of a disease which has begun generations back, and which may run for 
generations to come.”487 This was especially the case of alcoholic degeneration, 
where “the passion for drink is not always transmitted under this form [of 
dipsomania] to descendants, but . . . degenerates into madness, idiocy, hallucinations. 
In the same way the madness of ascendants becomes alcoholism in descendants” 
(though, following Lombroso and Ribot, Scott did not identify crime with madness). 
In punishing and releasing the drunkard as a wilful law breaker the courts therefore 
failed simultaneously to do justice to the individual (who was merely acting out the 
fate of bad heredity) and to protect the race from the danger of the criminal’s 
dipsomania “replaced in a succeeding generation by suicide or murder.”488  
 
Similarly, when in 1897 the hygienist John Francis Sutherland (who was then 
Senior Deputy Commissioner in Lunacy for Scotland) came to review The Abolition 
of Punishment by Julius Vargna, Professor in Justice at the University of Graz, he 
noted that in Scotland, as in England, there had been little real engagement with the 
series of problems raised by Continental discussions of forensic psychiatry, and “with 
the exception of papers read by Dr Clouston and myself at the meeting of the British 
Association in Edinburgh in 1892 . . . and the papers published by Mr. Charles Scott, 
Advocate, in the Juridical Review on insanity in relation to crime”, there had been no 
systematic British attempt to uncover what was “valuable and lasting in the 
propositions ably and persistently put forward by the German, French, and Italian 
schools of thinkers and observers.” These Continental Schools of jurisprudence had, 
wrote Sutherland, united the professionals managing deviancy – “jurists, legal and 
medical penologists, alienists, prison administrators, social reformers, and to all who 
have at heart the well-being of the State, and of the individual” – though he 
considered that there were good “statistical, economical, and penological” reasons for 
the “apparent lack of interest in the ‘criminal man,’ and his destiny” in Scotland, a 
nation where “the alcoholic aggressor” rather than the slighted lover turned 
premeditated poisoner provided the dominant criminological trope.489 Indeed, the 
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1895 Departmental Committee on Habitual Offenders, Vagrants, Beggars, Inebriates, 
and Juvenile Delinquents had revealed that, if contraventions of local police 
regulations were removed from the statistics of Scottish crime, between 90 to 95 % of 
all crime appearing before police magistrates was directly or indirectly the result of 
intoxication.490 
 
In the same year (1897) Sutherland raised similar concerns when he attended a 
panel of lawyers and psychiatrists convened to discuss developments in ‘State 
Medicine’ at the BMA meeting in Edinburgh. The data on crime in Scotland showed 
that the nation saw an average of nearly five hundred serious offences a year without 
a single notable case of injustice through judicial failure to apply the lunacy laws. 
There had, on the other hand, been countless cases where, as Sutherland put it, “gross 
injustice had been done to [criminals] who through intoxication, were insane at the 
time the crime was committed”, a fact suggesting that any reforms to the lunacy laws 
were not required in regard to “the deluded man, but with regard to the intoxicated 
man who committed crime of which he had no consciousness that it should have taken 
place.” Intoxication, Sutherland continued, “was insanity of the purest kind, and yet 
the law did not recognise that intoxication per se was insanity.”491  
 
Sutherland was one of Scotland’s most vocal campaigners for legal change in 
relation to psychiatric evidence, and in 1898 he returned to this subject within the 
pages of the Juridical Review, arguing that “homicides with motive, or with 
premeditation” were all but unknown in Scotland. While these data suggested the 
increasingly elaborate theories of the criminal produced on the Continent were largely 
useless when applied to Scotland, he advised his audience of lawyers to demand from 
judges a change in the laws so that “the pathological condition present during sobriety 
as well as ebriety be made the subject of enquiry at the trial, as well as questions of 
the heredity of insanity or of inebriety.”492 Furthermore, while intricate profiling of 
criminal types might have been unnecessary in a country where alcohol was so 
overwhelmingly to blame for crime, he could not rule out the theory that drunkards 
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were suffering from “an inherited neurosis, which in some instances may be 
considered as the finger-post pointing to the asylum, in others to the reformatory and 
the jail”, and that on the basis of this new scientific understanding of conduct, along 
“with the march of human thought and progress, all desire for revenge on the part of 
society for the breaking of its laws should cease.”493 As we saw in the previous 
chapter, this rejection of evidence surrounding the cravings of inebriates was central 
to the antagonisms between doctors and judges in Scottish court cases, but for 
Sutherland it was more generally a problem for the two models of law that prevailed 
in Scotland. On the one hand, the Historical School had based its theory of 
punishment on the “certainty of an absence of latent or patent physical and mental 
degeneration”, while on the other the Classical School, assured of the deterring effects 
of punishment, had shown “ignorance of the psychology of the drunkard and of 
questions immediately associated with it inseparable from his psychological state, 
such as heredity, habit, and disease”, factors that made the criminal incapable of 
responding to threats.494 
 
Legal publications initially responded positively to this new method of 
presenting evidence. For example, the Journal of Jurisprudence noted in 1876 that 
while psychiatrists had formerly displayed an unfortunate tendency to group a mass of 
different conditions under a single heading, this practice was notably diminished and 
“in the more advanced books we are now rid of such useless headings, we can see the 
importance of the change in conception when we turn to such books as Krafft-Ebing’s 
recent work.”495 However, the tension between monomania and degeneration, or 
rather the realisation that the two approaches to insanity were essentially identical, 
haunted forensic psychiatry during the late nineteenth century, with the parallel 
admitted even by those who set out to challenge it. Indeed, the curious element of 
these social defence school polemics is that, almost without exception, the texts 
undermined themselves by admitting that the psychiatric evidence upon which the 
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whole endeavour was founded lacked practical support and offered no immediate 
remedy to the problem of measuring responsibility.  
 
Thus, while these theorists suggested that the methods psychiatric researchers 
contained the embryonic form of future scientific tests, they were obliged to treat such 
science on faith as an hypothesis awaiting future confirmation (a position that was of 
course little different from that of the judges they attacked). In the absence of such a 
test, advocates of social defence philosophy were pushed into an acceptance of 
inferential methods close to those invoked in former cases of monomania as 
practically the only way to determine the responsibility of the criminal. If the binary 
test of responsibility enshrined in law could only be removed in the presence of a 
method capable of addressing the degree of responsibility, no suitable method was 
forthcoming, a fact which seemed to both point toward and to preclude psychiatry: 
while psychiatry presented itself as the most likely candidate for a specialism capable 
of determining the capacity of the mind, it was also clear that no such precision 
measurement fell within the capabilities of psychiatrists. Forensic psychiatrists were 
therefore forced to concede that the notion of a ‘border-land’ of insanity could not be 
applied in courts in light of the fact that it was “wellnigh impossible for psychiatry to 
solve so knotty a problem” as the specific degree of mental responsibility, 
necessitating some alternative test to preserve justice from “the spectacle in courts of 
law of hearing the diagnosis of moral insanity made in the case of a prisoner who is 
perfectly sane on all other subjects” save for the commission of the acts libelled.496  
 
Following this logic, Charles Scott was convinced that while the psychiatric 
and criminological programme outlined by the Florentine School or the experimental 
psychology pioneered by Wilhelm Wundt would hold the key to a future scientific 
test of criminal responsibility, until such methods were perfected legal theorists would 
have to rely on the older method of inferring irresponsibility whenever the acts 
examined “have little of no reference to any profit or pleasure to be got by the 
transgressor, excepting, perhaps, that of the commission itself.” As an example he 
noted: 
 
                                                 
496 Oppenheimer, Ibid., p.205. 
 227 
 the case of the Scottish clergyman who was found to be a kleptomaniac, and in whose manse a perfect 
magazine of old rotting tarts and odd and broken crockery was found. It has by some biologists been 
referred to what is called Reversion, but it bears a very striking resemblance to some vice beginning in 
the habits of ancestors, coming in time to operate like instinct without any conscious purpose, and yet, 




A similar pattern was present in John Hutton Balfour Browne’s Medical 
Jurisprudence of Insanity, a work first issued in response to Sir James Fitzjames 
Stephen’s call before Parliament for the introduction of a general code capable of 
reducing complex legal issues to a simple series of propositions while illustrating 
these principles with a list of cases.498  In attempting to meet the criteria Stephen had 
set, Browne wrote from a diluted Benthamite perspective according to which the 
State’s role in punishing its citizens was to serve as what he called “the motive 
administrator” of the people, forever adjusting the balance of pleasures and pains in 
order to maintain the social equilibrium.499 The main problem in reference to this 
equilibrium was whether or not jurists ought to recognise motiveless crime as a 
special category of medical defence (‘moral insanity’). The evidence for the existence 
of such an illness, beyond the fact that medical writers commonly testified to its 
existence, was, as we have seen, chiefly the cases in which a criminal act seemed to 
lack any motive or was accompanied by a “depraved impulse.” However, Browne 
noted, the existence of these impulses was generally accompanied by a “hereditary 
tendency” toward crime, an independent medical fact that was capable of 
“withdrawing certain acts from the influence of will” and giving them an “apparently 
motiveless character”.500  
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There was a consistent overlap between psychiatry and the law here, with 
figures from both camps arguing that the theory of punishment held by judges was 
philosophically unfounded and ignored scientific fact while accepting that the only 
practical access to insanity was to circumvent scientific evidence (histology, 
psychology, heredity) and focus solely on the nature of the act itself.  We see this 
same phenomenon spread across the world of forensic psychiatry and social defence 
philosophy during this period, and in the same year that Scott published this article, 
Charles Féré’s Pathology of Emotions had appeared in translation, outlining an almost 
identical argument from the psychiatric side. Féré, one of France’s leading 
neurologists, set out the familiar social defence argument by complaining that: 
 
the basis of penal right reposes on the doctrine of free choice which has not itself any scientific 
foundation and which is contrary to what physiology teaches us. The penal law admits two categories 
of individuals, the one responsible, the other irresponsible. This distinction is not founded on any 
scientific argument: desire, passion, impulsion, virtue, vice, madness, are allied to organic conditions 
betwixt which science can only establish degrees of intensity.  
 
From this denunciation of legal metaphysics, he proceeded instantly to the admission 
that “categories of responsibles, demi-responsibles, [and] irresponsibility” were 
similarly inaccessible to psychiatry and its allied discourses, with neither the “works 
of anthropology referring to criminality” nor the post-mortem study of the 
“morphology of organs” allowing for the problem of legal responsibility to be 
adequately settled.  
 
Thus, while Féré believed that the facts of modern psychiatry had rendered the 
legal understanding of responsibility obsolete, and while he wished to see accepted as 
the foundation of justice the maxim that “the sole principle of the law can only be the 
right of social defence”, there was something contradictory in his approach, for social 
defence could not be grounded in the very psychiatry that had made its necessity 
manifest, but had to be guided instead by the simple assumption that “Every criminal 
act results from the ignorance of reasonable motives of action.”501 This psycho-legal 
insistence on the necessity of inferring insanity from want of motive seemed, of 
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course, to refer back to monomania, the hallmark of an ‘unscientific’ age of alienism 
in which doctors and judges were grasping at metaphysical straws even when they 
confirmed the existence of insanity. Thus, a second principle was more or less always 
to be found somewhere alongside this defence of inferential methods in forensic 
psychiatry: the pinning of motiveless acts to the physically and mentally degenerate 
condition. As Féré noted apropos of his description of “systematic emotivities”, while 
the logic he employed “may appear a return to the ancient doctrine of monomania”, it 
was in fact entirely different, since these psychological manifestations were not the 
only evidence of defect, but were generally found in “degenerates, neurasthenics, or 
subjects debilitated by a general malady.”502  
 
An identical tension can be observed in Shobal Vail Clevenger’s seminal two-
volume Forensic Psychiatry (1898), where these same tensions were brought into 
even sharper focus than in the writings of Scott or Féré.503 Clevenger (1843 – 1920), a 
noted psychiatrist and sexologist who was for a long time the Associate Editor of the 
journal Alienist and Neurologist, planned his work on forensic psychiatry as a 
systematic updating of medico-legal theory. Indeed, this manual was, he claimed, the 
first synoptic presentation of forensic psychiatry to have been produced by an 
Anglophone writer for 60 years (since Isaac Ray’s 1838 Treatise on the Medical 
Jurisprudence of Insanity), a redress particularly needful following the then recent 
(1892) appearance in translation of Krafft-Ebing’s Psycopathia Sexualis. In seeking to 
bring the ideas of French and German authors to an English speaking audience, 
Clevenger planned his work around the subject of degeneration, which not only 
served as one of his twelve principal categories of insanity, but was used to structure 
his account from beginning to end with a second volume dedicated exclusively to the 
subject. Given this overt insistence on the significance of degeneration as a scientific 
grounds for psychiatric theory, one would expect Clevenger’s discussion of the 
relationship between the manias of the past and the degenerations of the present to 
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capture the rhetorical essence of this new psychiatric project. However, when he came 
to consider a category of crime like kleptomania, he was merely puzzled by fact that 
the “older writers” on forensics did not mention it, and that this ubiquitous medico-
legal species was “not recorded as an obsession until the appearance of more recent 
and accurate text-books on insanity.” As we have seen, the sudden ‘appearance’ of 
these new manias was a result of the restructuring of psychiatric theory around this 
time, creating a theoretical niche for insanities that were not merely manifest 
symptoms, but the underlying degeneration that had given rise to them (a form of 
argument closely following Magnan’s notion of syndromata).  
 
For Clevenger it was quite explicitly the insistence upon “moral mania” in 
older works of medical jurisprudence had served to make them outdated, with the 
conditions older writers had described as a ‘disease’ being reclassified merely the 
symptom of a multitude of other derangements. Clevenger’s approach here was clearly 
very close to that of Garnier and Colin (see chapter four), and indeed he went on to 
note that the sole justification for preserving the older language of homicidal mania 
was found in the class of degenerates that had been labelled ‘cerebral neurasthenics’ 
(“those who suffer from impulsive obsessions”) described in Garnier’s Folie à Paris 
as “the variety of impulse sometimes called homicidal monomania as a syndrome 
(collection of symptoms) ‘directly connected with hereditary moral degeneration, and 
essentially characterized by the desire to murder, without any intellectual disorder or 
passion.’”504  
 
It was then the stability of the underlying degenerate condition that 
distinguished it from the older notion of moral insanity, and where before the 
‘discovery’ of degeneration doctors had merely been struck by the existence of certain 
inexplicable acts in isolation, modern forensic examiners could point to the 
persistence of “nervous and mental debasement of degeneracy [and] physical stigmata 
with which it is so frequently associated”, signs that endured after the “maniacal, 
melancholic, or other insanity” had passed. It was in reference to the stability of these 
signs alone that psychiatrists were justified in explaining the seemingly inexplicable – 
whether in crimes of extreme brutality or bafflingg triviality – that psychiatrists were 
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able to isolate the true degenerate in the courtroom and “to distinguish apparent 
recovery from actual recovery” in the asylum.505 On this basis, Clevenger advised 
psychiatrists to resist “grouping individuals as degenerates, or [using] the word 
‘degeneracy’ as a pathological expression” to encompass “too many diverse 
conditions such as epilepsy, senility, organic brain disease or trauma”, conditions that 
were certainly “suggestive of a degenerate tendency”, though they lacked the 
“permanency in all cases that would be implied by the word ‘degenerate’ or 
‘degeneracy’”, and while the utility of the term was suggested by its widespread 
acceptance, for “medico-legal purposes its boundaries must be plainly, if arbitrarily, 
marked.”506 
 
Again, it was the M’Naughten Rules that served as the main target of this 
argument, and Clevenger argued that the “species found in Krafft-Ebing may know 
the distinction between right and wrong, but their responsibility is not thereby proved 
. . . Nothing short of being able to put one’s self in the place of the degenerate, 
mentally and otherwise, would enable one to form judgements as to what acts were 
insane and what sane, if any.” Hence, Clevenger advised, the court should dispense 
with any rigid test of responsibility and adopt a form of case-based reasoning in which 
psychiatric evidence of degeneracy was central to sentencing.507 This new medico-
legal reality was most clearly encountered in dipsomania, and since the 1870s lawyers 
had begun to recognise that an adequate definition of insanity must include “the 
diseased states caused by alcoholism and the modern doctrine that the addiction itself 
is often a disease”, a recognition necessitating “the revision of older methods of 
dealing with inebriates and holding them to a too rigid accountability.” It was in 
connection with this type of semi-responsibility, he noted, that “Degeneration as a 
special department of psychiatry has received a great amount of attention by French 
alienists, and the results of their researches are of immense value to both physicians 
and lawyers.”508 Similarly Edward Cox Mann had noted in 1893 that “the known facts 
of science, and the current facts respecting the disease of inebriety” demonstrated that 
the inebriate criminal was suffering from “an inherited neuropathic condition, an 
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abnormal state of the nutrition and circulation of the brain and nerve centres . . . all 
the signs and symptoms of an abnormal condition of the centric nervous system 
demanding stimulants which constitutes the disease – inebriety.”509 
 
Support for the established tests of criminal responsibility did not however 
come only from High Court Judges and those theorists committed to the Historical 
and Metaphysical Schools of jurisprudence. There were those who lauded the 
elasticity of M’Naughten as a characteristically British refusal to reduce 
commonsense to dogma, as one student argued in a 1921 thesis claiming that the 
open-ended nature of British legal practice had allowed the same guidelines to endure 
for nearly a century, permitting such notions as “irresistible impulse to fall under its 
definition of ‘knowledge’” without submitting this to formal definition (the irony of 
course is that at True’s trial the following year the High Court explicitly reject this 
claim). Nonetheless, the author of this thesis believed that the British were right to be  
suspicious of the French ‘discovery’ of semi-responsibility, according to which the 
“the mattoids and eccentrics, the psychoneurotics, the victims of hysteria . . . the 
senile, the degenerate, and those who on account of accident or illness, are imagined 
to be prone to commit criminal acts.” Thus, while it had “been urged in this country 
and in France (by the representatives of the neo-classical school) that such individuals 
should never incur full responsibility for their actions”, the French notion of demi-
fous (or its Scottish counterpart notion of diminished responsibility) was seen as a 
“meaningless concept”: one was either insane or not.510 
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This thesis has explored the ways in which hereditary degeneration was discussed by 
Scottish psychiatrists and public health officials in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries by focusing on the anti-alcohol movement. It has examined the 
theoretical writings of both clinical and forensic psychiatry to show how the theory of 
degeneration was taken up in relation to four key medico-psychiatric questions: 
Prophylaxis and public hygiene; the relationship between moral, intellectual, and 
physical degeneration; the search for laws of heredity; and the place of psychiatry 
within the modern state. Taken at its most general level, the thesis has attempted to 
explain the reception, transformation, and diffusion of notions of heredity and 
degeneration in terms of the two most fundamental problems faced by psychiatry in 
the second half of the nineteenth century. First, there was the problem of psychiatry’s 
taxonomical systems, which were already dated with respect to general medicine 
when they were initially proposed in the early nineteenth century. It is common 
knowledge that the first generation of psychiatrists – figures like Pinel and Tuke who 
had presided over the rise of the therapeutic asylum – drew on a system of disease 
classification that was simply incapable of replicating the diagnostic specificity of the 
emergent scientific medicine. I showed in the early chapters of this thesis how 
psychiatrists in Scotland were plagued by this problem throughout the nineteenth 
century: Constantly obliged to offer some new taxonomy of disease, novel 
nomenclature, or simply accept that the somatic basis of mental disease was an 
inference that could not be demonstrated in day to day asylum practice, psychiatrists 
were acutely aware that their knowledge of mental illness did not conform to the 
epistemological strictures of general medicine.  
 
Of course this need not have presented a problem; as many psychiatrists 
observed, their subject was a skilled craft that could not be reduced to words. Yet, at 
the same time, many psychiatrists asked why it was necessary for the keeper of an 
asylum to be a medical officer. Was the knowledge they produced in this unique 
space more broadly applicable to society and could their classifications be used 
outside the asylum? Was their knowledge scientific in nature, or was their interest and 
training in medical science incidental to the routines of asylum life? It was the attempt 
to negotiate questions like these that accounted for degeneration theory’s steady rise 
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from the 1860s onwards. I have shown throughout this thesis that psychiatrists were 
themselves conscious of these problems, and how, in their discussions of 
degeneration, they made direct reference to these professional questions and 
challenges. Returning to the opening lines of this thesis, we can see why the changing 
prerogatives of psychiatry in the 1860s became so important. From the mid 1860s 
onwards members of the learned profession would no longer be known as ‘Medical 
Officers of Asylums’ but members of the ‘Medico-Psychological Association’, a 
change explicitly intended to impress upon the public that psychiatry was not only a 
matter of governing asylums, but that the asylum was a site for the creation and 
dissemination of scientific knowledge concerning the mind. This knowledge, 
psychiatrists argued, was applicable to the normal and abnormal alike, and an 
increased focus on the “laws of heredité” would underwrite the truth of their claims. 
In this sense I showed that while hereditarianism and degenerationist thinking were 
not exactly the same thing, there were clear parallels in the attempt to ‘ground’ 
knowledge in some certain principle. As one student put it in a thesis submitted in 
1865, knowledge of the “Hereditary laws” would provide the “key to medicine as 
Newton had provided the key to physics with his laws of gravitation”, and that the 
steady advance in knowledge of these unseen laws would show doctors the value of a 
“Prophylactic in preference to a curative process of treatment.”511 
 
The argument of this thesis has therefore traced a rather singular story, rooted 
in the institutional peculiarities of Scotland, showing how psychiatrists attempted to 
use the problem of degeneration to mould their science into a branch of public health. 
However, as I have indicated throughout, these national debates were always situated 
in a wider discussion covering psychiatry and degeneration in Europe and America 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Indeed, it is in chapters six 
and seven – chapters devoted to Scotland’s unique legal and judicial culture in the late 
nineteenth century – that these connections are brought into the clearest light. I began 
in chapter two by outlining the major work in history and philosophy of science to 
have addressed the gradual emergence of heredity as an object of scientific discourse 
in the nineteenth century. Chapter three took up this theme with a detailed focus on 
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the work of Morel, the originator of degeneration theory in French psychiatry. I 
showed how Morel, Falret, and their colleagues proposed a taxonomy that was, in its 
promise to hold all known states of insanity under the single diagnostic heading of 
degeneracy, at once much broader and much narrower than previous systems. 
Although heredity was proclaimed to be the chief vector of degeneration in Morel’s 
work, I argued that his turn to degeneration theory stemmed more from a desire to 
show that mental illness could be brought within the framework of popular science at 
the level of aetiology, even if the symptoms with which psychiatry dealt could not be 
clearly distinguished from one another at the level of nosology. Furthermore, I 
showed how alcohol was taken as a central problem in degeneration from the outset, 
and why investigations into the effects of alcohol on the race were one of the most 
important scientific testing grounds for the theory. This was particularly the case with 
the section discussing the career of Valentin Magnan, where we saw alcohol and 
heredity take centre stage in the theory of degeneration.  
 
 Chapter four began by addressing the early reception of degeneration theory 
in Britain, showing how discussions of the dangerous classes, inveterate drunkards, 
and career criminals had begun to coalesce around the notion of a single underlying 
pathology in the decades prior to Morel’s treatise. I also showed how, quite apart from 
this broader social debate, the language of degeneration allowed doctors to address 
questions of individual bodily imbalance and the environmental conditions of disease 
with a theory that could simultaneously be applied to a medical framework 
emphasising isolated and specific pathological agents (a focus which found its 
clearest expression in the work of Lister and Pasteur). In this way the notion of 
degeneration was incredibly resilient to changing scientific models and allowed texts 
in European medicine and psychiatry to cross borders much more readily than they 
would otherwise have been able to. Indeed, it is of particular significance that 
Magnan’s writings on alcoholic degeneration were able to elicit such interest from 
those British doctors who continued to dispute his theory that heredity was the 
ultimate cause of degeneration.  
 
In chapter five I moved on to consider in detail the writings of Sir Thomas 
Clouston, Scotland’s most famous psychiatrist. Here Clouston was used as a means of 
introducing three prominent topics in a British context. First, I looked at his early, 
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clinical writings, in which degeneration was appealed to as a means of distinguishing 
between simple pathological conditions – conditions of absolute insanity that 
unquestionably fell within the domain of psychiatry – and the more interesting species 
of semi-insanity that would allow psychiatrists to demonstrate their knowledge of 
pathological cause. Here I showed how Clouston’s work found parallels in the 
writings of Continental psychiatrists who were similarly attempting to move 
psychiatry away from the shadow the early nineteenth-century taxonomies. I then 
moved on to consider Clouston’s early participation in the development of a pan-
European criminal anthropology, explaining how this nascent field allowed 
psychiatrists to install themselves as scientific examiners of the long established links 
between idlers, vagrants, drunkards, and criminals, particularly through their 
understanding of the ‘pathological nexus’ that was heredity. Finally, I showed how 
the desire to reform psychiatry’s relations with the law was behind both of these 
strategies in Clouston’s career: breaking with monomania served to indicate that the 
species of insanity the law recognised were outdated and represented moral, rather 
than scientific categorisations of conduct, while at the same time, through the 
emphasis on the pathological nexus of heredity, psychiatrists were able to suggest that 
their science might be useful in treating crime before it reached the courts.  Thus, as 
moral insanity (a condition of absolute insanity rendering the sufferer utterly 
irresponsible) was removed from psychiatry, it was replaced with a notion of insane 
morality, a state in which the powers of control holding the normal citizen back from 
the brink of savagery were lost.  
 
 The second half of the thesis explored the historical interaction between 
science and the law by focusing on the role of forensic psychiatry in late nineteenth- 
and early twentieth-century Scottish High Court trials at which psychiatrists were 
called to give evidence. I also considered the texts of forensic psychiatry and the 
reception of psychiatric ideas in the field of legal commentary as a means of 
contextualising and clarifying these specific medico-legal interactions. The 
examination of court cases demonstrated that, from the 1860s to the end of the 
nineteenth century, psychiatrists were treated by the law as experts whose power was 
largely confined to confirming the presence of a legally recognised form of insanity, 
usually one manifest in the absence of discernible motive. While this situation 
generated a well documented anti-legal rhetoric among members of the Medico-
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Psychological Association, I showed how psychiatry organised a far more interesting 
response to their legal impotence. This response consisted in publicising the notion, at 
first during the Quarterly Meetings of the MPA and later in the general press, that the 
law tended to treat criminals with too great a degree of leniency and that this leniency 
was the product of an outmoded and unscientific definition of insanity. Thus, 
psychiatrists argued, the judicial rejection of their science presented a grave danger to 
the public, for the law would fail to adequately punish the deeds of petty criminals 
who secretly harboured the seeds of degeneracy. This second move was of course a 
symbolic inversion of the old image of the mad doctor as one who sought to excuse 
any crime as insanity. It was, psychiatrists began to contend, the courts who were 
excusing too many dangerous criminals, and they were excusing them precisely 
because they failed to see the signs of grave danger embedded in the smallest criminal 
acts. In this way I showed how a quite precise and well defined set of documents, 
namely the trial transcripts of High Court cases where psychiatric witnesses were 
called to give evidence, can help illuminate a far more general historical question 
concerning the rise of psychiatric interest in criminal anthropology and degeneracy 
during the late nineteenth century. Furthermore, I showed how these ideas engage 
with hugely important historical developments in the Scottish legal system, not least 
the development of diminished responsibility.   
 
The contribution made by psychiatric medicine to new notions of 
responsibility in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries seems then to be a 
very important yet scarcely understood phenomenon. Firstly, the theories of conduct 
psychiatry produced seemed to mesh with the social defence model developed around 
the same time by legal theorists. The underlying assumptions of this social defence 
school, exemplified by the freie Rechtsfindung movement in Germany, the work of 
Saleilles and Laurent in France, Lombroso and Ferri in Italy, and an amorphous 
though vocal contingent of lawyers in Britain, represented a break with the rational 
choice model of the Classical School of Penal Jurisprudence expounded by Bentham 
and Beccaria a century earlier. The arguments of the social defence school were 
shown to stand in an interesting relationship to debates taking place in Scottish 
psychiatry, particularly the notion that punishment could only be justified insofar as it 
minimised social risk. Furthermore, this group of theorists emphasised the criminal’s 
discontinuity with the normal citizen, thereby rejecting the Classical School’s 
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suggestion that crime was a conscious and rationally calculated response to 
opportunity (this latter assumption had, of course, much in common with the 
discourse on degeneration). Throughout Europe the debate over the shape of future 
legislation often referred to the insanity laws as a prominent test case. Since the law 
deals with responsibility, legal theorists asked, was this state of responsibility to be 
understood as a scientific fact or legal definition? In addressing this question some 
disregarded psychiatry outright, pointing out that it had no reliable test of insanity or 
means of measuring responsibility (a point which psychiatrists were themselves 
obliged to concede). Others saw psychiatry as a crucial frame for theorising legal 
responsibility and looked to this thoroughly progressive science of the mind as an 
important means of theorising the ‘man of the future’. Thus, toward the end of the 
nineteenth century, legal reformers began to draw upon and influence the debates that 
medical polemicists and psychiatrists had been developing since the 1860s.  
 
While the reinvention of psychiatry as a branch of public health occurred in a 
number of European nations, and was well established in countries that had developed 
medical education in line with the principles of the Absolutist state, its British origins 
seemed to follow from Chadwick’s promotion of “social prophylaxis”, an early 
nineteenth-century notion that came to maturity in the last third of the century.512 Yet, 
in chapter seven, I indicated how there was again a distinctly Scottish turn in these 
debates, signified by the opposition between those legal theorists who wished to 
maintain the common law tradition and those who wished to codify the laws of 
Scotland according to the new social defence school. This was, I argued, broadly a 
division between those who wished to preserve Scotland’s legal autonomy from 
England and those who associated greater union with progress. This explains the 
steady stream of articles which appeared in the Scottish legal press during the late 
nineteenth century discussing the state of psychiatric knowledge and its viability in 
underwriting new notions of responsibility, not to mention the changing rhetoric of 
psychiatrists who themselves submitted articles to the legal press arguing that their 
knowledge was key to producing a new scientifically credible system of laws.  
 
                                                 
512 Chadwick, London Review, ‘Preventive Police’ 1829, 1: 252-308 
 239 
In short, this thesis may be summarised as an investigation of the two key 
transformations psychiatry sought to produce through its focus on degeneration, the 
first clinical, the second forensic: from peculiar insanity to insane peculiarity, and 
from moral insanity to insane morality. In the first transformation, the notion that 
insanity was a condition of inherent peculiarity was rejected – a notion which had 
guided psychiatrists since the early nineteenth century) – and in its place was put a 
developmentalist notion that tended to focus on degrees of control. Here insanity 
became a matter of quantity rather than quality; the insane citizen was not inherently 
different, he or she simply lacked the normal (and evolved) powers of self-restraint. In 
the second, forensic, transformation, the focus on moral insanity and monomania was 
abandoned – even as it came to be established as a legal criterion for assessing 
responsibility – and replaced with a notion of conduct that acknowledged insanity 
could coexist with intelligible motives if the signs of degeneration were present. 
Psychiatrists began to argue quite explicitly that asylums were filled with ‘the most 
sane of men’ and that no sharp boundary line separated sanity and insanity in any 
case. The notion of a pathological continuum therefore took on a double meaning, 
addressing both the popular journalistic sense of the continuum stretching from 
vagrancy and inebriety to social unrest and murder, and the continuum that traced a 
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